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Introduction
This thesis comprises four essays that belong to different strands of the theoretical economic
literature. Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 study competitions among heterogeneous agents. Chapter
1 investigates the effects of head starts in innovation contests in which firms invest over time
to find innovations. Chapter 2 studies how firms and managers pair up with each other when
firms play an imperfect competition in the same goods market. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 are
on optimal disclosure policies in contests. Chapter 3 models a contest as an all-pay auction
and studies whether a contest organizer should disclose the actual number of participating
bidders if each bidder’s participation is random. Chapter 4 considers whether an innovation
contest organizer, upon receiving a submission of an innovation, should reveal the information
of the submitted innovation in time. Chapter 1 and Chapter 3 are based on joint work with
Xiandeng Jiang and Dmitriy Knyazev. For this reason, I use the pronoun “we” in these
chapters, whereas I use “I” in Chapter 2 and Chapter 4.
Chapter 1 considers innovation contests among firms with heterogeneous starting positions.
This topic derives from some phenomena observed in the market. On one hand, many com-
panies, such as Nokia, that once “ruled the roost” of their respective industries got knocked
off by more innovative competitors and came crashing down. On the other hand, some com-
panies, such as Tesla, gave up patents for their technologies in early stages of their business.
What are the effects of head starts in innovation contests
Attempting to answer the this question, this chapter analyzes a two-firm winner-takes-all
contest in which there is a deadline and each firm decides when to stop a privately observed
search for innovations (with recall). The firm with a superior innovation at the outset has a
head start, and the firm with the most successful innovation at a common deadline wins. It
is found that a large head start guarantees a firm victory without incurring cost. However, In
contrast to what a naive person would expect, a medium-sized head start ensures defeat for
the firm if the deadline is sufficiently long. In the latter case, the competitor wins the entire
rent of the contest. A key insight is that when having a large head start a firm loses incentive
to innovate. Hence, a head start firm might want to get rid of its head start and commit to
innovate.
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Chapter 2 considers matchings between firms and managers. Firms compete in the goods
market. A firm’s production cost of the good depends on both this firm’s technology and the
human capital of the manager hired. However, if a manager is hired by one firm, this manager
cannot be hired by the other firms. Hence, a firm’s hiring decision has externalities on the
other firms’ profits and managers’ salaries.
In this chapter, I model the problem as a two-stage game: A first stage of simultaneous
1-to-1 matching and a second stage of Cournot competition among matched pairs. If firm
technology and human capital are complementary, it is rational for each firm-manager pair
to expect that the remaining agents will form a positive assortative matching (PAM), and
PAM on the whole market is a stable matching under rational expectations. Even if they are
substitutable yet the substitutive effect is relatively small, PAM is still stable. However, if
the goods market is sufficiently large, a negative assortative matching is stable. Social welfare
induced by matchings is discussed.
Chapter 3 considers information disclosure problem of a contest organizer. In many con-
tests, such as job promotions and patent races, each contestant has private information about
her valuation on the prize for winning and faces an uncertain number of competitors. The
organizer, although having no information on the values of the prize to the contestants, may
know the actual number of participating contestants. In such a case, to maximize the total
expected revenue, should the organizer commit to revealing or concealing the number of active
contestants?
This chapter models such a contest as an all-pay auction with stochastic entry. The contest
entails one prize and n potential bidders. Each bidder receives a signal about the value of the
prize and has a signal-dependent participation probability. All bidders bear a cost of bidding
that is an increasing function of their bids. It is shown that the contest organizer prefers
fully concealing (disclosing) the information about the number of participating bidders when
the cost functions are convex (concave). If bidders have independent and private values, this
result holds even if the probability of participating is endogenous. However, this result does
not hold when firms have heterogeneous participation probabilities.
Chapter 4 considers an information disclosure problem of an organizer when she is organiz-
ing a winner-takes-all dynamic contest to procure a valuable innovation. Contestants innovate
and submit innovations. Generally, submissions are made in the course of time but not at the
same time. Should the principal choose (1) to publish the information on a submission upon
receiving it or (2) to conceal the information until all contestants have made submissions?
I answer this question in a two-agent winner-takes-all contest in which each agent decides
when to stop a privately observed search for innovations. Each agent makes one-time sub-
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mission of her best discovery to the organizer. The contest ends when both submissions are
make, and the agent that submitted the best innovation wins. I find that the organizer prefers
revealing information on a submitted innovation upon receiving it to concealing it until the
end not only because the former policy elicits a higher expected revenue but also because it
is more efficient. Any hidden equal sharing rule is outcome equivalent to the winner-takes-all
contest with information concealment.
3
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Chapter 1
Head Starts and Doomed Losers:
Contest via Search
Introduction
“[U]nfortunately, for every Apple out there, there are a thousand other companies
. . . like Woolworth, Montgomery Ward, Borders Books, Blockbuster Video,
American Motors and Pan Am Airlines, that once ‘ruled the roost’ of their respec-
tive industries, to only get knocked off by more innovative competitors and come
crashing down.” (Forbes, January 8, 2014)
This chapter studies innovation contests, which are widely observed in a variety of indus-
tries. In many innovation contests, some firms have head starts: One firm has a more advanced
existing technology than its rivals at the outset of a competition. The opening excerpt address-
es a prominent phenomenon that is often observed in innovation contests: Companies with a
head start ultimately lose a competition in the long run. It seems that having a head start
sometimes results in being trapped. The failure of Nokia, the former global mobile communi-
cations giant, to compete with the rise of Apple’s iPhone is one example. James Surowiecki
(2013) pointed out that Nokia’s focus on (improving) hardware, its existing technology, and
neglect of (innovating) software contributed to the company’s downfall. In his point of view,
this was “a classic case of a company being enthralled (and, in a way, imprisoned) by its past
success” (New Yorker Times, September 3, 2013).
Motivated by these observations, we investigate the effects of head starts on firms’ com-
petition strategies and payoffs in innovation contests. Previous work on innovation contests
focuses on reduced form games and symmetric players, and previous work on contests with
head starts considers all-pay auctions with either sequential bidding or simultaneous bidding.
By contrast, we consider a stochastic contest model in which one firm has a superior existing
innovation at the outset of the contest and firms’ decisions are dynamic. The main contri-
bution of our study is the identification of the long-run effects of a head start. In particular,
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in a certain range of the head start value, the head start firm becomes the ultimate loser
in the long run and its competitor (or competitors) benefits greatly from its initial apparent
“disadvantage”. The key insight to the above phenomenon is that a large head start (e.g., a
patent) indicates a firm’s demise as an innovator.
Specifically, the model we develop in Section 1.1 entails two firms and one fixed prize. At
the beginning of the game, each firm may or may not have an initial innovation. Whether
a firm has an initial innovation, as well as the value of the initial innovation if this firm has
one, is common knowledge. If a firm conducts a search for innovations, it incurs a search
cost. As long as a firm continues searching, innovations arrive according to a Poisson process.
The value of each innovation is drawn independently from a fixed distribution. The search
activity and innovation process of each firm are privately observed. At any time point before a
common deadline, each firm decides whether to stop its search process. At the deadline, each
firm releases its most effective innovation to the public, and the one whose released innovation
is deemed superior wins the prize.
First, we consider equilibrium behavior in the benchmark case, in which no firm has any
innovation initially, in Section 1.2. We divide the deadline-cost space into three regions (as
in figure 1.1). For a given deadline, (1) if the search cost is relatively high, there are two
equilibria, in each of which one firm searches until it discovers an innovation and the other
firm does not search; (2) if the search cost is in the middle range, each firm searches until
it discovers an innovation; (3) if the search cost is relatively low, each firm searches until it
discovers an innovation with a value above a certain positive cut-off value. In the third case,
the equilibrium cut-off value strictly increases as the deadline extends and the arrival rate of
innovations increases, and it strictly decreases as the search cost increases.
We then extend the benchmark case to include a head start: The head start firm is
assigned a better initial innovation than its competitor, called the latecomer. Section 1.3
considers equilibrium behavior in the case with a head start and compares equilibrium payoffs
across firms, and Section 1.4 analyzes the effects of a head start on each firm’s equilibrium
payoff.
Firms’ equilibrium strategies depend on the value of the head starter’s initial innovation
(head start). Our main findings concern the case in which the head start lies in the middle
range. In this range, the head starter loses its incentive to search because of its high initial
position. The latecomer takes advantage of that and searches more actively, compared to
when there is no head start.
An immediate question is: who does the head start favor? When the deadline is short, the
latecomer does not have enough time to catch up, and thus the head starter obtains a higher
6
expected payoff than the latecomer does. When the deadline is long, the latecomer is highly
likely to obtain a superior innovation than the head starter, and thus the latecomer obtains
a higher expected payoff. In the latter case, the latecomer’s initial apparent “disadvantage”,
in fact, puts it in a more favorable position than the head starter. When the deadline is
sufficiently long, the head starter is doomed to lose the competition with a payoff of zero
because of its unwillingness to search, and all benefits of the head start goes to the latecomer.
Then, does the result that the latecomer is in a more favorable position than the head
starter when the deadline is long imply that the head start hurts the head starter and benefits
the latecomer in the long run? Focus on the case in which the latecomer does not have an
initial innovation. When the search cost is relatively low, the head start, in fact, always
benefits the head starter, but the benefit ceases as the deadline extends. It also benefits the
latecomer when the deadline is long. When the search cost is relatively high, the head start
could potentially hurt the head starter.
If the head start is large, neither firm will conduct a search, because the latecomer is
deterred from competition. In this scenario, no innovation or technological progress is created,
and the head starter wins the contest directly. If the head start is small, both firms play the
same equilibrium strategy as they do when neither firm has an initial innovation. In both
cases, the head start benefits the head starter and hurts the latecomer.
Section 1.5.1 extends our model to include stages at which the firms sequentially have an
option to discard their initial innovation before the contest starts. Suppose that both firms’
initial innovations are of values in the middle range and that the deadline is long. If the head
starter can take the first move in the game, it can increase its expected payoff by discarding its
initial innovation and committing to search. When search cost is low, by sacrificing the initial
innovation, the original head starter actually makes the competitor the new head starter; this
new head starter has no incentive to discard its initial innovation or to search any more. It is
possible that by discarding the head start, the original head starter may benefit both firms.
When search cost is high, discarding the initial innovation is a credible threat to the latecomer,
who will find the apparent leveling of the playing field discouraging to conducting a high-cost
search. As a result, the head starter suppresses the innovation progress.
In markets, some firms indeed give up head starts (Ulhøi, 2004), and our result provides
a partial explanation of this phenomenon. For example, Tesla gave up its patents for its
advanced technologies on electric vehicles at an early stage of its business.1 While there may
be many reasons for doing so, one significant reason is to maintain Tesla’s position as a leading
innovator in the electronic vehicle market.2 As Elon Musk (2014), the CEO of Tesla, wrote,
1Toyota also gave up patents for its hydrogen fuel cell vehicles at an early stage.
2Another reason is to help the market grow faster by the diffusion of its technologies. A larger market
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technology leadership is not defined by patents, which history has repeatedly shown
to be small protection indeed against a determined competitor, but rather by the
ability of a company to attract and motivate the world’s most talented engineers.3
Whilst Tesla keeps innovating to win a large share of the future market, its smaller competi-
tors have less incentive to innovate since they can directly adopt Tesla’s technologies. One
conjecture which coincides with our result is that “Tesla might be planning to distinguish
itself from the competitors it helps . . . by inventing and patenting better electric cars than
are available today” (Discovery Newsletter, June 13, 2014).
Section 1.5.2 considers intermediate information disclosure. Suppose the firms are required
to reveal their discoveries at an early time point after the starting of the contest, how would
firms compete against each other? If the head start is in the middle range, before the revelation
point, the head starter will conduct a search, whereas the latecomer will not. If the head
starter obtains a very good innovation before that point, the latecomer will be deterred from
competition. Otherwise, the head starter is still almost certain to lose the competition. Hence,
such an information revelation at an early time point increases both the expected payoff to
the head starter and the expected value of the winning innovation.
Section 1.6 compares the effects of a head start to those of a cost advantage and points out
a significant difference. A cost advantage reliably encourages a firm to search more actively
for innovations, whereas it discourages the firm’s competitor.
Section 1.7 concludes this chapter. The overarching message this chapter conveys is that
a market regulator who cares about long-run competitions in markets may not need to worry
too much about the power of the current market dominating firms if these firms are not in
excessively high positions. In the long run, these firms are to be defeated by latecomers. On
the other hand, if the dominating firms are in excessively high positions, which deters entry,
a regulator can intervene the market.
Literature
There is a large literature on innovation contests. Most work considers reduced form models
(Fullerton and McAfee, 1999; Moldovanu and Sela, 2001; Baye and Hoppe, 2003; Che and Gale,
2003).4 Head starts are studied in various forms of all-pay auctions. Leininger (1991), Konrad
(2002), and Konrad and Leininger (2007) model a head start as a first-mover advantage in a
increases demand and lowers cost.
3See “All Our Patent Are Belong To You,” June 12, 2014, on
http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/all-our-patent-are-belong-you.
4Also see, for example, Hillman and Riley (1989), Baye et al. (1996), Krishna and Morgan (1998), Che and
Gale (1998), Cohen and Sela (2007), Scho¨ttner (2008), Bos (2012), Siegel (2009, 2010, 2014), Kaplan et al.
(2003), and Erkal and Xiao (2015).
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sequential all-pay auction and study the first-mover’s performance. Casas-Arce and Martinez-
Jerez (2011), Siegel (2014), and Seel (2014) model a head start as a handicap in a simultaneous
all-pay auction and study the effect on the head starter. Kirkegaard (2012) and Seel and
Wasser (2014) also model a head start as a handicap in a simultaneous all-pay auction but
study the effect on the auctioneer’s expected revenue. Segev and Sela (2014) analyzes the
effect a handicap on the first mover in a sequential all-pay auction. Unlike these papers, we
consider a framework in which players’ decisions are dynamic.
The literature considering settings with dynamic decisions is scarce, and most studies focus
on symmetric players. The study by Taylor (1995) is the most prominent.5 In his symmetric T -
period private search model, there is a unique equilibrium in which players continue searching
for innovations until they discover one with a value above a certain cut-off. We extend Taylor’s
model to analyze the effects of a head start and find the long-run effects of the head start,
which is our main contribution.
Seel and Strack (2013, forthcoming) and Lang et al. (2014) also consider models with
dynamic decisions. Same as in our model, in these models each player also solves an optimal
stopping problem. However, the objectives and the results of these papers are different from
ours. In the models of Seel and Strack (2013, forthcoming), each player decides when to stop
a privately observed Brownian motion with a drift. In their earlier model, there is no deadline
and no search cost and a process is forced to stop when it hits zero. They find that players do
not stop their processes immediately even if the drift is negative. In their more resent model,
each search incurs a cost that depends on the stopping time. This more recent study finds that
when noise vanishes the equilibrium outcome converges to the symmetric equilibrium outcome
of an all-pay auction. Lang et al. (2014) consider a multi-period model in which each player
decides when to stop a privately observed stochastic points-accumulation process. They find
that in equilibrium the distribution over successes converges to the symmetric equilibrium
distribution of an all-pay auction when the deadline is long.
Our study also contributes to the literature on information disclosure in innovation con-
tests. Aoyagi (2010), Ederer (2010), Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011), and Wirtz (2013) study
how much information on intermediate performances a contest designer should disclose to the
contestants. Unlike what we do, these papers consider two-stage games in which the value of
a contestant’s innovation is its total outputs from the two stages. Bimpikis et al. (2014) and
Halac et al. (forthcoming) study the problem of designing innovation contests, which includes
both the award structures and the information disclosure policies. Halac et al. (forthcom-
ing) consider a model in which each contestant searches for innovations, but search outcomes
5Innovation contests were modeled as a race in which the first to reach a defined finishing line gains a prize,
e.g., Loury (1979), Lee and Wilde (1980), and Reinganum (1981, 1982).
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are binary. A contest ends after the occurrence of a single breakthrough, and a contestant
becomes more and more pessimistic over time if there has been no breakthrough. Bimpikis
et al. (2014) consider a model which shares some features with Halac et al. (forthcoming). In
the model, an innovation happens only if two breakthroughs are achieved by the contestants,
the designer decides whether to disclose the information on whether the first breakthrough
has been achieved by a contestant, and intermediate awards can be used. In both models,
contestants are symmetric. In contrast, the contestants in our model are always asymmetric.
Rieck (2010) studies information disclosure in the two-period case of Taylor’s (1995) model. In
contrast to our finding, he shows that the contest designer prefers concealing the outcome in
the first stage. Unlike all the above papers, Gill (2008), Yildirim (2005), and Akcigit and Liu
(2015) address the incentives for contestants, rather than the designer, to disclose intermediate
outcomes.
Last but most importantly, our study contributes to the literature on the relationship
between market structure and incentive for R&D investment. The debate over the effect of
market structure on R&D investment dates back to Schumpeter (1934, 1942).6 Due to the
complexity of the R&D process, earlier theoretical studies tend to focus on one facet of the
process. Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Fudenberg et al. (1983), Harris and Vickers (1985a,b,
1987), Judd (2003), Grossman and Shapiro (1987), and Lippman and McCardle (1987) study
preemption games. In these models, an incumbent monopolist has more incentive to invest
in R&D than a potential entrant. In fact, a potential entrant sees little chance to win the
competition, because of a lag at the starting point of the competition, and is deterred from
competition. In our model, the intuition for the result in the case of a large head start is
similar to this “preemption effect”, except that no firm invests in our case.
By contrast, Arrow (1962) and Reinganum (1983, 1985) show, in their respective models,
that an incumbent monopolist has less incentive to innovate than a new entrant.7 The cause for
this is what is called the “replacement effect” by Tirole (1997). While an incumbent monopolist
can increase its profit by innovating, it has to lose the profit from the old technology once
it adopts a new technology. This effectively reduces the net value of the new technology to
the incumbent. It is then natural that a firm who has a lower value of an innovation has less
incentive to innovate, which is exactly what happens in our model with asymmetric costs. On
the other hand, our main result, on medium-sized head start, has an intuition very similar to
the “replacement effect”. Rather than a reduction in the value of an innovation to the head
starter, a head start decreases the increase in the probability of winning from innovating. In
6See Gilbert (2006) for a comprehensive survey.
7Doraszelski (2003) generalizes the models of Reinganum (1981, 1982) to a history-dependent innovation
process model and shows, in some circumstances, the catching-up behavior in equilibrium.
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both Reinganum’s models and our model, an incumbent could have a lower probability of
winning than a new entrant. However, different from her models, in our model an incumbent
(head starter) can also have a lower expected payoff than a new entrant (latecomer).
1.1 The Model
Firms and Tasks
There are two risk neutral firms, Firm 1 and Firm 2, competing for a prespecified prize,
normalized to 1, in the contest. Time is continuous, and each firm searches for innovations
before a deadline T . At the deadline T , each firm releases to the public the best innovation it
has discovered, and the firm who releases a superior innovation wins the prize. If no firm has
discovered any innovation, the prize is retained. If there is a tie between the two firms, the
prize is randomly allocated to them with equal probability.
At any time point t ∈ [0, T ) before the deadline, each firm decides whether to continue
searching for innovations. If a firm continues searching, the arrival of innovations in this firm
follows a Poisson process with an arrival rate of λ. That is, the probability of discovering
m innovations in an interval of length δ is e
−λδ(λδ)m
m! . The values of innovations are drawn
independently from a distribution F , defined on (0, 1] with F (0) := lima→0 F (a) = 0. F is
continuous and strictly increasing over the domain.
Each firm’s search cost is c > 0 per unit of time. We assume that c < λ, because if c > λ
the cost is so high that no firm is going to conduct a search. To illustrate this claim, suppose
Firm 2 does not search, Firm 1 will not continue searching if it has an innovation with a value
above 0, whereas Firm 1’s instantaneous gain from searching at any moment when it has no
innovation is
lim
δ→0
∑+∞
m=1
e−λδ(λδ)m
m! − cδ
δ
= λ− c,
which is negative if c > λ.
Information
The search processes of the two firms are independent and with recall. Whether the opponent
firm is actively searching is unobservable; whether a firm has discovered any innovation, as
well as the values of discovered innovations, is private information until the deadline T .
For convenience, we say a firm is in a state a ∈ [0, 1] at time t if the value of the best
innovation it has discovered by time t is a, where a = 0 means that the firm has no innovation.
The initial states of Firm 1 and Firm 2 are denoted by aI1 and a
I
2, respectively. Firms’ initial
11
states are commonly known.
Strategies
In our model, each firm’s information on its opponent is not updated. Hence, the game
is static, although the firms’ decisions are dynamic. Then, the solution concept we use is
Nash equilibrium. In accordance with the standard result from search theory that each firm’s
optimal strategy is a constant cut-off rule, we make the following assumption.8
Assumption 1.1. We focus on equilibria that consist of constant cut-off rules: Denote aˆ∗i
as an equilibrium strategy. aˆ∗i ∈ Si := {−1} ∪ [aIi , 1].
If a constant cut-off strategy aˆ∗i ∈ [aIi , 1] is played, at any time point t ∈ [0, T ), Firm i
stops searching if it is in a state above aˆ∗i and continues searching if in a state below or at aˆ
∗
i .
9
The strategy aˆi = −1 represents that Firm i does not conduct a search.
Suppose both firms have no initial innovation. Without this assumption, for any given
strategy played by a firm’s opponent, there is a constant cut-off rule being the firm’s best
response. Such a cut-off value being above zero is the unique best response strategy, ignoring
elements associated with zero probability events. However, in the cases in which a firm is
indifferent between continuing searching and not if it is in state 0, this firm has (uncountably)
many best response strategies. The above assumption helps us to focus on the two most
natural strategies: not to search at all and to search with 0 as the cut-off.10 A full justification
for this assumption is provided in the appendix.
Let P˜ [a|aˆi, aIi ] denote the probability of Firm i ending up in a state below a if it adopts a
strategy aˆi and its initial state is a
I
i ; let E[cost|aˆi] denote Firm i’s expected cost on search if
it adopts a strategy aˆi. Firm i’s ex ante expected utility is
Ui =
∫ 1
0
P [a|aˆ−i, aI−i]dP [a|aˆi, aIi ]− E[cost|aˆi].
Now, we are ready to study equilibrium behavior. Before solving the head start case, we
first look at the case with no initial innovation.
8See Lippman and McCall (1976) for the discussion on optimal stopping strategies for searching with finite
horizon and recall.
9Once Firm i stops searching at some time point it shall not search again later.
10Without this assumption, there can be additional best response strategies of the following type: a firm
randomizes between searching and not searching until a time T ′ < T with cutoff 0 and stops at T ′ even if no
discovery was made.
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1.2 The Symmetric-Firms Benchmark (aI1 = a
I
2 = 0)
In this section, we look at the benchmark case, in which both firms start with no innovation.
It is in the spirit of Taylor’s (1995), except that it is in continuous time. The equilibrium
strategies are presented below.11
Theorem 1.1. Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0.
i. If c ∈ [12λ(1 + e−λT ), λ), there are two equilibria, in each of which one firm searches with
0 as the cut-off and the other firm does not search.
ii. If c ∈ [12λ(1 − e−λT ), 12λ(1 + e−λT )), there is a unique equilibrium, in which both firms
search with 0 as the cut-off.
iii. If c ∈ (0, 12λ(1 − e−λT )), there is a unique equilibrium, in which both firms search with
a∗ as the cut-off, where a∗ > 0 is the unique value that satisfies
1
2
λ[1− F (a∗)]
[
1− e−λT [1−F (a∗)]
]
= c. (1.1)
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.2.
0
λ
2
λ
Region 1
Region 3
Region 2
c = 1
2
λ(1 + e−λ))
c = 1
2
λ(1− e−λ))
T value
c
va
lu
e
Figure 1.1
The result is illustrated in figure 1.1. The deadline-cost space is divided into three regions.12
In Region 1, the search cost is so high that it is not profitable for both firms to innovate. In
Region 2, both firms would like to conduct a search in order to discover an innovation with
11When search cost is low, the equilibrium is unique even without Assumption 2.1. When search is high,
without Assumption 2.1, there are additional symmetric equilibria of the following type: each firm randomizes
between not participating and participating until a time T ′ < T with 0 as the cutoff.
12An “ area” we say is the interior of the corresponding area.
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any value, but none has the incentive to spend additional effort to find an innovation with
a high value. In Region 3, both firms exert efforts to find an innovation with a value above
a certain level. In this case, a firm in the cut-off state is indifferent between continuing and
stopping searching. This is represented by equation (1.1), in which 1 − e−λT [1−F (a∗)] is the
probability of a firm’s opponent ending up in a state above a∗ and 12 [1−F (a∗)] is the increase
in the probability of winning if the firm, in state a∗, obtains a new innovation. Hence, this
equation represents that, in the cut-off state, the instantaneous increase in the probability of
winning from continuing searching equals the instantaneous cost of searching. As T goes to
infinity, c = λ2 becomes the separation line for Case [i] and Case [iii].
Generally, there is no closed form solution for the cut-off value in Case [iii]. However, if
the search cost is very low, we have a simple approximation for it.
Corollary 1.1. Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0. When c is small, a
∗ ≈ F−1
(
1−
√
2c
λ2T
)
.
Proof. First, we assume that λT [1 − F (a∗)] is small, and we come back to check that it is
implied by that c is small. Applying equation (1.1), we have
c
λ
=
1
2
[1− F (a∗)]
[
1− e−λT [1−F (a∗)]
]
≈ 1
2
λT [1− F (a∗)]2
⇔[1− F (a∗)]2 ≈ 2c
λ2T
⇔a∗ ≈ F−1
(
1−
√
2c
λ2T
)
and λT [1− F (a∗)] ≈
√
2cT .
For later reference we, based on the previous theorem, define a function a∗ : (0, λ) ×
[0,+∞)→ [0, 1] where
a∗(c, T ) =

0 for c ∈ [12λ(1− e−λT ), λ)
the a∗ that solves (1.1) for c ∈ (0, 12λ(1− e−λT )).
A simple property which will be used in later sections is stated below.
Lemma 1.1. In Region 3, a∗(c, T ) is strictly increasing in T (and λ) and strictly decreasing
in c.
There are two observations. One is that a∗(c, T ) = 0 if c ≥ λ2 . The other is that a∗(c, T )
converges to F−1(1− 2cλ ) as T goes to infinity if c < λ2 , which derives from taking the limit of
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equation (1.1) w.r.t. T . Let us denote a∗L as the limit of a
∗(c, T ) w.r.t. T :
a∗L := lim
T→+∞
a∗(c, T ) =

0 for c ≥ λ2 ,
F−1(1− 2cλ ) for c < λ2 .
We end this section by presenting a full rent dissipation property of the contest when the
deadline approaches infinity.
Lemma 1.2. Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0. If c <
λ
2 , each firm’s expected payoff in equilibrium goes
to 0 as the deadline T goes to infinity.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.2.
The intuition is as follows. The instantaneous increase in the expected payoff from search-
ing for a firm who is in state a∗(c, T ), the value of the equilibrium cut-off, is 0 (it is indifferent
between continuing searching and not). If the deadline is finite, a firm in a state below a∗(c, T )
has a positive probability of winning even if it stops searching. Hence, the firms have positive
rents in the contest. As the deadline approaches infinity, there is no difference between being
in a state below a∗(c, T ) and at a∗(c, T ), because the firm will lose the contest for sure if it does
not search. In either case the instantaneous increase in the expected payoff from searching is
0. Hence, in the limit the firms’ rents in the contest are fully dissipated.
Though the equilibrium expected payoff goes to 0 in the limit, it is not monotonically de-
creasing to 0 as the deadline approaches infinity, because each firm’s expected payoff converges
to 0 as the deadline approaches 0 as well.13
1.3 Main Results: Exogenous Head Starts (aI1 > a
I
2)
In this section, we add head starts into the study. Without loss of generality, we assume that
Firm 1 has a better initial innovation than does Firm 2 before competition begins, i.e., aI1 > a
I
2.
We first derive the equilibrium strategies, and then we explore equilibrium properties.
1.3.1 Equilibrium Strategies
Theorem 1.2. Suppose aI1 > a
I
2.
1. For aI1 > F
−1(1− cλ), there is a unique equilibrium, in which no firm searches, and thus
Firm 1 wins the prize.
13In fact, by taking the derivative of (1.12) (as in the appendix) w.r.t. T , one can show that the derivative
at T = 0 is λ− c > 0 and that, if c < λ
2
, (1.12) is increasing in T for T < min{ 1
λ
ln λ
c
, 1
λ
ln λ
λ−2c} and decreasing
in T for T > max{ 1
λ
ln λ
c
, 1
λ
ln λ
λ−2c}.
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2. For aI1 = F
−1(1 − cλ), there are many equilibria. In one equilibrium, both firms do not
search. In the other equilibria, Firm 1 does not search and Firm 2 searches with a value
aˆ2 ∈ [aI2, aI1] as the cut-off.
3. For aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1− cλ)), there is a unique equilibrium, in which Firm 1 does not
search and Firm 2 searches with aI1 as the cut-off .
4. For aI1 = a
∗(c, T ), there are two equilibria. In one equilibrium, both firms search with
aI1 as the cut-off. In the other equilibrium, Firm 1 does not search and Firm 2 searches
with aI1 as the cut-off.
5. For aI1 ∈ (0, a∗(c, T )), there is a unique equilibrium, in which both firms search with
a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.3.
Remark. Case [4] and [5] exist only when c ≤ 12λ[1− e−λT ] (Region 3).
− 1
λ
ln(1− 2c
λ
) T
0
F−1(1− 2c
λ
)
F−1(1− c
λ
)
1
Td
a∗(c, T ) for c < λ
2
a∗(c, T ) for c ≥ λ
2
No firm searches.
Firm 1 does not search, Firm 2 searches.
Both firms search.
a
I 1
va
lu
e
Figure 1.2: Thresholds (when c < λ
2
(1− e−λT ) ).
The thresholds in the theorem are depicted in figure 1.2. The leading case is Case [3], when
the head start is in the middle range. A head start reduces the return of a search, in terms of
the increase in the probability of winning. Having a sufficiently large initial innovation, Firm
1 loses incentive to search because the marginal increase in the probability of winning from
searching for Firm 1 is too small compared to the marginal cost of searching, whether Firm
2 searches or not. Firm 2 takes advantage of that and commits to search until it discovers
an innovation better than Firm 1’s initial innovation. Hence, compared to its equilibrium
behavior in the benchmark case, Firm 2 is more active in searching (in terms of a higher
cut-off value) when Firm 1 has a medium-sized head start, and a larger value of head start
forces Firm 2 to search more actively.
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In Case [1], Firm 1’s head start is so large that Firm 2 is deterred from competition because
Firm 2 has little chance to win if it searches. Firm 1 wins the prize without incurring any
cost. Moreover, it is independent of the deadline T .
In Case [5], in which Firm 1’s head start is small, the head start has no effect on either
firm’s equilibrium strategy, and both firms search with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off, same as in the
benchmark case. The only effect of the head start is an increase in Firm 1’s probability of
winning (and a decrease in Firm 2’s).
In brief, a comparison of Theorem 1.2 and Theorem 1.1 shows that a head start of Firm 1
does not alter its own equilibrium behavior but Firm 2’s. The effect on Firm 2’s equilibrium
strategy is not monotone in the head start of Firm 1. The initial state of Firm 2, the latecomer,
is irrelevant to the equilibrium strategies. Figure 1.3 illustrates how each firm’s equilibrium
strategy changes as the value of the initial innovation of Firm 1, the head starter, varies.
a∗(c,T ) 1
-1
0
a∗(c,T )
1
aI1
aˆ1
(a) Firm 1
a∗(c,T ) 1
-1
0
a∗(c,T )
F−1(1− c
λ
)
1
F−1(1− c
λ
)
aI1
aˆ2
(b) Firm 2
Figure 1.3: Firms’ equilibrium cut-off values as the value of Firm 1’s initial innovation,
aI1, varies.
Figure 1.4 illustrates Firm 2’the best responses (when it has no initial innovation) to Firm
1’s strategies for various values of Firm 1’s initial states. The case in which Firm 1 has a
high-value initial innovation is significantly different from the case in which Firm 1 has no
initial innovation.
Turning back to Case [3] in the previous result, we notice that the lower bound for this
case to happen does not converge to the upper bound as the deadline approaches infinity, i.e.,
a∗L < F
−1(1 − cλ). The simplest but most interesting result of this study, the case of “head
starts and doomed losers”, derives.
Corollary 1.2. Suppose aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ)).
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-1 1
-1
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α′
α′′
1
BR1: when aI1 = 0
BR2: when aI1 = α
BR3: when aI1 = α
′
BR4: when aI1 = α
′′
a∗(c, T )
aˆ1
aˆ2
Figure 1.4: Best response projections for Firm 2 as aI1 takes values in {−1, α, α′, α′′}
(c < λ
2
(1− e−λT ) and aI2 = 0 ).
BR1 represents Firm 2’s best responses when no firm has an initial innovation. If Firm
1 does not search, Firm 2 would search with 0 as the cut-off. If Firm 1 searches with 0
as the cut-off, Firm 2 would search with a cut-off higher than the equilibrium cut-off. As
Firm 1 further rises its cut-off, Firm 2 would first rise its cut-off and then lower its cut-off.
When the deadline is long, Firm 2 would not search if Firm 1’s cut-off is high. BR2 and
BR3 represent Firm 2’s best responses when Firm 1 has an initial innovation with a value
slightly above a∗(c, T ), the equilibrium cut-off when there is no initial innovation. In this
case, if Firm 1 does not search, Firm 2’s best response is to search with the value Firm
1’s initial innovation as the cut-off. If Firm 1 searches with a cut-off slightly above the
value of its initial innovation, Firm 2’s best response is still to search with the value of
Firm 1’s initial innovation as the cut-off. Once Firm 1’s cut-off is greater than a certain
value, Firm 2 would not search. BR4 represents Firm 2’s best responses when Firm 1 has
a high-value initial innovation. In this case, if Firm 1 does not search, Firm 2 would still
search with the value of Firm 1’s initial innovation as the cut-off; if Firm 1 searches, Firm
2 would have no incentive to search. On the other hand, when the value of Firm 1’s initial
innovation is above a∗(c, T ), Firm 1’s best response to any strategy of Firm 2 is not to
search.
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1. Firm 2’s (Firm 1’s) probability of winning increases (decreases) in the deadline.
2. As T goes to infinity, Firm 2’s probability of winning goes to 1, and Firm 1’s goes to 0.
Proof. In equilibrium Firm 1 does not search and Firm 2 searches with aI1 as the cut-off. Firm
2’s probability of winning is thus
1− e−λT [1−F (aI1)],
which is increasing in T , and it converges to 1 as T goes infinity. Firm 1’s probability of
winning is e−λT [1−F (aI1)], which is, in the contrast, decreasing in T , and it converges to 0 as T
approaches infinity.
This property results from our assumption that search processes are with recall. The
larger the head start is, the smaller the marginal increase in the probability of winning from
searching is, given any strategy played by the latecomer. Hence, even if the head starter knows
that in the long run the latecomer will almost surely obtain an innovation with a value higher
than its initial innovation, the head starter is not going to conduct a search as long as the
instantaneous increase in the probability of winning is smaller than the instantaneous cost of
searching.
1.3.2 Payoff Comparison across Firms
A natural question arises: which firm does a head start favor? Will Firm 1 or Firm 2 achieve
a higher expected payoff? To determine that, we need a direct comparison of the two firms’
expected payoffs. When aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1− cλ)), the difference between the payoffs of Firm
1 and Firm 2 is14
DF (T, aI1) := e
−λT [1−F (aI1)] − (1− e−λT [1−F (aI1)])(1− c
λ[1− F (aI1)]
). (1.2)
The head start of Firm 1 favors Firm 1 (Firm 2) if DF (T, aI1) > (<)0.
DF (T, aI1) is increasing in a
I
1 and decreasing in T . Hence, a longer deadline tends toward
to favor Firm 2 when the head start is in the middle range. Since
DF (0, aI1) = 1 > 0
141− e−λT [1−F (aI1)] is Firm 2’s probability of obtaining an innovation better than Firm 1’s initial innovation,
aI1, and
1
λ[1−F (aI1)]
is the unconditional expected interarrival time of innovations with a value higher than aI1.
The second term in DF (T, aI1) thus represents the expected payoff of Firm 2.
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and
lim
T→∞
DF (T, aI1) = −(1−
c
λ[1− F (aI1)]
) < 0 for any aI < F−1(1− c
λ
),
there must be a unique Tˆ (aI1) > 0 such that DE(Tˆ (a
I
1), a
I
1) = 0. The following result derives.
Proposition 1.1. For aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1 − cλ)), there is a unique Tˆ (aI1) > 0 such that Firm 1
(Firm 2) obtains a higher expected payoff if T < (>)Tˆ (aI1).
That is, for any given value of the head start in the middle range (a∗L, F
−1(1− cλ)), the head
start favors the latecomer (head starter) if the deadline is long (short). The effects of a head
start do not vanish as the deadline approaches infinity. In fact, as the deadline approaches
infinity, the head start eventually pushes the whole share of the surplus to Firm 2.
Lemma 1.3. As the deadline increases to infinity,
1. for aI1 ∈ (0, a∗L), both Firms’ equilibrium payoffs converge to 0;
2. for aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ)), Firm 1’s equilibrium payoff converges to 0, whereas Firm 2’s
equilibrium payoff converges to 1− c
λ[1−F (aI1)]
∈ (0, 12).
Proof. [1] follows from Lemma 1.2. [2] follows from Corollary 1.2 and the limit of Firm 2’s
expected payoff
(1− e−λT [1−F (aI)])
(
1− c
λ[1− F (aI1)]
)
(1.3)
w.r.t. T .
A comparison to Lemma 1.2 shows that, just as having no initial innovation, when Firm
1 has an innovation whose value is not of very high, its expected payoff still converges to 0
as the deadline becomes excessively long. When there is no initial innovation, the expected
total surplus for the firms (i.e., the sum of the two firms’ expected payoff) converges to 0. In
contrast, when there is a head start with a value above a∗L, the expected total surplus is strictly
positive even when the deadline approaches infinity. However, as it approaches infinity, this
total surplus created by the head start of Firm 1 goes entirely to Firm 2, the latecomer, if the
head start is in the middle range. The intuition is as follows. For Firm 1, it is clear that its
probability of winning converges to 0 as the deadline goes to infinity. For Firm 2, we first look
at the case that aI1 = F
−1(1 − cλ). In this case Firm 2 is indifferent between searching and
not searching, and thus the expected payoff is 0. As the deadline approaches infinity, both
expected cost of searching and the probability of winning converges to 1, if Firm 2 conducts
a search. Then, if aI1 is below F
−1(1− cλ) (but above a∗L), as the deadline approaches infinity,
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Firm 2’s probability of winning still goes to 1, but the expected cost of searching drops to a
value below 1 because it adopts a lower cut-off for stopping. Hence, Firm 2’s expected payoff
converges to a positive value.
The relationship between the rank order of the two Firms’ payoffs and the deadline is
illustrated in figure 1.5, in each of which Firm 2 obtains a higher expected payoff at each point
in the colored area. (a) is for the cases in which c ≤ λ2 . In these cases a longer deadline tends
to favor the latecomer. (b) and (c) are for the cases in which c > λ2 . In these cases, the rank
order is not generally monotone in the deadline and the head start.
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Figure 1.5: When (aI1, T ) lies in the colored area, the head start favors the latecomer.
We notice in all the figures that if the deadline is sufficiently short, a head start is ensured
to bias toward Firm 1, whereas if it is long, only a relatively large head start biases toward
Firm 1.
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1.4 Effects of Head Starts on Payoffs
In this section, we study the effects of a head start on both firms’ payoffs. Suppose Firm
2 has no initial innovation, who does a head start of Firm 1 benefit or hurt? The previous
comparison between Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 already shows that a head start aI1 benefits
Firm 1 and hurts Firm 2 if aI1 < a
∗(c, T ) or aI1 > F−1(1− cλ). In the former case, which happens
only when a∗(c, T ) > 0 (Region 3 of figure 1.1), both firms search with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off,
the same as when there is no head start, and the head start increases Firm 1’s probability of
winning and decreases Firm 2’s. As the deadline goes to infinity, the expected payoffs to both
firms converge to 0, with the effect of the head start disappearing. In the latter case, Firm 1
always obtains a payoff of 1, and Firm 2 always 0.
The interesting case occurs then when the head start is in the middle range, aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1−
c
λ)), which will be the focus in the remaining parts of this study. To answer the above question
regarding the head start being in the middle range, we first analyze the case that point (c, T )
lies in Regions 2 and 3 (in figure 1.1), and then we turn to analyze the case of Region 1.
1.4.1 Regions 2 and 3
In the previous section, we showed that for T being sufficiently long, Firm 1 is almost surely
going to lose the competition if aI1 is in the middle range. Although it seems reasonable that
in this case a head start may make Firm 1 worse off, the following proposition shows that this
conjecture is not true.
Proposition 1.2. Suppose aI2 = 0. In Regions 2 and 3, in which c <
1
2λ(1 + e
−λT ), a head
start aI1 > 0 always benefits Firm 1, compared to the equilibrium payoff it gets in the benchmark
case.
To give the intuition, we consider the case of a∗(c, T ) > 0. Suppose Firm 1 has a head start
aI1 = a
∗(c, T ). As shown in Case [4] of Theorem 1.2, we have the following two equilibria: in
one equilibrium both firms search with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off; in another equilibrium Firm 1
does not search and Firm 2 searches with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off. Firm 1 is indifferent between
these two equilibria, hence its expected payoffs from both equilibria are e−λT [1−F (a∗(c,T ))], the
probability of Firm 2 finding no innovation with a value higher than a∗(c, T ). However, Firm
1’s probability of winning increases in its head start, hence a larger head start gives Firm 1 a
higher expected payoff.
The above result itself corresponds to expectation. What unexpected is the mechanism
through which Firm 1 gets better off. As a head start gives Firm 1 a higher position, we
would expect that it is better off by (1) having a better chance to win and (2) spending less
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on searching. Together with Theorem 1.2, the above proposition shows that Firm 1 is better
off purely from an increase in the probability of winning when aI1 < a
∗(c, T ); purely from
spending nothing on searching when aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1− cλ)) (though there could be a loss
from a decrease in the probability of winning); from an increase in the probability of winning
and a reduction in the cost of searching when aI1 > F
−1(1− cλ).
In contrast to the effect of a head start of Firm 1 on Firm 1’s own expected payoff, the
effect on Firm 2’s expected payoff is not clear-cut. Instead of giving a general picture of the
effect, we present some properties in the following.
Proposition 1.3. Suppose aI2 = 0.
1. A head start aI1 ∈ (0, F−1(1− cλ)) hurts Firm 2 if the deadline T is sufficiently small.
2. If c < λ2 , a head start a
I
1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ)) benefits Firm 2 if the deadline is sufficiently
long.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.3.
Case [1] occurs because a head start of Firm 1 reduces Firm 2’s probability of winning and
may increase its expected cost of searching. Case [2] follows from Propositions 1.2 and 1.1.
Because a head start of Firm 1 always benefits Firm 1 and a long deadline favors Firm 2, a
head start must also benefit Firm 2 if the deadline is long.15
Figure 1.6 illustrates how Firm 2’s equilibrium payoff changes as Firm 1’s head start
increases. In particular, a head start of Firm 1 slightly above a∗(c, T ), the equilibrium cut-off
when there is no initial innovation, benefits Firm 2 if a∗(c, T ) is low. Some more conditions
under which a head start benefits or hurts the latecomer are given below.
-1 0 α˜ ˜˜α F−1(1− cλ ) 1
When a∗(c, T ) = α˜
When a∗(c, T ) = ˜˜α
aI1
U2
Figure 1.6: Firm 2’s equilibrium payoffs as a∗(c, T ) varies.
Proposition 1.4. In Region 2 and 3, in which c < 12λ(1 + e
−λT ),
15Alternatively, it also follows from Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3. If the deadline is very long and the head start of
Firm 1 is in the middle range, Firm 2’s payoff converges to 0 same as in the benchmark case and some positive
value in head start case.
23
1. if
(1− e−λT [1−F (a∗(c,T ))])− 1
2
(1− e−2λT ) > 0, (1.4)
there exists a a˜I1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1 − cλ)) such that the head start aI1 hurts Firm 2 if
aI1 ∈ (a˜I1, F−1(1− cλ)) and benefits Firm 2 if aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), a˜I1);
2. if (1.4) holds in the opposite direction, any head start aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1− cλ)) hurts
Firm 2.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.3.
The first term on the left side of inequality (1.4) is Firm 2’s probability of winning in the
equilibrium in which Firm 2 searches and Firm 1 does not search in the limiting case that
Firm 1 has a head start of a∗(c, T ). The second term, excluding the minus sign, is Firm 1’s
probability of winning when there is no head start. The expected searching costs are the same
in both cases. The following corollary shows some scenarios in which inequality (1.4) holds.
Corollary 1.3. In Region 2, when a∗(c, T ) = 0, inequality (1.4) holds.
This shows that for search cost lying in the middle range, a head start of Firm 1 must
benefit Firm 2, if it is slightly above 0. The simple intuition is as follows. When Firm 1 has
such a small head start, Firm 2’s cut-off value of searching increases by only a little bit, and
thus the expected cost of searching also increases slightly. However, the increase in Firm 2’s
probability of winning is very large, because Firm 1, when having a head start, does not search
any more. Thus, in this case Firm 2 is strictly better off.
Lastly, even though Firm 1 does not search when the head start aI1 > a
∗(c, T ), it seems
that a low search cost may benefit Firm 2. On the contrary, a head start of Firm 1 would
always hurt Firm 2 when the search cost is sufficiently small.
Corollary 1.4. For any fixed deadline T , if the search cost is sufficiently small, inequality
(1.4) holds in the opposite direction.
Proof. As c being close to 0, a∗(c, T ) is close to 1, and thus the term on left side of inequali-
ty (1.4) is close to −12(1− e−2λT ) < 0.
That is because when c is close to 0, a∗(c, T ) is close to 1, and the interval in which Firm
1 does not search while Firm 2 searches is very small, and thus the chance for Firm 2 to win
is too low when aI1 > a
∗(c, T ), even though the expected cost of searching is low as well.
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1.4.2 Region 1
Since there are multiple equilibria in the benchmark case when (c, T ) lies in Region 1, whether
a head start hurts or benefits a firm depends on which equilibrium we compare to. If we
compare the two equilibria in each of which Firm 1 does not search and Firm 2 searches, then
the head start benefits Firm 1 and hurts Firm 2. If we compare to the other equilibrium in
the benchmark case, the outcome is not clear-cut.
Proposition 1.5. Suppose aI2 = 0. In Region 1, in which c >
1
2λ(1 + e
−λT ) and a∗(c, T ) = 0,
for aI1 ∈ (0, F−1(1− cλ)), if
(1− e−λT )(1− c
λ
)− e−λT [1−F (aI1)] < 0, (1.5)
Firm 1’s equilibrium payoff is higher than its expected payoff in any equilibrium in the bench-
mark case. If the inequality holds in the opposite direction, Firm 1’s equilibrium payoff is
lower than its payoff in the equilibrium in which Firm 1 searches and Firm 2 does not search
in the benchmark case.
This result is straightforward. The first term on the left side of inequality (1.5) is Firm
1’s expected payoff in the equilibrium in which Firm 1 searches and Firm 2 does not in the
benchmark case and the second term, excluding the minus sign, is its expected payoff when
there is no head start.
Moreover, the left hand side of inequality (1.5) strictly increases in T , and it reaches −1
when T approaches 0 and 1− cλ when T approaches infinity. The intermediate value theorem
insures that inequality (1.5) holds in the opposite direction for the deadline T being large.
As a result of the above property, when the head start is small and the deadline is long,
in an extended game in which Firm 1 can publicly discard its head start before the contest
starts, there are two subgame perfect equilibria: in one equilibrium, Firm 1 does not discard
its head start and Firm 2 searches with the Firm 1’s initial innovation value as the cut-off; in
the other equilibrium, Firm 1 discards the head start and searches with 0 as the cut-off and
Firm 2 does not search. Hence, there is the possibility that Firm 1 can improve its expected
payoff if it discards its head start.
Last, we discuss Firm 2’s expected payoff. The result is also straightforward.
Proposition 1.6. Suppose aI2 = 0. In Region 1, in which c >
1
2λ(1 + e
−λT ), for aI1 ∈
(0, F−1(1− cλ)), Firm 2’s equilibrium payoff is
• less than its expected payoff in the equilibrium in which Firm 1 does not search and Firm
2 searches in the benchmark case, and
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• higher than the payoff in the equilibrium in which Firm 1 searches and Firm 2 does not
search in the benchmark case.
Proof. Compared to the equilibrium in which Firm 2 searches in the benchmark case, in the
equilibrium when Firm 1 has a head start, Firm 2 has a lower expected probability of winning
and a higher expected cost because of a higher cut-off, and and thus a lower expected payoff.
But this payoff is positive.
1.5 Extended Dynamic Models (aI1 > a
I
2)
In this section, we study two extended models.
1.5.1 Endogenous Head Starts
We first study how the firms would play if each firm has the option to discard its initial inno-
vation before the contest starts. Formally, a game proceeds as below.
Model∗:
• Stage 1: Firm i decides whether to discard its initial innovation.
• Stage 2: Firm i’s opponent decides whether to discard its initial innovation.
• Stage 3: Upon observing the outcomes in the previous stages, both firms simultaneously
start playing the contest as described before.
The incentive for a head starter to discard its initial innovation when the latecomer has no
initial innovation has been studied in the previous section. The focus of the section is on the
case in which both firms have an initial innovation in the middle range.16 The main result of
this section is as follows.
Proposition 1.7. Suppose aI1, a
I
2 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ)). In Model∗ with Firm 1 having the first
move, there is a T˘ (aI1, a
I
2) > 0 such that
• if T > T˘ (aI1, aI2), there is a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), in which Firm 1
discards its initial innovation and searches with aI2 as the cut-off and Firm 2 keeps its
initial innovation and does not search;
• if T < T˘ (aI1, aI2), subgame perfect equilibria exist, and in each equilibrium Firm 2 searches
with aI1 as the cut-off and Firm 1 keeps its initial innovation and does not search.
16As shown in Proposition 1.2, when (c, T ) lies in Regions 2 and 3, the head starter with a medium-sized
initial innovation has no incentive to discard its head start if the latecomer has a no innovation. The head
starter would also have no incentive to discard its initial innovation when the latecomer has a low-value initial
innovation.
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Proof. See Appendix 1.A.4.
This proposition shows that in the prescribed scenario Firm 1 is better off giving up its
initial innovation if the deadline is long.17 The intuition is simple. For the deadline being long,
Firm 1’s expected payoff is low, because its probability of winning is low. By giving up its
initial innovation, it makes Firm 2 the head starter, and thus Firm 1 obtains a higher expected
payoff than before by committing to searching whereas Firm 2 has no incentive to search. Yet
the reasoning for the case in which c ≤ λ2 differs from that for the case in which c > λ2 . After
Firm 1 discards its initial innovation, Firm 2 turns to the new head start firm. In the former
case, Firm 2 would then have no incentive to discard its initial innovation any more as shown
in Proposition 1.2, and its dominant strategy in the subgame is not to search whether Firm
1 is to search or not. In the latter case, Firm 2 may have the incentive to discard its initial
innovation and search if the deadline is long. However, discarding the initial innovation is a
credible threat for Firm 1 to deter Firm 2 from doing that.
Remark. When the deadline is sufficiently long, by giving up the initial innovation, Firm 1
makes itself better off but Firm 2 worse off. However, if the deadline is not too long, by doing
so, Firm 1 can benefit both firms. This is because the total expected cost of searching after
Firm 1 discards its initial innovation is lower than before and hence there is an increase in the
total surplus for the two firms. It is then possible that both firms get a share of the increase
in the surplus. We illustrate that in the following example.
17Discarding a head start is one way to give up one’s initial leading position. In reality, a more practical
and credible way is to give away the head start innovation. A head start firm could give away it patent for its
technology. By doing so, any firm can use this technology for free. That is, every firm’s initial state becomes
aI1. If firms can enter the competition freely, the value of the head start technology is approximately zero to any
single firm, because everyone has approximately zero probability to win with this freely obtained innovation.
For a head start being in the middle range, the market is not large enough to accommodate two firms to
compete. Hence, to model giving away head starts with free entry to the competition, we can study a com-
petition between two firms but with some modified prize allocation rules. Formally, the game proceeds as below.
Model∗∗:
• Stage 1: Firm 1 decides whether to give away its initial innovation.
• Stage 2: Upon observing the stage 1 outcome, Firm 1 and Firm 2 simultaneously start playing the
contest as described before.
• If Firm 1 gives away its initial innovation:
– Both firms’ states at time 0 become aI1.
– The prize is retained if no firm is in a state above aI1 at the deadline T .
– The firm with a higher state, which is higher than aI1, at the deadline wins.
• If Firm 1 retains its initial innovation, the firm with a higher state at the deadline wins.
Suppose aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ )). If the deadline is long, in Model∗∗ there are two subgame perfect equilibria.
In one equilibrium, Firm 1 gives away its initial innovation and searches with aI1 as the cut-off and Firm
2 does not search. In the other equilibrium, Firm 1 retains its initial innovation and does not search and
Firm 2 searches with aI1 as the cut-off. However, forward induction selects the first equilibrium as the refined
equilibrium, because giving away a head start is a credible signal of Firm 1 to commit to search.
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Example 1.1. Suppose F is the uniform distribution, c = 13 , λ = 1, a
I
1 =
1
2 , and a
I
2 =
1
3 . If
Firm 1 discards its initial innovation, then its expected payoff would be 12(1− e−
T
3 ), and Firm
2’s expected payoff would be e−
T
3 ; if Firm 1 does not discard its initial innovation, then its
expected payoff would be e−
T
2 , and Firm 2’s expected payoff would be 13(1− e−
T
2 ).
Firm 1 would be better off by discarding its initial innovation if T > 2.52. If T ∈
(2.52, 3.78), by discarding the initial innovation, Firm 1 makes both firms better off. If T
is larger, then doing so would only make Firm 2 worse off.
The previous result is conditional on Firm 1 having the first move. If Firm 2 has the first
move, it may, by discarding its initial innovation, be able to prevent Firm 1 from discarding
its own head start and committing to searching. However, if the deadline is not sufficiently
long, Firm 1 would still have the incentive to discard its initial innovation.
Proposition 1.8. Suppose aI1, a
I
2 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ)). In Model∗ with Firm 2 having the first
move, there is a Tˆ (aI1, a
I
2) > 0 such that
• for T > Tˆ (aI1, aI2), there is a unique SPE, in which Firm 2 discards its initial innovation
and searches with aI2 as the cut-off and Firm 1 keeps the initial innovation and does not
search;
• for T ∈ (T˘ (aI1, aI2), Tˆ (aI1, aI2)), there is a unique SPE, in which Firm 2 keeps its initial
innovation and does not search and Firm 1 discards its initial innovation and searches
with aI1 as cut-off;
• for T < T˘ (aI1, aI2), subgame perfect equilibria exist, and in each equilibrium Firm 2
searches with cut-off aI1 and Firm 1 keeps its initial innovation and does not search.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.4.
In the middle range of the deadline, even though Firm 2 can credibly commit to searching
and scare Firm 1 away from competition by discarding its initial innovation, it is not willing
to do so, yet Firm 1 would like to discard its initial innovation and commit to searching. This
is because Firm 1’s initial innovation is of a higher value than Firm 2’s. The cut-off value of
the deadline at which Firm 2 is indifferent between discarding the initial innovation to commit
to searching, and keeping the initial innovation, is higher than that of Firm 1.
1.5.2 Intermediate Information Disclosure
In the software industry, it is common to preannounce with a long lag to launch (Bayus et al.,
2001). Many firms do that by describing the expected features or demonstrating prototypes at
trade shows. Many other firms publish their findings in a commercial disclosure service, such
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as Research Disclosure, or in research journals.18 Suppose there is a regulator who would like
to impose an intermediate information disclosure requirement on innovation contests. What
are the effects of the requirement on firms’ competition strategies and the expected value of
the winning innovation. Specifically, suppose there is a time point t0 ∈ (0, T ) at which both
firms have to reveal everything they have, how would firms compete against each other?
When the head start aI1 is larger the threshold F
−1(1− cλ), it is clear that no firm has an
incentive to conduct any search. When the head start is below this threshold, if t0 is very
close to T , information revelation has little effect on the firms’ strategies. Both firms will
play approximately the same actions before time t0 as they do when there is no revelation
requirement. After time t0, the firm in a higher state at time t0 stops searching. The other
firm searches with this higher state as the cut-off if this higher state is below F−1(1− cλ), and
stops searching as well if it is higher than F−1(1− cλ).
Our main finding in this part regards the cases in which the head start is in the middle
range and the deadline is sufficiently far from the information revelation point.19 That is,
firms have to reveal their progress at an early stage of a competition.
Proposition 1.9. Suppose at a time point t0 ∈ (0, T ) both firms have to reveal their discov-
eries. For aI1 ∈ (a∗L, F−1(1− cλ)) and aI2 < aI1, if T − t0 is sufficiently large, there is a unique
subgame perfect equilibrium, in which
• Firm 1 searches with F−1(1− cλ) as the cut-off before time t0 and stops searching from
time t0;
• Firm 2 does not search before time t0 and searches with aI1 as the cut-off from time t0 if
aI1 < F
−1(1− cλ).
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.4.
In the proof, we show that between time 0 and time t0, the dominant action of Firm 2
is not to search, given that the equilibria in the subgames from time t0 are described as in
Theorem 1.2. If Firm 1 is in a state higher than the threshold F−1(1 − cλ) at time t0, Firm
2’s effort will be futile if it searches before time t0. If Firm 1 is in a state in between its initial
state aI1 and and the threshold F
−1(1− cλ) at time t0, Firm 2 has the chance to get into a state
above the threshold F−1(1 − cλ) and thus a continuation payoff of 1, but this instantaneous
benefit only compensates the instantaneous cost of searching. Firm 2 also has the chance to
get into a state above that of Firm 1 but below the threshold F−1(1 − cλ) at time t0, which
18Over 90% of the world’s leading companies have published disclosures in Research Disclosure’s pages (see
www.researchdisclosure.com).
19Generally, for the cases in which aI1 < a
∗
L, there are many subgame perfect equilibria, including two
equilibria in each of which one firm searches with F−1(1 − c
λ
) as the cut-off between time 0 and time t0 and
the other firm does not.
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results in a continuation payoff of approximately 0 if the deadline is sufficiently long, whereas
it obtains a strictly positive payoff if it does not search before time t0. It is thus not worthwhile
for Firm 2 to conduct a search before time t0. If Firm 2 does not search before time t0, Firm 1
then has the incentive to conduct a search if the deadline is far from t0. If it does not search,
it obtains a payoff of approximately 0 when T − t0 is sufficiently large. If it conducts a search
before time t0, the benefit from getting into a higher state can compensate the cost.
An early stage revelation requirement therefore hurts the latecomer and benefits the head
starter. It gives the head starter a chance to get a high-value innovation so as to deter the
latecomer from competition. It also increases the expected value of the winning innovation.
1.6 Discussion: Asymmetric Costs (aI1 = a
I
2 = 0, c1 < c2)
In this section, we show that, compared to the effects of head starts, the effects of cost
advantages are simpler. A head start probably discourages a firm from conducting searching
and can either discourage its competitor from searching or encourage its competitor to search
more actively. In contrast, a cost advantage encourages a firm to search more actively and
discourages its opponent.
We now assume that the value of pre-specified prize to Firm i, i = 1, 2, is Vi and that
the search cost is for Firm i is Ci per unit of time. However, at each time point Firm i only
makes a binary decision on whether to stop searching or to continue searching. Whether it
is profitable to continue searching depends on the ratio of CiVi rather than the scale of Vi and
Ci. Therefore, we can normalize the valuation of each player to be 1 and the search cost to
be CiVi =: ci. W.l.o.g, we assume c1 < c2. For convenience, we define a function
I(ai|aj , ci) := λ
∫ a¯
ai
[Z(a|aj)− Z(ai|aj)]dF (a)− ci,
where Z(a|aj) is defined, in Lemma 4.2 in the appendix, as Firm j’s probability of ending up
in a state below a if it searches with aj as the cut-off. We emphasize on the most important
case, in which both firms’ search costs are low.
Proposition 1.10. For 0 < c1 < c2 <
1
2λ(1 − e−λT ), there must exist a unique equilibrium
(a∗1, a∗2), in which a∗1 > a∗2 ≥ 0. Specifically,
1. if I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, c2
)
> 0, the unique equilibrium is a pair of cut-off rules
(a∗1, a∗2), a∗1 > a∗2 > 0, that satisfy
λ
∫ a¯
a∗i
[
Z(a|a∗j , T )− Z(a∗i |a∗j , T )
]
dF (a) = ci;
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2. if I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, c2
)
≤ 0, the unique equilibrium is a pair of cut-off rules(
F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, 0
)
.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.5.
The existence of equilibrium is proved by using Brouwer’s fixed point theorem. As expect-
ed, a cost (valuation) advantage would drive a firm to search more actively than its opponent.
The following statement shows that while an increase in cost advantage of the firm in advan-
tage would make the firm more active in searching and its opponent less active, a further cost
disadvantage of the firm in disadvantage would make both firms less active in searching.
Proposition 1.11. For 0 < c1 < c2 <
1
2λ(1−e−λT ) and I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, c2
)
> 0,
in which case there is a unique equilibrium (a∗1, a∗2), a∗1, a∗2 > 0,
1. for fixed c2,
∂a∗1
∂c1
< 0 and
∂a∗2
∂c1
> 0;
2. for fixed c1,
∂a∗1
∂c2
< 0 and
∂a∗2
∂c2
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix 1.A.5.
The intuition is simple. When the cost of the firm in advantage decreases, this firm would
be more willing to search, while the opponent firm would be discouraged because the marginal
increase in the probability of winning from continuing searching in any state is reduced, and
therefore the opponent firm would lower its cut-off. When the cost of the firm at a disadvantage
increases, the firm would be less willing to search, and the opponent firm would consider it
less necessary to search actively because the probability of winning in any state has increased.
A comparison between the equilibrium strategies in this model and that of the benchmark
model can be made.
Corollary 1.5. For 0 < c1 < c2 <
1
2λ(1 − e−λT ) and I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, c2
)
> 0,
in which case there is a unique equilibrium (a∗1, a∗2), a∗1 > a∗2 > 0, a∗1 and a∗2 satisfy
1. a∗1 < a∗(c, T ) for the corresponding c = c2 > c1;
2. a∗2 < a∗(c, T ) for the corresponding c = c1 < c2.
Based on the benchmark model, a cost reduction for Firm 1 will result in both firms
searching with cut-offs below the original one; a cost increase for Firm 2 will certainly result
in Form 2 searching with a cut-off below the original one.
The equilibrium for the other non-marginal cases (conditional on c1 < c2), together with
the above case, are stated in Table 1.1 without proof. The regions in Table 1.1 are the same as
in Figure 1.1. The row (column) number indicates in which region c1 (c2) lies, and each element
31
c2 \ c1 Region 1 Region 2 Region 3
Region 1 (a∗1, a∗2)
(
F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, 0
)
(0,−1)
Region 2 / (0, 0) (0,−1)
Region 3 / / (0,−1), (−1, 0)
Table 1.1: Equilibria in all non-marginal cases.
in each cell represents a corresponding equilibrium. For example, the element in the cell at
the second row and the second column means that for c1, c2 ∈ (12λ(1− e−λT ), 12λ(1 + e−λT )),
there is a unique equilibrium, in which both firms search with cut-off 0. This shows that Firm
1 is more active in searching than is Firm 2.
Remark. Similar results can be found in a model with the same search cost but with different
arrival rates of innovations for the two firms.
1.7 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we studied the long-run effects of head starts in innovation contests in which
each firm decides when to stop a privately observed repeated sampling process before a preset
deadline. Unlike an advantage in innovation cost or innovation ability, which encourages a
firm to search more actively for innovations and discourages its opponent, a head start has
non-monotone effects. The head starter is discouraged from searching if the head start is large,
and its strategy remains the same if the head start is small. The latecomer is discouraged
from searching if the head start is large but is encouraged to search more actively if it is in
the middle range. Our main finding is that, if the head start is in the middle range, in the
long run, the head starter is doomed to lose the competition with a payoff of zero and the
latecomer will take the entire surplus for the competing firms. As a consequence, our model
can exhibit either the “preemption effect” or the “replacement effect”, depending on the value
of the head start.
Our results have implications on antitrust problems. Market regulators have concerns that
the existence of market dominating firms, such as Google, may hinder competitions, and they
take measures to curb the monopoly power of these companies. For instance, the European
Union voted to split Google into smaller companies.20 Our results imply that in many cases
the positions of the dominant firms are precarious. In the long run, they will be knocked
off their perch. These firms’ current high positions, in fact, may promote competitions in
20“Google break-up plan emerges from Brussels,” Financial Times, November 21, 2014.
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the long run because they encourage their rivals to exert efforts to innovate and reach high
targets. Curbing the power of the current dominating firms may benefit the society and these
firms’ rivals in the short run, but in the long run it hurts the society because it discourages
innovation. However, the the dominating firms’ positions are excessively high, which deters
new firms from entering the the market, a market regulator could take some actions.
The results have also implications on R&D policies. When selecting an R&D policy, policy
makers have to consider both the nature of the R&D projects and the market structure.
If the projects are on radical innovations, subsidizing innovation costs effectively increases
competition when the market is blank (no advanced substitutive technology exists in the
market). However, when there is a current market dominating firm with an existing advanced
technology, a subsidy may not be effective. The dominating firm has no incentive to innovate,
and the latecomer, even if it is subsidized, will not innovate more actively.
In our model we have only one head starter and one latecomer. The model can be extended
to include more than two firms, and similar results still hold. One extension is to study the
designing problem in our framework. For example, one question is how to set the deadline. If
the designer is impatient, she may want to directly take the head starter’s initial innovation
without holding a contest; if she is patient, she may set a long deadline in order to obtain
a better innovation. Some other extensions include: to consider a model with a stochastic
number of firms; to consider a model with cumulative scores with or without regret instead of
a model with repeated sampling.
1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Preliminaries
To justify Assumption 2.1, we show in the following that, for any given strategy played by
a firm’s opponent, there is a constant cut-off rule being the firm’s best response. If the cut-
off value is above zero, it is actually the unique best response strategy, ignoring elements
associated with zero probability events. We argue only for the case that both firms’ initial
states are 0. The arguments for the other cases are similar and thus are omitted.
Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0. For a given strategy played by Firm j, we say at time t
ati := inf{a˜ ∈ A|Firm i weakly prefers stopping to continuing searching in state a˜}
is Firm i’s lower optimal cut-off and
a¯ti := inf{a˜ ∈ A|Firm i strictly prefers stopping to continuing searching in state a˜}
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is Firm i’s upper optimal cut-off .
Lemma 1.4. Suppose aI1 = a
I
2 = 0. For any fixed strategy played by Firm j, Firm i’s best
response belongs to one of the three cases.
i. Not to search: a¯ti = a
t
i = −1 for all t ∈ [0, T ],
ii. Search with a constant cut-off rule aˆi ≥ 0: a¯ti = ati = aˆi ≥ 0 for all t ∈ [0, T ].
iii. Both not to search and search until being in a state above 0: a¯ti = 0 and a
t
i = −1 for all
t ∈ [0, T ).
Proof of Lemma 4.1. Fix a strategy of Firm j. Let P (a) denote the probability of Firm j
ending up in a state below a at time T . P (a) is either constant in a or strictly increasing
in a. It is a constant if and only if Firm j does not search.21 If this is the case, Firm i’s
best response is to continue searching with a fixed cut-off aˆti = a¯
ti = ati = 0 for all t. In the
following, we study the case in which P (a) is strictly increasing in a.
Step 1. We argue that, given a fixed strategy played by Firm j, Firm i’s best response is
a (potentially history-dependent) cut-off rule. Suppose at time t Firm i is in a state a˜ ∈ [0, 1].
If it is strictly marginally profitable to stop (continue) searching at t, then it is also strictly
marginally profitable to continue searching if it is in a state higher (lower) than a˜. Let the
upper and lower optimal cut-offs at time t be a¯ti and a
t
i, respectively, as defined previously.
Step 2. We show that {a¯ti}Tt=0 and {ati}Tt=0 should be history-independent. We use a
discrete version to approximate the continuous version. Take any t˜ ∈ [0, T ). Let {tl}kl=0,
where tl − tl−1 = T−t˜k =: δ for l = 1, ..., k, be a partition of the interval [t˜, T ]. Suppose Firm
i can only make decisions at {tl}kl=0 in the interval [t˜, T ]. Let {a¯tl}k−1l=0 and {atl}k−1l=0 be the
corresponding upper and lower optimal cut-offs, respectively, and Gδ(a) be Firm i’s probability
of discovering no innovation with a value above a in an interval δ.
At tk−1, for Firm i in a state a, if it stops searching, the expected payoff is P (a); if it
continues searching, the expected payoff is
Gδ(a)P (a) +
∫ 1
a
P (a˜)dGδ(a˜)− δci
=P (a) +
∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)− δci.
The firm strictly prefers continuing searching if and only if searching in the last period strictly
increases its expected payoff,
eδ(a) :=
∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)− δci > 0.
eδ(a) strictly decreases in a and eδ(1) ≤ 0. Because eδ(0) can be either negative or positive,
we have to discuss several cases.
21More generally, it is constant if and only if the opponent firm conducts search with a measure 0 over [0, T ].
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Case 1. If eδ(0) < 0, Firm i is strictly better off stopping searching in any state a ∈ [0, 1].
Thus, a¯tk−1 = atk−1 = −1.
Case 2. If eδ(0) = 0, Firm i is indifferent between stopping searching and continuing searching
with 0 as the cut-off, if it is in state 0; strictly prefers stopping searching, if it is in any state
above 0. Then a¯tk−1 = 0 and atk−1 = −1.
Case 3. If eδ(0) > 0 ≥ lima→0 eδ(a), Firm i is strictly better off continuing searching in state
0, but stopping searching once it is in a state above 0. Thus, a¯tk−1 = atk−1 = 0.
Case 4. If lima→0 eδ(a) > 0, then Firm i’s is strictly better off stopping searching if it is in a
state above aˆtk−1 and continuing searching if it is in a state below aˆtk−1 , where the optimal
cut-off aˆtk−1 > 0 is the unique value of a that satisfies,∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)− δc = 0.
Thus, in this case a¯tk−1 = atk−1 = aˆtk−1 .
Hence, the continuation payoff at tk−1 ≥ 0 for Firm i in a state a ∈ [0, 1] is
ω(a) =
P (a) +
∫ 1
a [P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)− δc for a < atk−1
P (a) for a ≥ atk−1 .
Then, we look at the time point tk−2. In the following, we argue that a¯tk−2 = a¯tk−1 . The
argument for atk−2 = atk−1 is very similar and thus is omitted.
First, we show that a¯tk−2 ≤ a¯tk−1 . Suppose a¯tk−2 > a¯tk−1 . Suppose Firm i is in state a¯tk−2
at time tk−2. Suppose Firm i searches between tk−2 and tk−1. If it does not discover any
innovation with a value higher than a¯tk−2 , then at the end of this period it stops searching
and takes a¯tk−2 . However, a¯tk−2 > a¯tk−1 implies
0 =
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a˜)− δci
<
∫ 1
a¯tk−1
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−1)]dGδ(a˜)− δc ≤ 0.
The search cost is not compensated by the increase in the probability of winning from searching
between tk−2 and tk−1, and thus the firm strictly prefers stopping searching to continuing
searching at time tk−2, which contradicts the assumption that a¯tk−2 is the upper optimal
cut-off. Hence, it must be the case that a¯tk−2 ≤ a¯tk−1 .
Next, we show that a¯tk−2 = a¯tk−1 .
In Case 1, it is straightforward that Firm i strictly prefers stopping searching at tk−2, since
it is for sure not going to search between tk−1 and tk. Hence, Firm i stops searching before
tk−1, and a¯tk−2 = a¯tk−1 = atk−2 = atk−1 = −1.
For a¯tk−1 ≥ 0, we prove by contradiction that a¯tk−2 < a¯tk−1 is not possible. Suppose the
inequality holds. If Firm i stops searching at tk−2, it would choose to continue searching at
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tk−1, and its expected continuation payoff at tk−2 is ω(a¯tk−2). If the firm continues searching,
its expected continuation payoff is
ω(a¯tk−2) +
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[ω(a)− ω(a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a)− δc. (1.6)
In Cases 2 and 3, a¯tk−1 = 0 implies a¯tk−2 = −1. Then,∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[ω(a)− ω(a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a)− δci
=
∫ 1
−1
[P (a)]dGδ(a)− δci
=eδ(−1)
≥0
which means that Firm i in state 0 is weakly better off continuing searching between tk−2 and
tk−1, which implies that a¯tk−2 ≥ 0, resulting in a contradiction.
For Case 4, in which a¯tk−1 > 0, we have in (1.6)∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[ω(a)− ω(a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a)
=
∫ a¯tk−1
a¯tk−2
[(
P (a) +
∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)
)
−
(
P (a¯tk−2) +
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a˜)
)]
dGδ(a)
+
∫ 1
a¯tk−1
[
P (a)−
(
P (a¯tk−2) +
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a˜)
)]
dGδ(a)
=
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[
P (a)− P (a¯tk−2)] dGδ(a) + ∫ a¯tk−1
a¯tk−2
[∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)
]
dGδ(a)
−
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[P (a˜)− P (a¯tk−2)]dGδ(a˜)
]
dGδ(a)
=Gδ(a¯tk−2)
∫ 1
a¯tk−2
[
P (a)− P (a¯tk−2)] dGδ(a) + ∫ a¯tk−1
a¯tk−2
[∫ 1
a
[P (a˜)− P (a)]dGδ(a˜)
]
dGδ(a)
>0.
Hence, at tk−2 Firm i would strictly prefer continuing searching, which again contradicts the
assumption that a¯tk−2 is the upper optimal cut-off. Consequently, a¯tk−2 = a¯tk−1 .
By backward induction from tk−1 to t0, we have a¯t0 = a¯tk−1 . Taking the limit we get
a¯t = lim
δ→0
a¯T−δ =: a¯ for all t ∈ [0, T ).
Similarly,
at = lim
δ→0
aT−δ =: a for all t ∈ [0, T ).
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In addition, a¯ 6= a when and only when a¯ = 0 and a = −1.
As a consequence, Firm i’s best response is not to search, if a¯ = a = −1; to continue
searching if it is in a state below a¯ and to stop searching once the firm in a state above a¯, if
a¯ = a ≥ 0.
In brief, the above property is proved by backward induction. Take Case [ii] for example.
If at the last moment a firm is indifferent between continuing and stopping searching when
it is in a certain state, which means the increase in the probability of winning from contin-
uing searching equals the cost of searching, and therefore there is no gain from searching.
Immediately before the last moment the firm should also be indifferent between continuing
searching and not given the same state. This is because, if the firm reaches a higher state
from continuing searching, it weakly prefers not to search at the last moment, and thus the
increase in the probability of winning from continuing searching at this moment equals the
cost of searching as well. By induction, the firm should be indifferent between continuing and
stopping searching in the same state from the very beginning.
In Case [iii], Firm i generally has uncountably many best response strategies. By Assump-
tion 2.1, we rule out most strategies and consider only two natural strategies: not to search
at all and to search with 0 as the cut-off.
Lemma 1.5. Suppose a firm’s initial state is 0, and she searches with a cut-off aˆ ≥ 0. Then,
the firm’s probability of ending up in a state below a ∈ [0, 1] at time T is
Z(a|aˆ, T ) =

0 if a = 0
e−λT [1−F (a)] if 0 < a ≤ aˆ
e−λT [1−F (aˆ)] +
[
1− e−λT [1−F (aˆ)]] F (a)−F (aˆ)1−F (aˆ) if a > aˆ.
1−e−λT [1−F (aˆ)] is the probability that the firm stops searching before time T, and F (a)−F (aˆ)1−F (aˆ)
is the conditional probability that the innovation above the threshold the firm discovers is in
between aˆ and a.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. For a = 0, it is clear that Z(a|aˆ, T ) = 0.
For 0 < a ≤ aˆ,
Z(a|aˆ, T ) =
∞∑
l=0
e−λT (λT )l
l!
F l(a) = e−λT [1−F (a)].
For a > aˆ, we approximate it by a discrete time model. Let {tl}kl=0, where 0 = t0 < t1 <
... < tk = T , be a partition of the interval [0, T ], and let δl = tl − tl−1 for l = 1, 2, ..., k. Define
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pi as
‖ pi ‖= max
1≤l≤k
|δl|.
Then,
Z(a|aˆ, T ) =Z(aˆ|aˆ, T ) + lim
‖pi‖→0
k∑
l=1
Z(a|aˆ, tl−1)
[ ∞∑
n=1
e−λδl(λδl)n
n!
[Fn(a)− Fn(aˆ)]
]
=Z(aˆ|aˆ, T ) + lim
‖pi‖→0
k∑
l=1
e−λtl−1[1−F (aˆ)]λe−λδl
(
[F (a)− F (aˆ)] +O(δl)
)
δl
=Z(aˆ|aˆ, T ) +
∫ T
0
λe−λt[1−F (aˆ)][F (a)− F (aˆ)]dt
=Z(aˆ|aˆ, T ) +
[
1− e−λT [1−F (aˆ)]
] F (a)− F (aˆ)
1− F (aˆ) ,
where the second term on the right hand side of each equality is the firm’s probability of ending
up in a state between aˆ and a. The term Z(aˆ|aˆ, tn) used here is a convenient approximation
when δl is small. The second equality is derived from the fact that
∞∑
n=2
(λδl)
n
n!
[Fn(a)− Fn(a∗)] < λ
2δ2l
2(1− λδl) = o(δl).
Lemma 1.6. Given a > a′, Z(a|a˜, T )− Z(a′|a˜, T )
1. is constant in a˜ for a˜ ≥ a;
2. strictly decreases in a˜ for a˜ ∈ (a′, a);
3. strictly increases in a˜ for a˜ ≤ a′.
This single-peaked property says that the probability of ending up in a state between a′
and a is maximized if a firm chooses strategy a′.
Proof of Lemma 1.6. First, we show that 1−e
−λTx
x strictly decreases in x over (0, 1] as
follows. Define s := λT and take x1, x2, 0 < x1 < x2 ≤ 1, we have
1− e−sx1
x1
>
1− e−sx2
x2
,
implied by
∂(1− e−sx1)x2 − (1− e−sx2)x1
∂s
= x1x2(e
−sx1 − e−sx2) ≥ 0 (= 0 iff s = 0) and
(1− e−sx1)x2 − (1− e−sx2)x1 = 0 for s = 0.
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Next, define x := 1− F (a), x′ := 1− F (a′), and x˜ := 1− F (a˜). We have
Z(a|a˜, T )− Z(a′|a˜, T ) =

e−λTx − e−λTx′ for a˜ ≥ a
(1− e−λTx′)− (1− e−λT x˜)xx˜ for a˜ ∈ (a′, a)
(1− e−λT x˜)x′−xx˜ for a˜ ≤ a′.
It is independent of a˜ for a˜ ≥ a, strictly increasing in x˜ and thus strictly decreasing in a˜ for
a˜ ≤ a′, and strictly decreasing in x˜ and thus strictly increasing in a˜ for a˜ ≤ a′.
Lemma 1.7. Suppose Firm j with initial state 0 plays a strategy aˆj. Then, the instantaneous
gain on payoff from searching for Firm i in a state a is
λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(ai|aˆj , T )]dF (a)− c.
Proof of Lemma 2.2. For convenience, denote H(a) as Z(a|aˆj , T ) for short. The instanta-
neous gain from searching for Firm i in a state ai is
lim
δ→0
(
e−λδH(ai) + λδe−λδ
[∫ 1
ai
H(a)dF (a) + F (ai)H(ai)
]
+ o(δ)− δc
)
−H(ai)
δ
= lim
δ→0
−(1− e−λδ)H(ai) + λδe−λδ
[∫ 1
ai
H(a)dF (a) + F (ai)H(ai)
]
+ o(δ)− δc
δ
= lim
δ→0
−λδe−λδH(ai) + λδe−λδ
[∫ 1
ai
H(a)dF (a) + F (ai)H(ai)
]
+ o(δ)− δc
δ
=− λH(ai) + λ
[∫ 1
ai
H(a)dF (a) + F (ai)H(ai)
]
− c
=λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(ai|aˆj , T )] dF (a)− c.
1.A.2 Proofs for the Benchmark Case
Proof of Theorem 1.1. We prove the theorem case by case.
Case[i]. When Firm i does not search, Firm j’s best response is to search with cut-off 0.
For 12λ(1 + e
−λT ) ≤ c, when Firm j searches with any cut-off aj ≥ 0, Firm i’s best response
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is not to search, since the instantaneous gain from searching for Firm i in state 0 is
λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|aj , T )dF (a)− c
≤λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|0, T )dF (a)− c
=λ
∫ 1
0
[
e−λT + (1− e−λT )F (a)]dF (a)− c
=λ
[
e−λT +
1
2
(1− e−λT )
]
− c
=
1
2
λ(1 + e−λT )− c
≤0 (= 0 iff 1
2
λ(1 + e−λT ) = c),
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 1.6. Hence, there are two pure strategy equi-
libria, in each of which one firm does not search and the other firm searches with 0 as the
cut-off, and if 12λ(1 + e
−λT ) = c there is also an equilibrium in which both firms search with
0 as the cut-off.
Case [ii]. First, we show that any strategy with a cut-off value higher than zero is a
dominated strategy. When Firm j does not search, Firm i prefers searching with 0 as the
cut-off to any other strategy. Suppose Firm j searches with aˆj ≥ 0 as the cut-off. The
instantaneous gain from searching for Firm i in a state ai > 0 is
λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(ai|aˆj , T )]dF (a)− c
≤λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|ai, T )− Z(ai|ai, T )]dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1− e−λT )[1− F (ai)]2 − c
<0,
where the first inequality follows from Lemma 1.6. Hence, once Firm i is in a state above
0, it has no incentive to continue searching any more. In this case, Firm i prefers either not
to conduct any search or to search with 0 as the cut-off to any strategy with a cut-off value
higher than zero.
Second, we show that the prescribed strategy profile is the unique equilibrium. It is
sufficient to show that searching with 0 as the cut-off is the best response to searching with
0 as the cut-off. Suppose Firm j searches with 0 as the cut-off, the instantaneous gain from
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searching for Firm i in state a = 0 is
λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|0, T )dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1 + e−λT )− c
>0.
That is, Firm i is strictly better off continuing searching if it is in state 0, and strictly better
off stopping searching once it is in a state above 0. Hence, the prescribed strategy profile is
the unique equilibrium.
Case [iii]. First, we prove that among the strategy profiles in which each firm searches with
a cut-off higher than 0, the prescribed symmetric strategy profile is the unique equilibrium.
Suppose a pair of cut-off rules (a∗1, a∗2), in which a∗1, a∗2 > 0, is an equilibrium, then Firm i in
state a∗i is indifferent between continuing searching and not. That is, by Lemma 2.2, we have
λ
∫ 1
a∗i
[
Z(a|a∗j , T )− Z(a∗i |a∗j , T )
]
dF (a)− c = 0. (1.7)
Suppose a∗1 6= a∗2. W.l.o.g., we assume a∗1 < a∗2. Then,
c =λ
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗1|a∗2, T )]dF (a)
>λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗2, T )]dF (a)
>λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗1, T )]dF (a) = c
resulting in a contradiction. Hence, it must be the case that a∗1 = a∗2.
Next, we show the existence of equilibrium by deriving the unique equilibrium cut-off value
a∗ := a∗1 = a∗2 explicitly. Applying Lemma 4.2 to (1.7), we have
λ
∫ 1
a∗
[
1− e−λT [1−F (a∗)]
] F (a)− F (a∗)
1− F (a∗) dF (a) = c
⇔1
2
[1− F (a∗)]
[
1− e−λT [1−F (a∗)]
]
=
c
λ
. (1.8)
The existence of a solution is ensured by the intermediate value theorem: when F (a∗) = 1,
the term on the left hand side of (1.8) equals to 0, smaller than cλ ; when F (a
∗) = 0, it equals
to 1−e
−λT
2 , larger than or equals to
c
λ . The uniqueness of the solution is insured by that the
term on the left hand side of the above equality is strictly decreasing in a∗.
Second, we show that there is no equilibrium in which one firm searches with 0 as the
cut-off. Suppose Firm j searches with 0 as the cut-off. The instantaneous gain from searching
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for Firm i in a state ai > 0 is
λ
∫ 1
ai
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(ai|0, T )]dF (a)− c
=λ
∫ 1
ai
(1− e−λT )[F (a)− F (ai)]dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1− e−λT )[1− F (ai)]2 − c, (1.9)
which is positive when ai = 0 and negative when ai = 1. By the intermediate value theorem,
there must be a value aˆi > 0 such that (1.9) equals 0 when ai = aˆi. Hence, Firm i’s best
response is to search with aˆi as the cut-off. However, if Firm i searches with aˆi as the cut-off,
it is not Firm j’s best response to search with 0 as the cut-off, because
0 =
∫ 1
aˆj
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(aˆj |0, T )]dF (a)− c
<
∫ 1
aˆj
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(aˆj |aˆj , T )]dF (a)− c
<
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|aˆj , T )− Z(0|aˆj , T )]dF (a)− c,
which means that Firm j strictly prefers continuing searching when it is in a state slightly
above 0.
Last, we show that there is no equilibrium in which one firm does not search. Suppose
Firm j does not search. Firm i’s best response is to search with 0 as the cut-off. However,
Firm j then strictly prefers searching when it is in state 0, since the instantaneous gain from
searching for the firm in state 0 is again
λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|ai, T )dF (a)− c > 0.
Proof of Lemma 1.2. The expected total cost of a firm who searches with a cut-off a ≥ 0
is
c
[∫ T
0
∂(1− Z(a|a, t))
∂t
tdt+ TZ(a|a, T )
]
=(1− e−λT [1−F (a)]) c
λ[1− F (a)] , (1.10)
which strictly increases in a. In Regions 2 and 3, in equilibrium, the probability of winning
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for each firm is
1
2
[1− Z2(0|a∗(c, T ), T )]
=
1
2
(1− e−2λT ), (1.11)
and thus the expected payoff to each firm is the difference between the expected probability
of winning (1.11) and the expected search cost (1.10), setting a to be a∗(a, T ):
1
2
(1− e−2λT )− (1− e−λT [1−F (a∗(c,T ))]) c
λ[1− F (a∗(c, T ))] . (1.12)
The limit of (1.12) as T approaches infinity is 0.
1.A.3 Proofs for the Head Start Case
First, we state two crucial lemmas for the whole section.
Lemma 1.8.
1. For aI1 > a
∗(c, T ), not to search is Firm 1’s strictly dominant strategy.
2. For aI1 = a
∗(c, T ), not to search is Firm 1’s weakly dominant strategy. If Firm 2 searches
with cut-off aI1, Firm 1 is indifferent between not to search and search with a
I
1 as the
cut-off; Otherwise, Firm 1 strictly prefers not to search.
Proof of Lemma 1.8. Suppose Firm 2 does not search, Firm 1’s best response is not to
search. Suppose Firm 2 searches with cut-off a2 ≥ aI1. If Firm 1 searches with cut-off a1 ≥ aI1,
following from Lemma 1.6, the instantaneous gain from searching for Firm 1 in any state
a1 ≥ aI1 ≥ a∗(c, T ) is
λ
∫ 1
a1
[Z(a|a2, T )− Z(a1|a2, T )]dF (a)− c
≤λ
∫ 1
a∗(c,T )
[Z(a|a∗(c, T ), T )− Z(a∗(c, T )|a∗(c, T ), T )]dF (a)− c, (1.13)
where equality holds if and only if a1 = a2 = a
∗(c, T ). The right hand side of inequality (1.13)
is less than or equal to 0 (it equals to 0 iff c ≥ 12λ[1 − e−λT ]). Hence, the desired results
follow.
Lemma 1.9.
1. For aI1 > F
−1(1− cλ), not to search is Firm 2’s strictly dominant strategy.
2. For aI1 = F
−1(1− cλ), not to search is Firm 2’s weakly dominant strategy. If Firm 1 does
not search, Firm 2 is indifferent between not to search and search with any aˆ2 ∈ [aI2, aI1]
as the cut-off. If Firm 1 searches, Firm 2’s strictly prefers not to search.
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Proof of Lemma 1.9. If Firm 1 does not search, the instantaneous gain from searching for
Firm 2 in a state a2 ≤ aI1 is
lim
δ→0
λδe−λδ[1− F (aI1)] + o(δ)− cδ
δ
= λ[1− F (aI1)]− c
< 0 in Case [1]= 0 in Case [2].
If Firm 1 searches, Firm 2’s instantaneous gain is even lower. Hence, the desired results
follow.
Proof of Theorem 1.2. [1],[2], and [3] directly follow from Lemmas 1.8 and 1.9. We only
need to prove [4] and [5] in the following.
[4]. Following Lemma 1.8, if Firm 2 searches with cut-off aI1, Firm 1 has two best responses:
not to search and search with cut-off aI1. If Firm 1 searches with cut-off a
I
1, the instantaneous
gain from searching for Firm 2 is
λ
∫ 1
aI1
Z(a|aI1, T )dF (a)− c
=λ
∫ 1
aI1
[
e−λT [1−F (a
I
1)] + (1− e−λT [1−F (aI1)])F (a)− F (a
I
1)
1− F (aI1)
]
dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1 + e−λT [1−F (a
I
1)])[1− F (aI1)]− c
>λ[1− F (aI1)]− c
>0
if it is in a state a2 < a
I
1 = a
∗(c, T ); it is
λ
∫ 1
a2
[Z(a|aI1, T )− Z(a2|aI1, T )]dF (a)− c < 0
if it is in a state a2 > a
I
1 = a
∗(c, T ). Hence, the two prescribed strategy profiles are equilibria.
[5]. First, there is no equilibrium in which either firm does not search. If Firm 2 does not
search, Firm 1’s best response is not to search. However, if Firm 1 does not search, Firm 2’s
best response is to search with cut-off aI1 rather than not to search. If Firm 2 searches with
cut-off aI1, then not to search is not Firm 1’s best response, because the instantaneous gain
from searching for Firm 1 in state aI1 is
λ
∫ 1
aI1
[Z(a|aI1, T )− Z(aI1|aI1, T )]dF (a)− c
=
1
2
λ(1− e−λT [1−F (aI1)])[1− F (aI1)]− c
>0,
where inequality holds because aI1 < a
∗(c, T ).
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Next, we argue that there is no equilibrium in which either firm searches with cut-off aI1.
Suppose Firm i searches with cut-off aI1. Firm j’s best response is to search with a cut-off
aˆj ∈ [aI1, a∗(c, T )). This is because the instantaneous gain from searching for Firm j in a state
a′ ≥ aI1 is
λ
∫ 1
a′
p2[Z(a|aI1, T )− Z(a′|aI1, T )]dF (a)− c. (1.14)
(1.14) is larger than 0 when a′ = aI1. It is less than 0 if a′ = a∗(c, T ), because by Lemma 1.6
we have
λ
∫ 1
a∗
p2[Z(a|aI1, T )− Z(a∗|aI1, T )]dF (a)− c
<λ
∫ 1
a∗(c,T )
[Z(a|a∗(c, T ), T )− Z(a∗|a∗(c, T ), T )]dF (a)− c
=0.
Then, the intermediate value theorem and the strict monotonicity yield the unique cut-off
value of aˆj ∈ (aI1, a∗(c, T )).
However, if Firm j searches with cut-off aˆj ∈ [aI1, a∗(c, T )), Firm i’s best response is to
search with a cut-off value aˆi ∈ (aˆj , a∗(c, T )) rather than aI1, because the instantaneous gain
from searching for Firm i in a state a˜ is
λ
∫ 1
a˜
[Z(a|aˆ1, T )− Z(a˜|aˆ1, T )]dF (a)− c
< 0 for a˜ = a∗(c, T )> 0 for a˜ = aˆ1
and it is monotone w.r.t. a˜. This results in contradiction. Hence, there is no equilibrium in
which either firm searches with aI1 as the cut-off.
Last, we only need to consider the case in which each firm searches with a cut-off higher
than aI1. Following the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 1.1, we have (a
∗(c, T ), a∗(c, T ))
being the unique equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1.2. We apply Theorem 1.2 here for the analysis. We only need to
show the case for aI1 ∈ (a∗(c, T ), F−1(1− cλ)). In this case, Firm 1 does not to search and Firm
2 searches with aI1 as the cut-off. Now, take the limit a
I
1 → a∗(c, T ) from the right hand side
of a∗(c, T ). In the limit, where Firm 2 searches with a∗(c, T ) as the cut-off, Firm 1 weakly
prefers not to search. If aI1 = a
∗(c, T ), Firm 1 is actually indifferent between searching and
not. Hence, a head start in the limit makes Firm 1 weakly better off. Firm 1’s payoff when
it does not search is e−λT [1−F (aI1)], the probability of Firm 2 ending up in a state below aI1,
is strictly increasing in aI1. Hence, a higher value of the head start makes Firm 1 even better
off.
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Proof of Proposition 1.3. [1]. For T being small, a∗(c, T ) = 0. DM (0, aI1) = 0, and the
partial derivative of DM (T, aI1) w.r.t. T when T is small is
∂DM (T, aI1)
∂T
= λ(1− aI1)e−λT (1−a
I
1)[1− c
λ(1− aI1)
]− λe−2λT + ce−λT ,
which equals to −λaI1 < 0 at the limit of T = 0.
[2]. Follows from Propositions 1.1 and 1.2.
Proof of Proposition 1.4. DM (T, aI1) is strictly decreasing in a
I
1, and it goes to the opposite
of (1.12), which is less than 0, as aI1 goes to F
−1(1− cλ), and
(1− e−λT [1−F (a∗(c,T ))])− 1
2
(1− e−2λT ) (1.15)
as aI1 goes to a
∗(c, T ). Hence, if (1.15) is positive, Case 1 yields from the intermediate value
theorem; Case 2 holds if (1.15) is negative.
1.A.4 Proofs for the Extended Models
Proof of Proposition 1.7. We argue that, to determine a subgame perfect equilibrium, we
only need to consider two kinds of strategies profiles:
a Firm 1 retains its initial innovation and does not search, and Firm 2 searches with aI1 as
the cut-off;
b Firm 1 discards its initial innovation and searches with aI2 as the cut-off, and Firm 2
retains its initial innovation.
First, suppose c < λ2 (1 + e
−λT ). If Firm 1 retains the initial innovation, it will have no
incentive to search, and Firm 2 is indifferent between discarding the initial innovation and
not. In either case, Firm 2 searches with aI1 as the cut-off. Given that Firm 1 has discarded
its initial innovation, Firm 2 has no incentive to discard its initial innovation as shown in
Proposition 1.2.
Second, suppose c > λ2 (1 + e
−λT ). In the subgame in which both firms discard their initial
innovation, there are two equilibria, in each of which one firm searches with 0 as the cut-off
and the other firm does not search. Hence, to determine a subgame perfect equilibrium, we
have to consider another two strategy profiles, in addition to [a] and [b]:
c Firm 1 discards its initial innovation and searches with 0 as the cut-off, and Firm 2
discards its initial innovation and does not search.
d Firm 1 discards its initial innovation and does not search, and Firm 2 discards its initial
innovation and searches with 0 as the cut-off.
46
However, we can easily rule out [c] and [d] from the candidates for equilibria. In [c], Firm
2 obtains a payoff of 0. It can deviate by retaining its initial innovation so as to obtain a
positive payoff. Similarly, in [d], Firm 1 can deviate by retaining its initial innovation to
obtain a positive payoff rather than 0.
Last, it remains to compare Firm 1’s payoff in [a] and [b]. In [a], Firm 1’s payoff is
e−λT [1−F (a
I
1)]. (1.16)
In [b], it is
(1− e−λT [1−F (aI2)])(1− c
λ[1− F (aI2)]
). (1.17)
The difference between these two payoffs, (1.17) and (1.16), is increasing in T , and it equals
−1 when T = 0 and goes to 1 − c
λ[1−F (aI2)]
> 0 as T approaches infinity. Hence, the desired
result is implied by the intermediate value theorem.
Proof of Proposition 1.8. The backward induction is similar to the proof of Proposition 1.7,
and thus is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 1.9. The equilibrium for the subgame starting from time t0 derives
from Theorem 1.2. Suppose at time t0, Firm i is in a state a
0
i , where max{a01, a02} ≥ aI1.
Assume a0i > a
0
j . If a
0
i > F
−1(1− cλ), then Firm i obtains a continuation payoff of 1, and Firm
j obtains 0. If a0i ∈ (a∗(c, T − t0), F−1(1 − cλ)), then Firm i obtains a continuation payoff of
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a0i )], and Firm j obtains (1− e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a0i )])(1− c
λ[1−F−1(a0i )]
).
To prove this result, we first show that not to search before t0 is Firm 2’s best response
regardless of Firm 1’s action before time t0. It is equivalent to showing that not to search
before t0 is Firm 2’s best response if Firm 2 knows that Firm 1 is definitely going to be in any
state a01 ≥ a∗L at time t0.
As we have shown before, for any a01 ≥ (>)F−1(1 − cλ), Firm 2 (strictly) prefers not to
conduct searching before time t0.
If a01 ∈ [a∗L, F−1(1− cλ)), Firm 2’s unique best response before time t0 is not to search. The
instantaneous gain from searching at any time point before t0 for Firm 2 in a state below a
0
1
is
λ
[
[1− F (F−1(1− c
λ
))] +
∫ F−1(1− c
λ
)
a01
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)
− [1− F (a01)](1− e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
0
i )])(1− c
λ[1− F−1(a0i )]
)
]− c
=λ
[ ∫ F−1(1− cλ )
a01
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)
− [1− F (a01)](1− e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
0
i )])(1− c
λ[1− F−1(a0i )]
)
]
,
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which is strictly negative when T − t0 is sufficiently large, and thus conducting a search before
time t0 actually makes Firm 2 strictly worse off in this case.
Next, we show that Firm 1’s best response before time t0 is to search with F
−1(1− cλ) as
the cut-off, if Firm 2 does not search before t0. To see this, look at the instantaneous gain
from searching for Firm 1 in a state below F−1(1− cλ):
λ
[
[1− F (F−1(1− c
λ
))]
+
∫ F−1(1− c
λ
)
aI1
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)− [1− F (aI1)]e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
I
1)]
]− c
=
∫ F−1(1− c
λ
)
aI1
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)− [1− F (aI1)]e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
I
1)]
>
∫ F−1(1− c
λ
)
a˜
e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a)]dF (a)− [1− F (a˜)]e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (aI1)]
>(1− c
λ
− F (a˜))e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a˜)] − [1− F (a˜)]e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (aI1)]
=e−λ(T−t0)[1−F (a
I
1)][1− c
λ
− F (a˜)]
(
eλ(T−t0)[F (a˜)−F (a
I
1)] − 1− F (a˜)
1− cλ − F (a˜)
)
,
where a˜ is any value in (aI1, F
−1(1− cλ)). The term on the right hand side of the last equality
is strictly positive if T − t0 is sufficiently large. Hence, the desired result yields.
1.A.5 Proofs for the Case with Asymmetric Costs
Proposition 1.12. If 0 < c1 < c2 <
1
2λ(1−e−λT ) there exists a pure strategy equilibrium (a∗1,
a∗2) with a∗1, a∗2 ≥ 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.12. We prove the existence of equilibrium by applying Brouwer’s
fixed point theorem. First, same as in the previous proofs, if Firm j searches with a cut-off
aˆj ≥ 0, the instantaneous gain from searching for Firm i in state 0 is
λ
∫ 1
0
Z(a|1, T )− ci > 0,
and thus Firm i is better off continuing searching if it is in state 0.
Next, let us define for each Firm j a critical value
αj = sup{aj ∈ [0, 1] | I(0|αj , ci) = λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|αj)− Z(0|αj)]dF (a)− ci > 0}.
Suppose there is a αj ∈ (0, 1) such that
I(0|αj , ci) = λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|αj)− Z(0|αj)]dF (a)− ci = 0.
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For any aˆj ∈ [0, αj ],
I(0|aˆj , ci) ≥ 0 and
I(1|aˆj , ci) < 0.
By the intermediate value theorem and the strict monotonicity of Q(a|aˆj , ci) in a, there must
exist a unique a˜i ∈ [0, 1) such that
I(a˜i|aˆj , ci) = 0.
That is, if Firm j searches with cut-off aˆj , Firm i’s best response is to search with cut-off a˜i.
For any aˆj ∈ (αj , 1], if the set is not empty,
I(0|aˆj , ci) < 0.
That is, Firm i’s best response is to search with cut-off 0.
Then, we could define two best response functions BRi : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] where
BRi(aˆj) :=
0 for aˆj ∈ (αj , 1] if it is not emptya˜i where I(a˜i|aˆj , ci) = 0 for aˆj ∈ [0, αj ].
It is also easy to verify that BRi is a continuous function over [0, 1]. Hence, we have a
continuous self map BR : [0, 1]2 → [0, 1]2 where
BR = (BR1, BR2)
on a compact set, and by Brouwer’s fixed point theorem, there must exist of a pure strategy
equilibrium in which each Firm searches with a cut-off higher than or equal to 0.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. First, using the same arguments as in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1.1, we claim that if there exists an equilibrium it must be the case that each firm
searches with a cut-off higher than or equal to 0 with one strictly positive value for one firm.
Next, we show that there can be no equilibrium in which Firm 2 searches with a cut-off
aˆ2 > 0 and Firm 1 searches with cut-off 0. Such a strategy profile (0, aˆ2) is an equilibrium if
and only if
λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|aˆ2, T )− Z(0|aˆ2, T )]dF (a)− c1 ≤ 0, and
λ
∫ 1
aˆ2
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(aˆ2|0, T )]dF (a)− c2 = 0.
49
However,
0 = λ
∫ 1
aˆ2
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(aˆ2|0, T )]dF (a)− c2
< λ
∫ 1
aˆ2
[Z(a|aˆ2, T )− Z(aˆ2|aˆ2, T )]dF (a)− c2
< λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|aˆ2, T )− Z(0|aˆ2, T )]dF (a)− c1 ≤ 0,
resulting in a contradiction.
Next, we derive the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilirbium
in which Firm 2 searches with a cut-off 0 and Firm 1 searches with a cut-off strictly higher
than 0. A pair of cut-off rules (aˆ1, 0), aˆ1 > 0, is an equilibrium if and only if
λ
∫ 1
aˆ1
[Z(a|0, T )− Z(aˆ1|0, T )]dF (a)− c1 = 0 and (1.18)
λ
∫ 1
0
[Z(a|aˆ1, T )− Z(0|aˆ1, T )]dF (a)− c2 ≤ 0, (1.19)
where
(1.18)⇔1
2
λ(1− e−λT )[1− F (aˆ1)]2 − c = 0⇔ aˆj = F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1− e−λT )
)
. (1.20)
Then, (1.20) and (1.19) together imply that (aˆi, 0) is an equilibrium if and only if
I
(
0|F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1− e−λT )
)
, c2
)
≤ 0. (1.21)
We will see that if (1.21) holds there is no other equilibrium.
When (1.21) does not hold, there is a unique equilibrium, in which each firm searches
with a cut-off strictly higher than 0. Because by Proposition 1.12 an equilibrium must exists.
Let (a∗1, a∗2) be such an equilibrium. We first show that a∗1 > a∗2 must hold by proof by
contradiction, and then we show that it must be a unique equilibrium. Such a pair (a∗1, a∗2) is
an equilibrium if and only if
λ
∫ 1
a∗i
[Z(a|a∗j , T )− Z(a∗i |a∗j , T )]dF (a) = ci for i = 1, 2 and j 6= i. (1.22)
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Suppose a∗1 ≤ a∗2. Applying Lemma 1.6, we have
c1 =λ
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗1|a∗2, T )]dF (a)
≥λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗2, T )]dF (a)
≥λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗1, T )]dF (a) = c2,
resulting in a contradiction.
Then, we show the uniqueness of the equilibrium for Cases [1]− [3] by contradiction. For
Case [1] we show that the solution to (1.22) is unique, and for Cases [2] and [3] we show that
there can be no equilibrium in which each firm searches with a cut-off higher than 0 coexisting
with equilibrium
(
F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, 0
)
. We can prove all of them together. Suppose
there are two equilibria (a∗1, a∗2) and (a˜∗1, a˜∗2), where (a∗1, a∗2) is a solution to (1.22) and (a˜∗1, a˜∗2)
is either
(
F−1
(
1−
√
2c1
λ(1−e−λT )
)
, 0
)
or a solution to (1.22). It is sufficient to show that the
following two cases are not possible:
1. a˜∗1 > a∗1 > a∗2 > a˜∗2 ≥ 0 and
2. a∗1 > a˜∗1 > a∗2 > a˜∗2 ≥ 0.
Suppose a˜∗1 > a∗1 > a∗2 > a˜∗2 ≥ 0. Applying Lemma 1.6 we have
0 =λ
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a∗1|a∗2, T )]dF (a)− c1
<λ
∫ 1
a˜∗1
[Z(a|a∗2, T )− Z(a˜∗1|a∗2, T )]dF (a)− c1
<λ
∫ 1
a˜∗1
[Z(a|a˜∗2, T )− Z(a˜∗1|a˜∗2, T )]dF (a)− c1 = 0,
resulting in a contradiction.
Suppose a∗1 > a˜∗1 > a∗2 > a˜∗2 ≥ 0. Applying Lemma 1.6 again, we have
0 ≥λ
∫ 1
a˜∗2
[Z(a|a˜∗1, T )− Z(a˜∗2|a˜∗1, T )]dF (a)− c2
>λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a˜∗1, T )− Z(a∗2|a˜∗1, T )]dF (a)− c2
>λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1, T )− Z(a∗2|a∗1, T )]dF (a)− c2 = 0,
resulting in another contradiction.
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Proof of Proposition 1.11. For fixed c2 we have
∂a∗2
∂a∗1
= −
∂
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1,T )−Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )]dF (a)
∂a∗1
∂
∫ 1
a∗2
[Z(a|a∗1,T )−Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )]dF (a)
∂a∗2
=
∫ 1
a∗2
∂[Z(a|a∗1,T )−Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )]
∂a∗1
dF (a)
∂Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )
∂a∗2
< 0.
Then,
∂a∗1
∂c1
= − −1
λ
∫ 1
a∗1
[
∂[Z(a|a∗2,T )−Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )]
∂a∗2
∂a∗2
∂a∗1
− ∂Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )a∗1
]
dF (a)
< 0 and
∂a∗2
∂c1
=
∂a∗2
∂a∗1
∂a∗1
∂c1
> 0.
For fixed c1 we have
∂a∗1
∂a∗2
= −
∂
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2,T )−Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )]dF (a)
∂a∗2
∂
∫ 1
a∗1
[Z(a|a∗2,T )−Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )]dF (a)
∂a∗1
=
∫ 1
a∗1
∂[Z(a|a∗2,T )−Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )]
∂a∗2
dF (a)
∂Z(a∗1|a∗2,T )
∂a∗1
> 0.
Then,
∂a∗2
∂c2
= − −1
λ
∫ 1
a∗2
[
∂[Z(a|a∗1,T )−Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )]
∂a∗1
∂a∗1
∂a∗2
− ∂Z(a∗2|a∗1,T )a∗2
]
dF (a)
< 0 and
∂a∗1
∂c1
=
∂a∗1
∂a∗2
∂a∗2
∂c2
< 0.
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Chapter 2
Matching Prior to Cournot Competition:
An Assignment Game with Externalities
Introduction
Recently, an observation was addressed in the following piece of news:
“Apple is reported to be working on an electric car . . . The . . . company has
been on a hiring spree attracting key members of rival car manufacturers’ electric
and new vehicle system teams. . . . A new team has reportedly been . . . under
the control of the former Ford executive Steve Zadesky and former chief executive
of Mercedes-Benz’s research and development Johann Jungwirth.” (The Guardian
February 20, 2015)
When making hiring decisions, a large firm does not only care about the ability of the
workers to be hired by itself but also the ability of the workers to be hired by its rival firms.
A worker does not only affect her employer’s competing strategy but also her employer’s rival
firms’ strategies in the goods market. That is, each firm’s hiring decision has externalities
on the other firms and workers. If such externalities are taken into account, what would be
a stable matching outcome between firms and workers? And what would be the consequent
goods market outcome? Such a labor market matching problem could not be solved by the
standard models introduced by Gale and Shapley (1962) and Shapley and Shubik (1971) since
externalities are not considered in these models.1
This chapter extends the literature on matching with externalities. It is the first attempt
to link the labor market matching problem to the imperfect competition problem in a goods
market. Specifically, the problem is modeled as a two-stage game in which firms and managers
simultaneously for a 1-to-1 matching before a Cournot competitions starts among all firm-
manager pairs. I provide sufficient conditions for the outcomes that good firms hire good
1See Roth and Sotomayor (1992) for a detailed discussion of literature.
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managers and that good firms hire lesser managers, respectively.
To analyze the above problem, one needs a proper concept of stable matching. I start by
a review of the general model for 1-to-1 assignment games with externalities in Section 2.1.
The solution concept I use is an adaption of Sasaki and Toda’s (1996) conjectural equilibrium
(Hahn, 1987) for pessimistic (Aumann and Peleg, 1960) agents. A matching is stable if there
is an associated feasible payoff profile such that: (1) the matching is consistent with agents’
conjectures (expectations about the resulting matchings), i.e., the matching is in the expecta-
tion of each pair of agents; (2) no pair of agents can block the outcome. A result parallel to
the finding of Sasaki and Toda in matching with externalities and ordinal preferences is that
a stable matching is ensured to exist if and only if each agent considers all matchings possible.
Section 2.2 puts the genera framework of 1-to-1 assignment games into use in the environ-
ment of a Cournot competition. Firms produce a homogeneous good and sell it to the same
market, and the market price of the good is decided by the aggregate output. Hence, each
firm’s hiring outcome affects all other firm’s production decisions and profits, which in turn
affects these firms’ hiring decisions. I assume that (i) each firm has to hire one manager to
produce the good; (ii) the market demand function is linear; (iii) the unit production cost of
a firm depends only on the technology the firm and the human capital of the manager hired
by the firm. Under these assumptions, it is shown in Section 2.3 that if the unit cost function
is submodular, it is rational for each firm-manager pair to believe that, if they are to pair up,
the remaining agents will form a positive assortative matching (PAM) among themselves, and
the PAM on the whole market is a stable matching under these rational conjectures. That
is, if firm technology and human capital are complementary, it will be a stable matching that
a good manager works for a good firm and a lesser manager works for a lesser firm. Even
if the the unit cost function is supermodular, as long as the cross derivative is sufficiently
smaller than the product of the partial derivatives, the PAM is still stable under rational con-
jectures. That is, if firm technology and human capital are substitutable, yet the substitutive
effect is dominated by the marginal effects of technology and human capital, it would still
be a stable matching that good firms hire good managers. However, if the market demand
level is sufficiently high, the negative assortative matching is a stable matching. Because of
multi-dimensionality of externalities, it is not easy to provide a short-cut to prove the above
results. I prove them in a recursive method, using Sharpley and Shubik’s linear programming
technology. On the other hand, an example shows that a stable matching does not generally
exist.
Afterwards, I analyze social welfare induced by matchings. A surprising result is that
when technology and human capital are complementary, the social welfare induced by a PAM,
54
which is stable, could be lower than that induced by some other matching. Hence, when firm
technology and human capital are substitutable, a government may improve social welfare by
subsidizing production cost to induce a more desirable matching outcome in the labor market.
Literature
Ever since Gale and Shapley’s (1971) and Shapley and Shubik’s (1971) pioneer work, there
has been a huge literature on matching and assignment games. Two-sided matching with
externalities was first studied by Sasaki and Toda (1996), but the literature had been very
scarce until the past few years. In Sasaki and Toda’s one-to-one matching model, externalities
are captured by preferences over the set of complete matchings rather than the set of agents
on the other side of the market. Each pair of deviators have exogenously given conjectures
about the possible matchings resulting from their block. They provide a concept of conjectural
equilibrium for their model and show that a stable matching is guaranteed to exist if and only
if each conjecture consists of all possible matchings.2 My model applies Sasaki and Toda’s
abstract framework into the concrete environment of a Cournot competition.3
Most existing work on matching with externalities focuses on the cases with non-trasferable
utilities. Hafalir (2008) perfects Sasaki and Toda’s model of one-to-one matching with ordinal
preferences by proposing endogenized “sophisticated conjectures” and shows the existence of
stable matchings under these conjectures. In contrast to Sasaki and Toda’s far-sighted notions,
Mumcu and Saglam (2010) consider a setting of one-to-one matching in which each pair of
deviators hold the actions of all other players constant when considering their block. Fisher and
Hafalir (2016) study stable matchings in a setting of one-to-one matching in which each agent’s
utility is affected by the aggregate level of externality and each agent has little influence on
the externality level. Similar to Mumcu and Saglam (2010), Bando (2012, 2014) studies stable
matchings and analyzes deferred acceptance algorithm in a setting of many-to-one matching
allowing externalities in the choice behavior of firms but not of workers. Pycia and Yenmez
(2015) consider a general many-to-many matching market with contracts and externalities.
They extend the classical substitutes condition to allow for externalities and establish existence
of stable matchings under the condition. In another recent study, Teytelboym (2012) looks
at multilateral matching markets in networks with contacts and externalities and shows that
2The proof is for the case of two-sided externalities. The same negative result holds under one-sided exter-
nalities, and the existence of stable matching is not guaranteed under rational conjectures as well.
3There is an independent study by Gudmundsson and Habis (2013). Their model is similar to the one here
for general assignment games. The major difference in the settings is on specifying the agents pairs’ values of
deviation. In their setting, a value of deviation is directly given. By contrast, in my setting a pair’s value of
deviation subjects to their conjecture and a stable matching has to be consistent with conjectures. Their study
complements this study by showing properties of equilibria of general two-sided one-to-one assignment games
with externalities. I emphasize on the application of the framework.
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a stable matching exists if and only if agents’ preferences are pairwise aligned in the sense of
Pycia (2012). There is also a literature that examines externalities between couples matched
to the same firm or among peers matched to the same college (Dutta and Masso´, 1997; Klaus
and Klijn, 2005; Echenique and Yenmez, 2007; Pycia, 2012; Kojima et al., 2013; Ashlagi et al.,
2014; Inal, 2015). In contrast to all the above papers, my study considers transferable utilities
and focuses on sorting patterns of stable matchings.
A recent study by Chade and Eeckhout (2016) is closely related to this chapter. They also
consider a two-stage game: A first stage of one-to-one matching and a second stage pairwise
competition among agent pairs (teams). Their model has three distinguishing features: (1)
Each agent has only two possible types; (2) there is a mass of agents, so each agent pair’s
actions have no effect on the overall market; (3) each agent pair (team) competes only against
another pair and thus has no effect on the other teams. Due to these features, a complete
solution to the game can be derived. They also study sorting patterns of stable matchings
and efficiency. My model is also, in some sense, an extension to that of Jehiel and Moldovanu
(1996). Unlike my model in which there are multiple agents on each side of the matching
market, their auction model entails many buyers but only one seller with one indivisible good.
They emphasize on individual strategic play and show that agents might be better off not
participating.
Besides the above theoretical work, there has also been some work emphasizing on appli-
cations and methodologies for quantifying externality effects in matching problems. Baccara
et al. (2012) study an office assignment problem with transferable utilities and quantify the
effects of network externalities on choices and outcomes. Uetake and Watanabe (2012) con-
duct a comprehensive analysis of an industry game in which firms enter a market by merging
an incumbent firm, using a matching model with externalities.
Apart from the studies of matching, I would also like to mention a study by Brander and
Spencer (1985). The Stackelberg-Cournot version of their model is a two-stage game: At the
first stage, a government decides whether to subsidize the production of a domestic firm; at
the second stage firms play a Cournot competition. Under some conditions, subsidization may
increase domestic social welfare. The two-stage game of this chapter shares some features
with Brander and Spencer’s model. Comparing to a lesser manager, a good manager can
relatively reduce the unit production cost of a firm. Thus, my model can be regarded as a
model in which the good managers choose firms to subsidize before the firms start a Cournot
competition.
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2.1 The Model
General Matching and Assignment
Let I be the set of agents on one side (firms) of the market and J be the set of agents
on the other side (managers). I and J are finite and disjoint. The market is denoted by
M = I ∪ J . To simplify the exposition, I assume (i) that I and J have the same cardinality
(i.e., n = |I| = |J | ≥ 2) and (ii) that each of the agents must be matched to one agent on the
other side of the market. Let i and j denote a generic firm and manager, respectively.
A matching is a bijection function µ : I ∪ J → I ∪ J such that: (i) for each m ∈ I ∪ J ,
µ ◦ µ(m) = m; (ii) µ(i) ∈ J , µ(j) ∈ I for all i ∈ I and for all j ∈ J . µ(i) = j (or
equivalently, µ(j) = i) is written as (i, j) ∈ µ. Let A(I, J) be the set of all matchings. For
each (i, j) ∈ I × J, A(i, j) = {µ ∈ A(I, J)|(i, j) ∈ µ}.
Let pi : I × J × A(I, J)→ R+ denote a surplus function. pi(i, j, µ) is interpreted as the
surplus agent i and j create (for themselves) in matching µ. I denote pi(µ) :=
∑
(i,j)∈µ pi(i, j, µ)
as the total surplus of the agents on a matching µ.
Let (u, v) ∈ R|I|+ × R|J |+ denote a payoff profile.4 A payoff profile is a redistribution of the
surpluses to the agents. For simplicity, I assume both pi and (u, v) to be nonnegative.5
The triplet < I, J, pi > is called an assignment game (matching with transferable
utilities) with externalities.
Estimation Function
The notion of stability in this chapter is pair-wise stability. When a firm and a manager are
trying to leave their current respective partner and form a new partnership between themselves,
they need to take into account how the other agents will behave. I here adapt the non-Bayesian
setting proposed by Sasaki and Toda (1996). Let ϕ(i, j) ⊂ A(i, j) be the set of matchings that
agent i and j consider possible if they form a partnership. ϕ is called an estimation function
by Sasaki and Toda. Agents are assumed to be “pessimistic”. That is, a pair of agents not
matched would like to pair up if they believe they can gain by pairing to each other. Let us
denote the value of deviation by
V (ij|ϕ) := min
µ∈ϕ(i,j)
pi(i, j, µ).
4The lower bound of the payoffs is normalized to be 0. Typically, in some market games, if an agent quits
from the market, this agent gets 0 profit, and the resulting matching among the remaining agents do not
influence this agent’s payoff.
5So that I can directly apply the linear programming method without modification.
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Equilibrium Concept
The equilibrium concept I propose is defined as below.
Definition 2.1. Given an estimation function ϕ, a triplet (µ, u, v) is a ϕ-equilibrium if
1. ϕ-admissibility: for any pair (i, j) ∈ µ, µ ∈ ϕ(i, j);
2. ϕ-stability: there is no pair of agents (i, j) for whom V (ij|ϕ) > ui + uj ;
3. feasibility: for all (i, j) ∈ µ, ui + vj = pi(i, j, µ).
This matching µ is called a ϕ-stable matching.
ϕ-admissibility requires a matching to be consistent with agents’ conjectures (i.e., if a
matching is going to be an equilibrium matching, it must be in the expectations of the agent
pairs). ϕ-stability requires that the outcome cannot be blocked by any pair of agents who are
not paired to each other. Feasibility requires that there is no cross-pair monetary transfer and
that no money is left on the table.6
Let Eϕ(I, J, pi) denote the set of all ϕ-equilibria. A negative result, which parallel to that
of Sasaki and Toda (1996) for the case with ordinal preferences, can be shown.
Theorem 2.1. The set Eϕ(I, J, pi) of ϕ-equilibria is non-empty for any surplus function pi if
and only if ϕ(i, j) = A(i, j) for all i ∈ I and j ∈ J .
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.1.
2.2 Cournot Competition among Firm-Manager Pairs
Suppose that firms produce a homogeneous consumer good and sell in the same goods market.
Firms differ in production technologies. Each firm must employ one manager so can it produce
the good. Managers differ in human capital. The unit production cost of a firm depends on
both the production technology of the firm and the human capital of the manager hired by
the firm. Each firm wants to maximize its profit, and each manager goes to the firm that is
willing to pay her the highest salary.
The question is whether high-type (with good production technology) firms would hire
high-type managers (with high human capital). It seems ambiguous because there are two
effects. On the one hand, a high-type manager can help a firm produce more output at a
lower production cost and occupy a larger share of the market. On the other hand, if high-
type managers work for high-type firms, the total output would be high, which results in a
6This requirement can be relaxed.
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low market price, and thus a high-type firm may not be willing to pay a high salary to hire a
high-type manager.
To study this problem, I model it as a two stage game and put the previous framework
into use. The timeline of the two-stage game is as below.
• Stage 1: Firms pair up with managers.
• Stage 2: Firms play a Cournot competition.
At the first stage, firms and managers simultaneously form partnerships, and at the sec-
ond stage firms simultaneously decide their respective output quantities after observing the
matching formed at the first stage. Since each firm’s output quantity has some influence on
the market price of the good, the surplus of a firm-manager pair depends on the full matching
realized. The game is very complicated because of the multi-dimensionality brought by ex-
ternalities. However, some clear results can be derived under some mild assumptions. Before
solving problem, I need to specify the surplus function pi and the estimation function ϕ.
2.2.1 Specification of pi
Firms and managers are assigned to types via maps f : I → F and s : J → S, where
F := [f, f ] and S := [s, s] are compact subsets of R. Their types are publicly known. fi is
firm i’s technology type and sj is manager j’s human capital type. Then, I make the following
assumptions.
Assumption 2.1. The inverse demand function is linear, i.e.,
p(µ, q) := max{ A− α
∑
(i,j)∈µ
qij , 0}.
A is a constant, µ is the matching on the labor market, qij ≥ 0 is the amount of the good
produced and sold by firm i who employs manager j, and q is a vector of qij’s.
Assumption 2.2. The unit production cost of each firm-manager pair is constant.
Let us denote the unit cost function by c : F × S → [c, c], where c > 0. c(f, s) represents
the unit production cost of a type-f firm who hires a type-s manager.
Assumption 2.3. The unit production cost function c(·, ·) is twice continuously differentiable
and decreasing in both types (i.e., c1 < 0 and c2 < 0).
Then, the maximum value of c is c = c(f, s), and the minimum is c = c(f, s).
Assumption 2.4. The value of c is bounded from above by An , i.e.,
A
n > c.
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By imposing Assumption 2.4, I restrict attention to the cases in which no manager or firm
will leave the market or produce 0 output. While this saves us some tedious computational
work, this is without loss of generality for the analysis.7 Further more, I say firm technology
and human capital are substitutable if c12 ≥ 0; complementary if c12 ≤ 0.
Hence, for a given matching µ, the surplus8 created by (i, j) ∈ µ, given the other firm-
manager pairs produce q−(ij), is
pi(i, j, µ| q−(ij)) = max
qij≥0
qij · [p(µ, q)− c(fi, sj)].
For a realized matching µ, the solution to the Cournot competition in the second stage is as
follows.
Lemma 2.1. Suppose Assumptions 2.1, 2.2, and 2.4 hold. For a given matching µ, in a
Cournot game among the matched pairs in µ, a pair (i, j) ∈ µ produce
qij(µ) =
1
(n+ 1)α
[A− (n+ 1)c(fi, sj) +
∑
(i′,j′)∈µ
c(fi′ , sj′)]
and get a surplus of
pi(i, j, µ) =
1
(n+ 1)2α
[A− (n+ 1)c(fi, sj) +
∑
(i′,j′)∈µ
c(fi′ , sj′)]
2. (2.1)
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.2.
In the two-stage game, when (i, j) believe that if they pair to each other, µ is going to be
the resulting matching and firms will play a Cournot competition in the second stage, qij(µ) is
the amount of output that (i, j) are going to produce. That is, qij(µ) is (i, j)’s best response
to their conjecture, and pi(i, j, µ) is the corresponding surplus for (i, j).
2.2.2 Specification of ϕ
According to Theorem 2.1, if each agent’s conjectures consist of all possible matchings, a stable
matching must exist. However, it is not a good idea to assume that agents have universal
conjectures, because that would include many unreasonable matchings. In the following, I will
focus on rational conjectures: conjectures based on rational deductions. Although Theorem 2.1
does not apply any more in this case, the same techniques are used in the proofs.
7If I do not impose the upper bound on the c value, there are cases in which the high-type firms and managers
would produce a large amount of the good, and then the market price is too low for the low-type firms and
managers to survive. For these cases, I can simply exclude these low-type agents from the analysis.
8Notice that although other firms’ output quantities are also involved in the surplus function of a pair of
agents (i, j), this does not mean that there are indeed externalities. A simple example is that if c(f, s) = f + s,
then the output and the surplus of a pair of agents (i, j) do not depend on how the other agents are going to
match since the value of
∑
(i,j)∈µ fi + sj does not depend on µ.
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Rational Conjectures
First, rational conjectures are formally described below. Let Mc := Ic ∪ Jc be a submarket
in which |Ic| = |Jc|, and let Ms := Is ∪ Js = M\Mc be the complement of set Mc. Let µc
denote a generic matching on Mc, and µs a generic matching on Ms. For a given conditional
reduced market
Mr := {Ms | µc},
denote firm i and manager j’s conjecture, when considering to pair to each other, on this
conditional reduced market by
ϕMr(i, j) ⊂ {µs ∈ A(Is, Js) | (i, j) ∈ µs}.
Denote a further conditional reduced market by
M ijr := {Ms\{i, j} | (i, j) ∪ µc}
and the corresponding conditional conjecture function by ϕM
ij
r . Then, I say ϕMr(i, j) is ra-
tional (on market Mr) if: (1) for any matching µs ∈ ϕMr(i, j), µs\{(i, j)} is a ϕM
ij
r -stable
matching on the reduced market M ijr ; (2) for any i′ ∈ Is\{i} and j′ ∈ Js\{j}, ϕM
ij
r (i′, j′) is
rational (on market M ijr ).9 When Ms consists of only 4 agents, every firm-manager pair’s
conjecture is rational since each conjecture contains exactly one sub-matching.10 ϕMr is ra-
tional if ϕMr(i, j) is rational for any i, j ∈ Ms. I illustrate this concept by the following
example.
Example 2.1. Consider a matching market with 5 agents on each side of the market. I show
an example of forming rational conjectures by backward deduction.
First, suppose conditional on (i1, j1), (i2, j2), and (i3, j3) being paired up, respectively, it
is an equilibrium11 that i4 hires j4 and i5 hires j5 on the reduced market {i4, i5, j4, j5}. Then,
consider the reduced market {i3, i4, i5, j3, j4, j5} conditional on (i1, j1) and (i2, j2) being paired
up, respectively. With a little abuse of notation, I denote this conditional reduced market by
M ′′ := {i3, i4, i5, j3, j4, j5 | (i1, j1), (i2, j2)}.
9Notice that I can not directly kick i and j out, since they still have an role at the Cournot competition
stage of the game.
10Li (1993) applies the idea of rational expectations to his model of a one-to-one matching with externalities
and shows that the existence of the equilibrium is ensured when externalities are very weak.
11Since there are only 4 agents, a stable matching must exist.
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If conjectures are rational, it must be the case that
ϕM
′′
(i3, j3) = {{(i3, j3), (i4, j4), (i5, j5)}}.
Next, suppose {(i3, j3), (i4, j4), (i5, j5)} is indeed a ϕM ′′-stable matching on market M ′′ con-
ditional on (i1, j1) and (i2, j2) being paired up, respectively. Consider the conditional reduced
market
M ′ := {i2, i3, i4, i5, j2, j3, j4, j5 | (i1, j1)}
in which (i1, j1) are paired up. If conjectures are rational, it must be the case that
ϕM
′
(i2, j2) = {{(i2, j2), (i3, j3), (i4, j4), (i5, j5)}}.
Finally, suppose {(i2, j2), (i3, j3), (i4, j4), (i5, j5)} is indeed a ϕM ′-stable matching on mar-
ket M ′ conditional on (i1, j1) being paired up. Consider the full market
M := {i1, i2, i3, i4, i5, j1, j2, j3, j4, j5}.
If conjectures are rational, it must be the case that
ϕ(i1, j1) = {{(i1, j1), (i2, j2)), (i3, j3), (i4, j4), (i5, j5)}}.
That is, when firm i1 and manager j1 are considering to pair up, they believe that this matching
will be the resulting matching.
In brief, a rational conjecture, e.g., ϕ(i1, j1), requires agents i1 and j1 to have a correct
belief about what i2 and j2, when considering to pair up conditional on (i1, j1) being paired up,
believe about what i3 and j3, when considering to pair up conditional on (i1, j1) and (i2, j2)
being paired up, respectively, believe about what matching will be formed among {i4, i5, j4, j5}
conditional on(i1, j1), (i2, j2), and (i3, j3) being paired up, respectively.
Assortative Matchings and Assortative Conjectures
It is complicated to derive rational conjectures, and I now consider assortative matchings as
natural candidates. It will be shown that in many cases conjectures consisting of assortative
matchings on the reduced markets are rational. Let’s review the following definition adapted
to the model in which no two agents share the same type.
Definition 2.2. A matching µ on market M is a positive assortative matching (PAM) if for
any two pairs (i, j), (i′, j′) ∈ µ,
fi > fi′ ⇔ sj > sj′ .
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A negative assortative matching (NAM) is defined similarly.12
Let us denote µM+ as the PAM on M and µ
M(ij)
+ = (i, j) ∪ µM\{i,j}+ as the matching in
which the submatching µM\{i,j} is the PAM on M\{i, j}. Similarly, denote µM− as the NAM
on M and µ
M(ij)
− = (i, j) ∪ µM\{i,j}− as the matching in which the submatching µM\{i,j} is the
NAM on M\{i, j}. For a given conditional reduced market M r, denote
ϕMr+ (i, j) := {µMs(ij+ }, for i, j ∈Ms
as the i and j’s conjecture in which it is a PAM on the corresponding further reduced market.
Similarly, denote
ϕMr− (i, j) := {µMs(ij− }, for i, j ∈Ms
as the i and j’s conjecture in which it is a NAM on the corresponding further reduced market.
2.3 Main Results
First, unfortunately, a stable matching in this two-stage game may not necessarily exist under
rational conjectures.
Proposition 2.1. In the two-stage game with Assumptions 2.1-2.4, a stable matching may
not exist under rational conjectures.
It is proved by the following example.
Example 2.2. Consider a game with 3 firms and 3 managers. Let the parameters be as
follows: Agents’ types are (f1, f2, f3) = (0.2, 0.25, 0.8) and (s1, s2, s3) = (0.2, 0.5, 0.8); the unit
production cost function is c(f, s) = 1f ·s ; A = 80 and α = 1. The surplus function assigns
(approximately) values to the pairs of agents in the six matchings as follows.
µ1
13 426 733
f1 f2 f3
s1 s2 s3
µ2
10 535 657
f1 f2 f3
s1 s3 s2
µ3
320 62 693
f1 f2 f3
s2 s1 s3
µ4
234 412 363
f1 f2 f3
s2 s3 s1
µ5
438 52 609
f1 f2 f3
s3 s1 s2
µ6
356 293 356
f1 f2 f3
s3 s2 s1
Let r(ij) denote the stable matchings in the conditional reduced market {M \ {i, j}|(i, j)}.
For n = 2, there are no externalities, and then rational conjectures can be easily obtained by
12See Legros and Newman (2007) for more on general assortative matchings.
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looking at the maximal total surplus of the four agents. Thus,
r(11) = {µ2} r(12) = {µ4} r(13) = {µ5}
r(21) = {µ5} r(22) = {µ1} r(23) = {µ2}
r(31) = {µ6} r(32) = {µ2} r(33) = {µ1}.
These are also agents’ estimations. Consequently, the values for the characteristic function
are obtained as follows.
V (11) = 10 V (12) = 234 V (13) = 438
V (21) = 52 V (22) = 426 V (23) = 535
V (31) = 356 V (32) = 656 V (33) = 733.
Putting these values into the primal problem, I obtain the maximum value zmax = V (13) +
V (22)+V (31) = 1221. The only admissible matching here is µ2. However, µ2 can only achieve
a total surplus of 1201 which is smaller than zmax. Hence, there exists no stable matching
under rational conjectures in this game.
Remark. Taxing the unit production cost or subsidizing the production cost can change the
existence of stable matching. In the above example, if the government either taxes on produc-
tion cost by 10 percent (unit production cost function is then 1.1f ·s) or subsidizes production cost
by 10 percent (unit production cost function is effectively 0.9f ·s), µ2 = {(i1, j1), (i2, j3), (i3, j2)}
would be stable. If the government subsidizes production cost by 30 percent (unit production
cost function is then 0.7f ·s), the NAM µ6 = {(i1, j3), (i2, j2), (i3, j1)} would be stable.
Nevertheless, existence of stable matching under rational conjectures could be ensured in
some restricted scenarios. Denote (c2)12 as the cross derivative of c
2. The following theorem
provides sufficient conditions to ensure ϕMr+ and ϕ
Mr− to be stable under rational conjectures
in the corresponding scenarios.
Theorem 2.2. In the two-stage game with Assumptions 2.1-2.4,
1. if c12 ≤ 0, then ϕMr+ is rational for Mr, and µM+ is a stable matching under rational
conjectures;
2. if c12 > 0 and
(c2)12
c12
≥ 4 · n2−n
n2+1
· An , then ϕMr+ is rational for Mr, and µM+ is a stable
matching under rational conjectures;
3. if c12 > 0 and
(c2)12
c12
≤ 2 · n2−n
n2+1
· An , then ϕMr− is rational for Mr, and µM− is a stable
matching under rational conjectures.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.3.
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These sufficient conditions are based on (i) the complementary and substitutive effects be-
tween technology and human capital (captured by c12), (ii) the relationship between marginal
effects (captured by c1 and c2) and the substitutive effect, and (iii) the market size. In Sce-
nario 1, in which firm technology and human capital are complementary, a PAM is ensured
to be a stable matching under rational conjectures.13 In Scenario 2, in which firm technology
and human capital are substitutable, if the ratio of the cross derivative of the square of the
cost function and the cross derivative of the unit cost function is sufficiently large, the PAM is
still stable. In Scenario 3, in which the market demand is very high, a change in the resulting
matching has little influence on the final total output and the market price. In this case a
NAM is stable under rational conjectures. The proof is a top-down recursive method. The
intuition is provided as below.
We first analyze Scenario 1. Increase the human capital of the manager hired by the best
firm (i.e., firm 1) increases by ∆ > 0 and keep the other variables constant. Firm 1’s best
response to this is to produce more, and the other firms’ best responses to firm 1’s action
are to produce less. In the matching framework, there must be some other manager (hired
by some firm i other than firm 1) whose human capital decreases by ∆. Firm i would then
produce even less, and the other firms response to this by producing more. However, when
firm technology and human capital are complementary, for firms other than firm 1 and firm
i, firm 1’s effect dominates. Hence, by hiring the best manager (i.e., manager 1) firm 1 is the
only firm that gains and all other firms suffer. This logic can be applied recursively to firm 2
and manager 2, firm 3 and manager 3, and so on. As a consequence, in this scenario the game
ends up with a PAM.
In Scenario 2, the ratio, (c
2)12
c12
, can be written as c1c2c12 + c. The condition is based on
the marginal effects to the substitutive effect. The marginal effects and the substitutive
effect counter each other. To give the intuition, I start from an assignment game with no
externalities. Suppose each firm can only produce one unit and the market price of the good
is fixed, but the unit production cost still depends on firm type and manager type. The
separation point is c12 = 0: the PAM is stable if and only if c12 ≤ 0. Then, take into account
the effects of c1, c2. c2 < 0 implies that by hiring a marginally better manager, a firm can
produce marginally more at a lower cost, and thus get a higher profit. Hence, even when
c12 > 0, as long as c12 is not too large, a good firm is still willing to spend a little more money
to hire a better manager, and the higher the |c2| value is, the more the firm is willing to pay.
Similar logic applies to c1. Therefore, the separation point, in terms of the value of c12, for
PAM being stable and unstable moves upward. As a consequence, when the marginal effects
13Noticed that although µ
M(ij)
+ is the worse case for agents i and j when they are paired to each other, I
cannot directly apply Theorem 2.1 to prove the result for this case.
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dominate the substitutive effect, good firms should hire good managers; otherwise, good firms
may hire lesser managers and lesser firms may hire good managers.
Theorem 2.2 does not provide a complete solution to the problem, and there are cases
not covered. A natural question follows is, could a non-assotative matching be stable when
technology and human capital are substitutive but neither condition 3 nor condition 2 is
satisfied? The answer is yes, and I prove it by the the following example, which is a modification
of Example 2.2.
Example 2.3 (A non-assortative matching being stable.). Consider a game with 3 firms and
3 managers. Let the parameters be as follows: agents’ types are (f1, f2, f3) = (0.2, 0.5, 0.8)
and (s1, s2, s3) = (0.2, 0.5, 0.8); the unit production cost function is c(f, s) =
1
f ·s ; A = 80 and
α = 1. The surplus function assigns (approximately) values to the pairs of agents in the six
matchings as follows.
µ1
7 559 680
f1 f2 f3
s1 s2 s3
µ2
6 625 625
f1 f2 f3
s1 s3 s2
µ3
237 237 568
f1 f2 f3
s2 s1 s3
µ4
216 492 340
f1 f2 f3
s2 s3 s1
µ5
340 216 493
f1 f2 f3
s3 s1 s2
µ6
320 405 320
f1 f2 f3
s3 s2 s1
The stable matchings in the conditional reduced market {M \ {i, j}|(i, j)}, r(ij), can be
easily obtained by looking at the maximal total surplus of the four agents in this market.
r(11) = {µ2} r(12) = {µ4} r(13) = {µ6}
r(21) = {µ5} r(22) = {µ1} r(23) = {µ2}
r(31) = {µ6} r(32) = {µ2} r(33) = {µ1}.
These are also agents’ estimations. Consequently, the values for the characteristic function
are obtained:
V (11) = 7 V (12) = 237 V (13) = 340
V (21) = 237 V (22) = 559 V (23) = 625
V (31) = 340 V (32) = 625 V (33) = 680.
Putting these values into the primal problem, I obtain the maximum value zmax = V (11) +
V (23) + V (32) = 1257. The only admissible matching here is µ2, and µ2 can achieve a
total surplus of 1257. Therefore, this matching µ2, neither positive assortative nor negative
assortative, is stable under rational conjectures.
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2.4 Social Welfare
In this section, I conduct an analysis of social welfare induced by matchings. I say a matching
µ dominates a matching µ′ if the social surplus (i.e., total consumer benefit minus total
production cost) generated in the Cournot game conditional on µ being formed is higher than
that induced by matching µ′, and µ is a dominant matching if no other matching induces a
higher social surplus than µ does. The result is describes as follows.
Proposition 2.2. In the two-stage game with Assumptions 2.1-2.4,
(0). if c12 < 0 and n ≤ 3, then µM+ is ensured to be a dominant matching;
(1). if c12 < 0 and n > 3, then µ
M
+ is not ensured to be a dominant matching;
(2). if c12 < 0 and
c1c2
c12
≤ − Anα , then µM+ is a dominant matching;
(3). if c12 > 0 and
c1c2
c12
≥ 3 · Anα , then µM+ is a dominant matching;
(4). if c12 > 0 and
A
nα is sufficiently large, then µ
M− is a dominant matching;
(5). if c12 = 0, then µ
M
+ is a dominant matching.
Proof. See Appendix 2.A.4.
A naive guess is that when firm technology and human capital are complementary, the
PAM should induce the highest social welfare since it induces the highest total output and low
cost agents produces more; when substitutable, the NAM is more likely to be dominant. The
above result shows that this conjecture is not correct. In the proof for case (1), I constructe an
example to show that when (i) the gap between of the average unit cost of the best n−2 firms,
who positive assortatively hire the best n− 2 managers, respectively, and the unit cost of the
second worst firm, who hires the second worst manager, is sufficiently large and (ii) it makes
little difference on the unit cost for the worst firm to hire the worst manager or the second
worst manager, matching {(in, jn−1), (in−1, jn)}∪µM\{in−1,jn−1,in,jn}+ dominates the PAM. (2)
and (3) say that the PAM is dominant if the marginal effects are sufficiently larger than the
complementary or substitutive effect, respectively. (4) says that the NAM is dominant if the
market is sufficiently large. (5) is about the cases in which no externalities present. Similar
results can be found for producer surpluses.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter studies a matching problem in the environment of a Cournot competition. A
PAM can be a stable matching under rational expectations when firm technology and human
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capital are either complimentary or substitutable, while a NAM can be stable under rational
expectations only when the two production factors are substitutable and the goods market is
sufficiently large. An example was given to show that a stable matching under rational beliefs
may not exist when technology and human capital are substitutable. Although I discussed
about the existence of stable matchings among assortative matchings, I did not give a general
pattern about stable matchings. Example 2.3 and some other simulations lead to the guess
that, when firm technology and human capital are substitutable, if a stable matching exists
under rational beliefs, this stable matching satisfies a partition pattern: Firms and managers
are sorted from the highest type to the lowest type and are partitioned into to several groups,
and firms and managers in each group match assortatively. Come back to the existence of
equilibrium, some other meaningful sufficient conditions may also be found. Moreover, the core
and the equilibrium payoffs are not characterized, and hence further work might be done.14
2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Review of Linear Programming (LP)
Given a conditional reduced market Mr := {Ms|µc} and a conjecture function ϕMr , we can
use Shapley and Shubik’s (1971) Linear Programming method to find a ϕMr -stable matching.
(Primal)
max
x
z =
∑
i∈Is
∑
j∈Js
V (ij|ϕMr)xij
s.t.
∑
i∈Is xij ≤ 1, ∀j ∈ Js∑
j∈Js xij ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ Is
xij ≥ 0
(Dual)
min
u,v
w =
∑
i∈Is
ui +
∑
j∈Js
vj
s.t. ui + vj ≥ V (ij|ϕMr), ∀i ∈ Is, ∀j ∈ Js
ui ≥ 0
vj ≥ 0
The maximum value zmax of the primal problem is attained with all xij = 0 or 1. By
strong duality both the primal and the dual have the same optimal value, i.e., zmax = wmin.
By complementary slackness, if x∗ij = 1 then the corresponding dual constraint must be tight
which implies ui + vj ≥ V (ij|ϕMr).
Take an extreme solution x∗ to the PP , I construct a matching µ∗s such that it satisfies
14Generally, it is complicated to define a core. First, for example, in my to-stage game members of a coalition
must not only have beliefs about what kind of matchings the agents outside of the coalition will form but also
what kind of actions they will play at the second stage. A coalition at the matching stage can play either
non-cooperatively or cooperatively at the Cournot competition stage. If they play cooperative, they can ask
the best firm (to hire the best manager) to produce at the lowest unit cost for all the firms in the coalition.
Hence, one has to be careful about specifying values to the characteristic function.
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that
(i, j) ∈ µ∗s if and only if x∗ij = 1.
Take an solution (u∗, v∗) to the dual problem.
Lemma 2.2. µ∗s is a ϕMr -stable matching if and only if µ∗s is admissible.
Proof. Define u′i := pi(i, j, µ
∗
s)−v∗j for i, j ∈ µ∗s. Then, the triplet (µ∗, u′, v∗) is a ϕ-equilibrium.
The estimation function ϕ plays the key role in this problem, since problems arise if there
is no admissible matching with a total surplus of the agents being larger than or equal to zmax.
Remark. For a matching µ to be a ϕMr -stable matching it is necessary but not sufficient
that15,16
i. µ is ϕMr -admissible and
ii. zmax ≤ pi(µ).
However, following from Lemma 2.2, the following conditions are sufficient.
Lemma 2.2’. A matching µs is a ϕ
Mr -stable matching if
i. µs = arg maxµ′s∈A(Is,Js) V (µ
′
s|ϕMr);
ii. µs is ϕ
Mr -admissible.
Example.(More efficient matching may not be stable): Let n = 3. Then, there are six possible
matchings. Consider a surplus function which assigns values to the pairs of agents in the six
matchings as follows.
Let the universal conjectures hold: ϕi(j) = ϕj(i) = A(i, j) for all i ∈ I, j ∈ J . Then, all
the matchings are admissible, and the values for the characteristic function are as following:
V (i2j2) = V (i3j3) = 0
V (ij) = 1 for all (i, j) /∈ {(i2, j2), (i3, j3)}.
15In assignment games with no externalities, these two conditions are sufficient. Moreover, it is also possible
that between two admissible matchings, the less efficient (with lower total surplus) matching is a stable matching
while the more efficient matching is not. It is illustrated by the following example that follows.
16This result differs from Proposition 3.4 of Gudmundsson and Habis (2013). In their proof, the tricky case
that when a pair of agents want to increase their payoffs they must take (back) some money from the other
agents was overlooked.
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µ1
100 0 0
i1 i2 i3
j1 j2 j3
µ2
1 1 1
i1 i2 i3
j2 j3 j1
µ3
1 1 1
i1 i2 i3
j3 j1 j2
µ4
1 1 1
i1 i2 i3
j1 j3 j2
µ5
1 1 1
i1 i2 i3
j3 j2 j1
µ6
1 1 1
i1 i2 i3
j2 j1 j3
Hence, the maximum value to the primal problem is zmax = 1, and µ2, µ3, µ4, µ5, and µ6 are
all stable matchings. But matching µ1, the most efficient matching, is not a stable matching
since it is blocked by (i2, j3) and (i3, j2).
Proof of Theorem 2.1. First, for any given problem (I, J, pi), if ϕ(i, j) = A(i, j) for all i ∈ I
and all j ∈ J , the set Eϕ(I, J, pi) of ϕ-equilibria is non-empty. This follows from Lemma 2.2,
because a µ∗ constructed in the above way is admissible.
Second, I show that, for a problem (I, J, pi), if ϕ(i, j) 6= A(i, j) for some pair of i ∈ I and
for j ∈ J , then there exists a surplus function pi such that Eϕ(I, J, pi) = ∅. Notice that this
can not happen if there are only two agents on each side of the market, I only need to look at
the cases in which n = |I| = |J | ≥ 3. The proof is divided into several steps.
Step 1. Let us first consider a sub-LP problem of a pair of agents (i′, j′), by ignoring the
characteristic value related them. Let zmax(i
′, j′) denote the maximum value to the following
PP :17
max
x
z =
∑
i∈I′
∑
j∈J ′
V (ij|A(i, j))
s.t.
∑
i∈I′
xij ≤ 1 ∀j ∈ J ′,∑
j∈J ′
xij ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I ′,
xij ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I ′ and j ∈ J ′,
where I ′ = I \ {i′} and J ′ = J \ {j′}.
Let wmin(i
′, j′) denote the minimum value to the following DP :
min
u,v
w =
∑
i∈I′
ui +
∑
j∈J ′
vj
st. ui + vj ≥ V (ij|A(i, j)) ∀i ∈ I ′ and ∀j ∈ J ′,
ui ≥ 0 and vj ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I ′ and ∀j ∈ J ′.
17V (ij|A(i, j)) = min{pi(i, j, µ)| (i, j) ∈ µ, µ ∈ A(i, j)}. That is, although I ignore i′ and j′, the characteristic
value of a pair (i, j) is still taken from all the full matchings in A(i, j), but not necessarily in A(i, j)∩A(i′, j′).
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Again, the fundamental duality theorem tells us that wmin(i
′, j′) = zmax(i′, j′), where wmin(i′, j′)
is the minimum value of the sum of the payoffs that the other agents demand when (i′, j′) are
going to pair up.
Step 2. W.l.o.g., assume that ϕ(i1, j2) 6= A(i1, j2). Then there is a µ ∈ A(i1, j2) \
ϕ(i1, j2).Let us denote j
′
k = µ(ik) for all k ≥ 2. For all k ≥ 3, let pi satisfy
pi(ik, j
′
k, µ˜) + zmax(ik, j
′
k) >pi(µ˜
′)
for all µ˜ ∈ A(ik, j′k) and for all µ˜′ /∈ A(ik, j′k). This is equivalent to
pi(ik, j
′
k, µ˜) >pi(µ˜
′)− wmin(ik, j′k)
for all µ˜ ∈ A(ik, j′k) and for all µ˜′ /∈ A(ik, j′k). Then any matchings other than µ and µ′ =
{(i1, j′2), (i2, j2), (i3, j′3), ..., (in, j′n)} are blocked by some pair (ik, j′k) for k ≥ 3. Then, similarly,
let pi satisfy
pi(i1, j
′
2, µ¯) >pi(µ)− wmin(i1, j′2)
for all µ¯ ∈ A(i1, j′2). Then µ is blocked by (i1, j′2). Lastly, let pi satisfy
pi(i1, j2, µˆ) >pi(µ
′)− wmin(i1, j2)
for all µˆ ∈ ϕ(i1, j2). Then, I have that µ′ is blocked by (i1, j2). Therefore, Eϕ(I, J, pi) = ∅ for
the problem (I, J, pi) constructed in this way.
2.A.2 Cournot Competition
Proof of Lemma 2.1. It is a quadratic problem and thus can be solved by a linear system. In
the Cournot game each pair (i, j) ∈ µ, (i, j) chooses qij(µ) (also written as q(i, j, µ)) such that
qij(µ) = arg max
q≥0
q · [A− α(q +
∑
(i′,j′)∈µ,i′ 6=i,j′ 6=j
qi
′j′)− c(fi, sj)]
The first order condition for each pair (i, j) ∈ µ gives us the following linear system:
A− c(fi1 , sµ(i1))
A− c(fi2 , sµ(i2))
...
A− c(fin , sµ(in))
 = α

2 1 . . . 1
1 2 1 . . .
...
...
...
...
1 . . . 1 2


q(i1, µ(i1), µ)
q(i2, µ(i2), µ)
...
q(in, µ(in), µ)
 .
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Thus,
q(i1, µ(i1), µ)
q(i2, µ(i2), µ)
...
q(in, µ(in), µ)
 =
1
α

n
n+1 − 1n+1 . . . − 1n+1
− 1n+1 nn+1 − 1n+1 . . .
...
...
...
...
− 1n+1 . . . − 1n+1 nn+1


A− c(fi1 , sµ(i1))
A− c(fi2 , sµ(i2))
...
A− c(fin , sµ(in))
 .
Therefore, for a pair (i, j) ∈ µ, their optimal output quantity for a realized matching µ is
qij(µ) =
1
(n+ 1)α
[A− (n+ 1)c(fi, sj) +
∑
(i′,j′)∈µ
c(fi′ , sj′)] > 0.
Substituting back the above solution to the surplus function, I get
pi(i, j, µ) =
1
(n+ 1)2α
[A− (n+ 1)c(fi, sj) +
∑
(i′,j′)∈µ
c(fi′ , sj′)]
2 = α
[
qij(µ)
]2
.
2.A.3 Stable Matchings under Rational Conjectures
For all the following proofs, I do the following computations with the surplus function derived
from above. Let [M1,M2] be a partition of market M , in which
M1 =I1 ∪ J1 := {i1, ..., in−2} ∪ {j1, ..., jn−2} and
M2 =I2 ∪ J2 := M\M1 = {l, p} ∪ {l, p} where fl > fp and sl > sp.
We write c(fi, sj) by c
ij for short sometimes. For a given µM1 ∈ A(I1, J1), I have the following
equations:
[
pi2(il, jl, µ
M1 ∪ µM2+ ) + pi2(ip, jp, µM1 ∪ µM2+ )
]
−
[
pi2(il, jp, µ
M1 ∪ µM2− ) + pi2(ip, jl, µM1 ∪ µM2− )
]
=
[
pi2(il, jl, µ
M1 ∪ µM2+ )− pi2(il, jp, µM1 ∪ µM2− )
]
−
[
pi2(ip, jl, µ
M1 ∪ µM2− )− pi2(ip, jp, µM1 ∪ µM2+ )
]
=
1
(n+ 1)2α
·
[
−n(cll − clp) + (cpp − cpl)
]
·
2A− n(cll + clp) + (cpp + cpl) + 2 ∑
(i,j)∈µM1
cij

− 1
(n+ 1)2α
·
[
−n(cpl − cpp) + (clp − cll)
]
·
2A− n(cpp + cpl) + (clp + cll) + 2 ∑
(i,j)∈µM1
cij
 .
For convenience, denote T 1, T 2, T 3, T 4 as the terms in the 4 big brackets on the right hand
side of the last equality in order.
Lemma 2.3. In the two-stage game with Assumptions 2.2-2.4, for a given [M1,M2] and a
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µM1 ∈ A(I1, J1),
1. if c12 ≤ 0, then T1T2 − T3T4 > 0;
2. if c12 > 0 and
(c2)12
c12
≥ 2 · n2−n
n2+1
· A+
(
n−2
)
c
n , then T1T2 − T3T4 > 0;
3. if c12 > 0 and
(c2)12
c12
≤ 2 · n2−n
n2+1
· An , then T1T2 − T3T4 < 0.
Proof. First, I have
c2 < 0 ⇒ T 1, T 3 > 0;
A
n
− c > 0 ⇒ T 2, T 4 > 0.
For [1], it is sufficient to show T 1 ≥ T 3 and T 2 > T 4.
T 1 − T 3 =− (n− 1)[(cll − clp)− (cpl − cpp)] = −(n− 1)
∫ fl
fp
∫ sl
sp
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ ≥ 0.
T 2 − T 4 =− (n+ 1)
[
(cll + clp)− (cpp + cpl)
]
= −(n+ 1)
∫ fl
fp
[c1(fˆ , sl) + c1(fˆ , sp)]dfˆ > 0.
For [2] and [3],
T1T2 − T3T4 =− (n− 1)
[
(cll − clp)− (cpl − cpp)
]2A+ 2 ∑
(i,j)∈µM1
cij

+ (n2 + 1)
[((
cll
)2 − (clp)2)− ((cpl)2 − (cpp)2)]
=− (n− 1)
∫ fl
fp
∫ sl
sp
c12( ˜f, s˜)ds˜df˜
2A+ 2 ∑
(i,j)∈µM1
cij

+ (n2 + 1)
∫ fl
fp
∫ sl
sp
(
c12( ˜f, s˜)
)2
ds˜df˜ ,
greater than 0 in [2] and less than 0 in [3].
Proof of Theorem 2.2. I will prove by generalization. Take a conditional reduced market
M tr := {M ts|µtc} where M ts := Its ∪ J ts = {i1, i2, ..., it} ∪ {j1, j2, ..., jt} for a t in {2, ..., n}.
For [1] and [2], want to show that if ϕ
Mtr
+ is rational on M
t
r then ϕ
Mt+1r
+ is rational on M
t+1
r .
When t = 2 it holds, following from Lemma 2.3. When t > 2, it is sufficient to show
(i). µ
Mts
+ := arg max
µ∈A(Its,Jts)
V (µ|ϕMtr+ )
where V (µ|ϕMtr+ ) =
∑
(i,j)∈µ pi
2(i, j, µ
Mts(ij)
+ ∪ µtc). I prove it in a recursive method. That is,
µ
Mts
+ induced by a solution to the PP of the sub-game (see Lemma 2.2’ in Appendix 2.A.1).
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W.o.l.g., assume fi1 > fi2 > ... > fit and si1 > si2 > ... > sit . Take a matching
µ ∈ A(Its, J ts). If (i1, j1) /∈ µ, replace µ by another matching µ′ := {(i1, j1), (µ(j1), µ(i1))} ∪
[µ\{(i1, µ(i1)), (µ(j1), j1)}]. By Lemma 2.3, I have
V (µ′|ϕMtr+ ) > V (µ|ϕM
t
r
+ ).
V is maximized only if (i1, j1) are paired to each other.
Next, repeat the above procedure, I can get that, conditional on (i1, j1) being paired to
each other, V is maximized only if (i2, j2) are paired to each other. By repeating these steps
recursively, I have the V value maximized at µ
Mts
+ .
[3] is proved in a similar way.
2.A.4 Social Welfare
Proof of Proposition 2.2. W.l.o.g., assume α = 1 since α is a scaler, and suppose f1 > f2 >
... > fn and s1 > s2 > ... > sn. For a given matching µ, the social benefit is
B(µ) :=
∫ Q(µ)
0
A− q dq
=AQ(µ)− Q
2(µ)
2
=
A
n+ 1
[nA− c(µ)]− 1
2(n+ 1)2
[nA− c(µ)]2
=
1
n+ 1
([
n− n
2
2(n+ 1)
]
A2 − 1
n+ 1
·Ac(µ)− 1
2(n+ 1)
· [c(µ)]2
)
,
and the total cost of production is
C(µ) :=
1
n+ 1
∑
(i,j)∈µ
cij [A− (n+ 1)cij + c(µ)]
=
1
n+ 1
Ac(µ)− (n+ 1) ∑
(i,j)∈µ
(
cij
)2
+ [c(µ)]2
 .
The social surplus is then
B(µ)− C(µ)
=
1
n+ 1
[n− n2
2(n+ 1)
]
A2 − n+ 2
n+ 1
Ac(µ)− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
[c(µ)]2 + (n+ 1)
∑
(i,j)∈µ
(
cij
)2 .
For the following part, I take a matching µ′ 6= µM+ and a matching µ 6= µM− . (i, j′), (i′, j) ∈
µ′, in which i > i′ and j > j′, and µ := {(i, j), (i′, j′)}∪ [µ′\{(i, j′), (i′, j)}]. Then, I derive the
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following equations:
[B(µ)− C(µ)]− [B(µ′)− C(µ′)]
=− n+ 2
n+ 1
A[c(µ)− c(µ′)]− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· [c(µ)− c(µ′)][c(µ) + c(µ′)]
+ (n+ 1)
([(
cij
)2
+
(
ci
′j′
)2]− [(cij′)2 + (ci′j)2])
=− n+ 2
n+ 1
A[(cij − cij′)− (ci′j − ci′j′)]− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· [(cij − cij′)− (ci′j − ci′j′)][c(µ) + c(µ′)]
+ (n+ 1)
[
(cij − cij′)[(cij + cij′)− (ci′j′ + ci′j)] + [(cij − cij′)− (ci′j − ci′j′)](ci′j′ + ci′j)
]
.
=− n+ 2
n+ 1
A[(cij − cij′)− (ci′j − ci′j′)]− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· [(cij − cij′)− (ci′j − ci′j′)][c(µ) + c(µ′)]
+ (n+ 1)
[
[(cij − cij′)− (ci′j − ci′j′)](cij + cij′) + (ci′j − ci′j′)[(cij + cij′)− (ci′j′ + ci′j)]
]
.
For Case 0, I have
[B(µ)− C(µ)]− [B(µ′)− C(µ′)]
≥− n+ 2
n+ 1
A[(cij + ci
′j′)− (cij′ + ci′j)]
− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· [(cij + ci′j′)− (cij′ + ci′j)][(cij + ci′j′) + (cij′ + ci′j)]
+ (n+ 1)[(c2ij + c
2
i′j′)− (c2ij′ + c2i′j)]
=− n+ 2
n+ 1
A[(cij + ci
′j′)− (cij′ + ci′j)] + n
2 − 2
n+ 1
·
([(
cij
)2
+
(
ci
′j′
)2]− [(cij′)2 + (ci′j)2])
+
2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
[(cij − ci′j′)2 − (cij′ − ci′j)2]
>− n+ 2
n+ 1
A[(cij + ci
′j′)− (cij′ + ci′j)] + n
2 − 2
n+ 1
· [(cij − cij′)− (ci′j − ci′j′)](ci′j + ci′j′)
>− 1
n+ 1
[∫ fi
fi′
∫ fi
fi′
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dfˆdsˆ
]
[(4 + 2n− n2) · A
n
]
>0 when n ≤ 3.
Hence, when n ≤ 3, for any matching µ′ 6= µM+ , there is another matching that dominates µ′,
and therefore µM+ is a dominant matching.
Case 1. I construct the following example. Let us take two values
cˆ :=
1
n− 2
n−2∑
k=1
ckk and c˜ :=
cn−1n−1 + cn−1n
2
,
where cˆ < c˜. Take matching µ′′ := {(in, jn−1), (in−1, jn)} ∪ [µM+ \{(in−1, jn−1), (in, jn)}]. I
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show in the following that there are some scenarios in which µ′′ dominates µM+ .
[B(µM+ )− C(µM+ )]− [B(µ′′)− C(µ′′)]
=(cn−1n−1 − cn−1n)[− n+ 2
n+ 1
A− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· [(cn−1n−1 + cn−1n) + (cnn−1 + cnn)]
+ (n+ 1)(cn−1n−1 + cn−1n)
]
− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· (cn−1n−1 − cn−1n) · 2
n−2∑
k=1
ckk
+
2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· (cnn−1 − cnn)[c(µ) + c(µ′)]
− (n+ 1)(cnn−1 − cnn)(cnn + cnn−1)
<(cn−1n−1 − cn−1n)
(
−n+ 2
n+ 1
A+
[
(n+ 1)− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
]
· 2cˆ− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· 2 · A
n
)
− (2n+ 3)(n− 2)
n+ 1
· (cn−1n−1 − cn−1n) · c˜
+ (cnn−1 − cnn)
[
2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· [c(µ) + c(µ′)]− (n+ 1)(cnn + cnn−1)
]
=(cn−1n−1 − cn−1n) · 2n
2 + 2n− 1
n+ 1
·
[
cˆ− n
2 + 4n+ 3
2n2 + 2n− 1 ·
A
n
− 2n
2 − n− 6
2n2 + 2n− 1 · c˜
]
+ (cnn−1 − cnn)
[
2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· [c(µ) + c(µ′)]− (n+ 1)(cnn + cnn−1)
]
<(cn−1n−1 − cn−1n) · 2n
2 + 2n− 1
n+ 1
·
[
(cˆ− c˜)− n
2 + 4n+ 3
2n2 + 2n− 1 ·
A
n
]
+ (cnn−1 − cnn)
[
2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· [c(µ) + c(µ′)]− (n+ 1)(cnn + cnn−1)
]
,
in which n
2+4n+3
2n2+2n−1 < 1 when n > 3. Thus, the term on the right hand side of the last inequality
is less than 0 when: cnn−1−cnn → 0, n > 3, and cˆ− c˜ > n2+4n+3
2n2+2n−1 · An . Hence, µM+ is dominated
by µ′.
Case 2.
[B(µ)− C(µ)]− [B(µ′)− C(µ′)]
>[(cij − cij′)− (ci′j − ci′j′)](− n+ 2
n+ 1
A+ 2n
A
n
+ (n+ 1)
(cij − cij′)[(cij − ci′j) + (cij′ − ci′j′)]
(cij − cij′)− (ci′j − ci′j′)
)
>
[∫ fi
fi′
∫ sj
sj′
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ
] ( n
n+ 1
A+ (n+ 1) ·
[∫ sj
sj′
c2(fi, sˆ)dsˆ
]
·
[∫ fi
fi′
[c1(fˆ , sj) + c1(fˆ , sj′)]dfˆ
]
∫ fi
fi′
∫ sj
sj′
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ
)
>
[∫ fi
fi′
∫ fi
fi′
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dfˆdsˆ
] ( n
n+ 1
A+ (n+ 1) ·
∫ fi
fi′
∫ sj
sj′
c1(fˆ , sˆ) · c2(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ∫ fi
fi′
∫ sj
sj′
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ
)
≥0.
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Hence, µM+ is a dominant matching.
Case 3.
[B(µ)− C(µ)]− [B(µ′)− C(µ′)]
>
[∫ fi
fi′
∫ sj
sj′
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ
] (− n+ 2
n+ 1
A− 2n+ 3
2(n+ 1)
· 2A
+ (n+ 1)
[∫ sj
sj′
c2(fi′ , sˆ)dsˆ
]
·
[∫ fi
fi′
[c1(fˆ , sj) + c1(fˆ , sj′)]dfˆ
]
∫ fi
fi′
∫ sj
sj′
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ
)
>
[∫ fi
fi′
∫ sj
sj′
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ
] (− 3n+ 5
n+ 1
A+ (n+ 1) ·
∫ fi
fi′
∫ sj
sj′
c1(fˆ , sˆ) · c2(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ∫ fi
fi′
∫ sj
sj′
c12(fˆ , sˆ)dsˆdfˆ
)
≥0.
Hence, µM+ must be the most efficient matching.
Case 4. [B(µ)− C(µ)]− [B(µ′)− C(µ′)] < 0 when An is sufficiently large.
Case 5.
[B(µ)− C(µ)]− [B(µ′)− C(µ′)] =
[∫ sj
sj′
c2(fi′ , sˆ)dsˆ
]
·
[∫ fi
fi′
[c1(fˆ , sj) + c1(fˆ , sj′)]dfˆ
]
> 0.
Hence, µM+ is a dominant matching.
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Chapter 3
On Disclosure Policies in
All-pay Auctions with Stochastic Entry
Introduction
Many real-world competitions, such as rent seeking, political campaigns, and job promotions,
are commonly viewed as contests. In these contests, participants spend resources in order to
win some prizes. Classic studies of contest theory focused on setting in which there is fixed
and known number of contestants and contestants have no private information. However, in
many competitions, an individual has no information about the actual number of contestants
she has to compete with nor the values of the prizes to the other competitors. For instance,
when an individual seeks a job promotion, she has to compete not only with colleagues whom
she knows but also anonymous candidates from outside, and she does not know the values of
the position to the others. Similarly, in a patent race, a firm may not be aware of the number
of other firms who are developing similar products nor the values of the patent to those
firms. With some government-contract contests, the government invites selected contractors
to submit proposals. In this type of contests, although the contest organizer does not know
the values of prizes to the competitors, he may know the exact number of contestants who are
participating. In order to maximize his own expected revenue, should he reveal or conceal the
actual number of participants?
We address the above issue in a setting of all-pay auctions with a stochastic number of
bidders. There is one prize and a fixed number of potential risk neutral bidders, each of
whom can receive a signal on the value of the prize to her and an the signal and has a signal-
dependent probability of participating in the auction. The realized number of participants
is known privately to the organizer. The organizer chooses between two policies: (1) fully
revealing the actual number of participants, or (2) fully concealing the number. He publicly
announces the chosen policy before the contest starts and commits to implement it during
the contest (before bidders start bidding). Each bidder upon participating receives a private
79
signal about her valuation of the prize. The function governing the joint distribution of the
signals is common knowledge. Each participating bidder makes a private bid for the prize.
The prize is assigned to the bidder with the highest bid, and it is retained if there is no bid.
All bidders incur a cost that is a strictly increasing function of their bid. As in the model
of Gavious et al. (2002), we differentiate three cases where the cost function is, respectively,
convex, concave, or linear.1 Each bidder chooses her bid to maximize her expected utility, and
the organizer chooses a disclosure policy to maximize the expected total bids.
Our first main finding is that the optimal disclosure policy depends on the curvature of
bidders’ cost function. Specifically, if the cost function is concave (convex), concealing the
actual number of participating bidders leads to a lower (higher) expected total bids. However,
the ex ante expected utilities of each potential bidder are the same under these two disclosure
policies. The key reason is that a participating bidder’s interim expected utility, at the time
when she learns her signal but not the number of bidders, is invariant to both the curvature of
the cost function and the disclosure policy. The cost a participating bidder incurs under full
concealment is simply the average value over the costs he incurs under full disclosure. Hence,
if the cost function is concave (and the inverse function is convex), under full disclosure the
organizer extracts a risk premium from each bidder. Because bidders are indifferent between
the two disclosure policies, the optimal disclosure policy for the organizer is thus also Pareto
dominant.
We further consider disclosure under endogenous entry: A bidder incurs a cost to enter
the contest. Our second and third main results apply the first main result and show that
under endogenous entry, concealing the actual number of participating bidders still leads to a
lower (higher) expected total bids if the cost function is concave (convex). The reason is that,
implied the payoff equivalence result for the potential bidders with exogenous entry, disclosure
policies are irrelevant to the potential bidders’ entry decisions.
However, the main result cannot be extended to the cases with asymmetric participation
probabilities. To illustrate that, we analyze a two-player contest with linear bid cost functions
and uniformly distributed independent and private values. The bidder with a lower probability
of participation tends to bid more aggressively than her opponent. The contest organizer
prefers fully revealing the number of participating bidders to fully concealing it.
This chapter contributes to the scarce literature on information revelation and stochastic
entry in contests.2 Lim and Matros (2009) are the first to study information disclosure policies
in Tullock contests with a stochastic number of contestants. In their paper, each potential
1See Gavious et al. (2002) for interpretations.
2See Morath and Mu¨nster (2008), Fu et al. (2014), and Serena (2015) for studies on disclosure policies on
contestants’ abilities.
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contestant has an exogenous probability of participation, and they find that the disclosure
policies are irrelevant to the expected total effort. Based on their work, Fu et al. (2011)
investigate the same problem in a similar setting with a more general contest success function.
They find that the disclosure irrelevance principle does not hold in non-Tullock contests and
the optimal disclosure policy depends on the curvature of the characteristic function they
define.3 This is similar to our first main result. Fu et al. (forthcoming) study disclosure policies
in a two-player Tullock contest with asymmetric valuations and asymmetric probabilities of
participation. In these papers, contestants’ valuations of the prize are commonly known,
costs are linear, and the probabilities of participation is exogenous. In contrast, our model’s
major innovation is private information on valuations.4 We link the optimal disclosure policy
with the curvature of the cost function under both exogenous and endogenous probability of
participation.
This chapter is also closely related to McAfee and McMillan’s (1987) work. They study
disclosure policies in first price sealed bid auctions with a stochastic number of participants
and independent and private values. Their setting is with a more general exogenous and
correlated participation probability structure, and they relate the optimal disclosure policy to
bidders’ risk altitudes.5 More specifically, the seller prefers concealing the number of bidders
if the bidders have constant absolute risk aversion. They also find that a (potential) bidder’s
interim expected utilities are the same across the two disclosure policies. We go beyond their
paper by considering signal-dependent participation probabilities and endogenous entry.
3.1 The Model
Consider a contest with a set N = {1, 2, ..., n} potential risk neutral bidders and one indivisible
prize. Each potential bidder participates in the contest with an independent probability. The
number of participants is only observable to the contest organizer, and the organizer has to
announce publicly and commit to his disclosure policy — either to disclose or conceal the
information about the number of participating bidders.
Each bidder i can receive a private signal, Xi ∈ [0, 1] about her valuation of the prize. The
3In Tullock contests, contestant i wins with a probability
xri∑
j x
R
j
. Fu et al. (2011) generalize the winning
probability function to f(xi)∑
j f(xj)
and define the characteristic function as f(xi)
f ′(xi) .
4See Matthews (1987), Levin and Ozdenoren (2004), Levin and Smith (1994), and Ye (2004) for studies on
auctions with a stochastic number of bidders.
5Take a participating bidder and fixed her interim probability of winning. He is effectively risk averse if the
curvature of the cost function is convex, and our result shows that the organizer is better off concealing the
information.
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value of the prize to the bidder i is
Vi = u(Xi, {Xj}j∈N\i)
where u : [0, 1]n → [0, 1] is continuous, strictly increasing in the first variable, and weakly
increasing and symmetric in the other variables.
The random variables X1, ..., Xn are governed by the joint distribution function F , with
the density function f . f is strictly positive and symmetric in the signals. Let FX denote the
marginal distribution of a signal.
Stochastic participation and believe updating. A bidder with a signal Xi has a
conditional independent probability (CIP) p(Xi) of participating the contest.
6 Because of the
dependency of bidders’ probabilities of participation on their signals, a bidder updates her
belief about the distribution of the other potential bidders’ signals according to the Bayesian
rule, based on the actual number of participants. Suppose there is a subset M ⊂ N of partici-
pating bidders, besides bidder i /∈M . With a little abuse of notation, denote random variable
Y m = max{Xj}j∈M , where m = |M |, as the highest signal among the participating bidder-
s other than i, and let F˜Ym(·|x) denote the corresponding updated cumulative distribution
function of Y m given Xi = x, and f˜Ym(·|x) be the density function. The updated distribution
F˜Ym(y|x) is∫ y
0 ...
∫ y
0
[∫ 1
0 ...
∫ 1
0
∏m+1
k=2 p(xk)
∏n
l=m+2(1− p(xl))fX−1(x2, ..., xn|x)dx2...dxm+1
]
dxm+2...dxn∫ 1
0 ...
∫ 1
0
∏m+1
k=2 p(xk)
∏n
l=m+2(1− p(xl))fX−1(x2, ..., xn|x)dx2...dxn
.
Define vm(x, y) = E[Vi|Xi = x, Y m = y] as the participating bidder i’s expected value of the
prize conditional on when there are m participating opponent bidders, i’s signal is x, and the
highest signal among the m other bidders is y.
Each participating bidder i submits a bid bi, and bids are submitted simultaneously and
independently of each other. The bidder with the highest bid wins the prize, but all partici-
pating bidders pay their bids. Ties are resolved by random allocation. A bid b causes a cost
g(b), where function g : R+ → R+ is strictly increasing, twice continuously differentiable with
g(0) = 0. When there is a subset M of participating bidders, each bidder bids bi and the
6At this moment, we assume that potential bidder’s probability of participation is exogenous but depends
on her signal.
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payoffs are:
Wi =

Vi − g(bi) if bi > maxj∈M\{i} bj
−g(bi) if bi < maxj∈M\{i} bj
1
#{k∈M :bk=bi}Vi − g(bi) if bi = maxj∈M\{i} bj .
In detail, the model has the following timing:
1. The contest organizer commits to reveal or conceal her private information before the
contest starts.
2. Bidders receive signals, and nature chooses the number of participating bidders.
3. The organizer implements his commitment.7
4. Bidders submit their bids privately.
5. The one with the highest bid wins the prize.
3.2 Exogenous Participation Probabilities
We will give symmetric equilibrium strategies under the two disclosure policies and compare
the expected revenues for the organizer. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss
the existence of symmetric equilibrium, and we directly maintain the following assumption
throughout the chapter:
Assumption 3.1. The environment is such that a symmetric pure strategy equilibrium bidding
function exists, and it is increasing.8 In particular, this assumption is true if signals are
independent.
3.2.1 Contests with Full Disclosure
We first consider the subgame in which the organizer reveals the actual number of bidders
before they make their bids.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose the organizer commits to disclose the number of participating bidders.
[i.] In a subgame with m + 1 participating bidders, in a symmetric equilibrium a bidder with
a signal x bids
βm(x) = g
−1( ∫ x
0
vm(s, s)f˜Ym(s|s)ds
)
7A thorough analysis on the issue of commitment is beyond the scope of this chapter.
8As shown by Krishna and Morgan (1997), a sufficient condition for the existence of a symmetric equilibrium
in each case of our model is vm(x, s)f˜Ym(s|x) increasing in x for m = 1, 2, ..., n− 1.
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and the associated expected payoff is
pim(x) =
∫ x
0
vm(x, s)f˜Ym(s|x)ds−
∫ x
0
vm(s, s)f˜Ym(s|s)ds.
[ii.] The organizer’s ex ante expected revenue is
ERD = n
n−1∑
m=0
∫ 1
0
p(x)Pm(x)βm(x)dFX(x),
where Pm(x) :=
(
n−1
m
) ∫ 1
0 ...
∫ 1
0
∏m+1
k=2 p(xk)
∏n
l=m+2(1−p(xl))fX−1(x2, ..., xn|x1)dx2...dxn is the
probability of a participating bidder with a signal x facing m opponents.
Proof. [i.] Krishna and Morgan (1997) have shown, in their heuristic derivation, that each
bidder’s equilibrium strategy in terms of spending is
cm(x) =
∫ x
0
vm(s, s)f˜Ym(s|s)ds.
Hence, the equilibrium strategy in terms of bid is βm(x) = g
−1(cm(x)). The associated
expected payoff is pim(x) =
∫ x
0 vm(x, y)fYm(y|x)dx− g(βm(x)).
[ii.] The organizer’s ex ante expected revenue is
ERD =
n−1∑
m=0
(
n
m+ 1
)∫ 1
0
...
∫ 1
0
m+1∏
k=1
p(xk)
n∏
l=m+2
(1− p(xl))
m+1∑
i=1
βm(xi)f(x1, ..., xn)dx1....dxn
=
n−1∑
m=0
(
n
m+ 1
)∫ 1
0
...
∫ 1
0
m+1∏
k=1
p(xk)
n∏
l=m+2
(1− p(xl))(m+ 1)βm(x1)f(x1, ..., xn)dx1....dxn
=
n−1∑
m=0
∫ 1
0
p(x1)βm(x1)fX1(x1)
· n
(
n− 1
m
)∫ 1
0
...
∫ 1
0
m+1∏
k=2
p(xk)
n∏
l=m+2
(1− p(xl))f(x2, ..., xn|x1)dx2....dxndx1
=n
n−1∑
m=0
∫ 1
0
p(x1)Pm(x1)βm(x1)fX1(x1)dx1.
In this case a participating bidder with a signal x and facing m opponents has a expected
payoff of
pim(x) =
∫ x
0
vm(x|y)f˜Ym(y|x)dy − g(βm(x)).
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3.2.2 Contests with Full Concealment
Next, we analyze the subgame in which the organizer conceals the information about the
actual number of bidders.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose the organizer commits to conceal the number of participating bidders.
[i.] In a symmetric equilibrium, a bidder with a signal x bids
β(x|p) = g−1( n∑
m=0
Pm(x)
∫ x
0
vm(s, s)f˜Ym(s|s)ds
)
and the associated expected payoff is
pi(x|p) =
n−1∑
m=0
Pm(x)
[∫ x
0
vm(x, y)f˜Ym(y|x)dy −
∫ x
0
vm(s, s)f˜Ym(s|s)ds
]
.
[ii.] The organizer’s ex ante expected revenue is
ERC = n
∫ 1
0
p(x)β(x|p)dFX(x).
Proof. [i.] Suppose each of the other participating bidders plays the symmetric strategy β(·|p).
Suppose bidder i receives a signal x. She bids b to maximize her expected payoff
pi(b, x|p) =
n−1∑
m=0
Pm(x)
∫ β−1(b|p)
0
vm(x, y)f˜Ym(y|x)dy − g(b). (3.1)
The first order condition with respect to b yields
n−1∑
m=0
Pm(x)f˜Ym(β
−1(b|p)|x)vm(x, β−1(b|p)) 1
β′(β−1(b|p)|p) − g
′(b) = 0. (3.2)
At a symmetric equilibrium, β(x|p) = b and thus (3.2) becomes
n−1∑
m=0
Pm(x)f˜Ym(x|x)vm(x, x)− g′(β(x|p))β′(x|p) = 0
and thus
β(x|p) = g−1( n−1∑
m=0
Pm(x)
∫ x
0
v(s, s)f˜Ym(s|s)ds
)
.
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The associated expected payoff is pi(x|p) = pi(x, x|p). [ii.] The organizer’s expected revenue is
ERC =
n−1∑
m=0
∫ 1
0
...
∫ 1
0
(
n
m+ 1
)m+1∏
k=1
p(xk)
n∏
l=m+2
(1− p(xl))
m+1∑
i=1
β(xi|p)f(x1, ..., xn)dx1...dxn
=n
n−1∑
m=0
∫ 1
0
p(x1)Pm(x1)β(x1|p)fX1(x1)dx1
=n
∫ 1
0
p(x1)β(x1|p)fX1(x1)dx1.
3.2.3 Comparison across Disclosure Policies
Before we compare the ex ante expected revenues to the organizer across the two disclosure
policies, we first consider the ex ante expected payoffs to each potential bidder. It is found
that each potential bidder is actually indifferent between these two policies no matter what
the cost function is.
Proposition 3.1. With exogenous and CIP’s {p(x)}x∈[0,1], for whatever g is, under either
disclosure policy a participating bidder’s interim expected payoff is
pi(p) =
∫ 1
0
n−1∑
m=0
Pm(x)
[∫ x
0
vm(x, y)f˜Ym(y|x)dy −
∫ x
0
vm(s, s)f˜Ym(s|s)ds
]
dFX(x).
Proof. From Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, pi(p) =
∫ 1
0
∑n−1
m=0 Pm(x)pim(x)dFX(x) =
∫ 1
0 pi(x|p)dFX(x).
This result is similar to that of McAfee and McMillan (1987). They find payoff equivalence
in their setting with independent and private values and constant absolute risk aversion utili-
ties. The intuition is that, under full concealment, a bidder expected value of prize conditional
on winning and the cost she exerts, respectively, simply average those under full disclosure. In
particular, under each disclosure policy the curvature of the cost function irrelevant to each
bidder’s interim expected utility and cost, because the allocation rule and bidders’ information
remain exactly the same and a similar logic of the revenue equivalence theorem applies.9
The curvature of the cost function has no effect on a bidder’s interim cost, and it translates
into the curvature of the bidding function. Hence, it has an effect on the rank of the expected
revenues to the organizer between the two disclosure policies. The first main result is stated
as below.
Theorem 3.1. With exogenous and CIP’s {p(x)}x∈[0,1],
9The incentive compatibility constraints are the same under different cost functions, and the bidder with
the lowest signal receives a payoff of 0.
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1. if g is convex, the organizer prefers to conceal the number of participating bidders;
2. if g is concave, the organizer prefers to disclose the number of participating bidders;
3. if g is linear, the organizer is indifferent between concealing and revealing.
Proof. We only show the case of g being convex. g−1 is then concave. Applying Jensen’s
inequality to β(x|p), we have
ERC = n
∫ 1
0
p(x)β(x|p)dFX(x)
= n
∫ 1
0
p(x)g−1
( n−1∑
m=0
Pm(x)
∫ x
0
vm(s, s)f˜Ym(s|s)ds)dFX(x)
)
≥ n
∫ 1
0
n∑
m=0
p(x)Pm(x)g
−1( ∫ x
0
vm(s, s)fYm(s|s)ds)dFX(x)
)
= n
∫ 1
0
n∑
m=0
p(x)Pm(x)βm(x)dFX(x)
= ERD.
The above theorem states that the organizer prefers concealing the number of participating
bidders if the marginal cost of bidding is increasing, whereas he prefers disclosing the informa-
tion if the marginal cost is decreasing. It is a result similar to that of Fu et al. (2011).10 They
link the disclosure policies to the curvature of their characteristic function in a public infor-
mation setting. In contrast, we link disclosure policies to the curvature of the cost function
in a private information setting. Both findings result from the fact that uncertainty in the
number of participating bidders smooths the bidding strategy of each participating bidder.
The organizer extracts a risk premium from each participating bidder under full disclosure
in our model with a concave cost function, same as in their model with a concave impact
function. It can be further shown that full concealment (disclosure) is an optimal disclosure
policy among all disclosure policies if the cost function is convex (concave).11 Together with
Proposition 3.1, this property also implies that the optimal disclosure policy for the organizer
is also Pareto optimal.
10Unlike our finding, in Fu et al. (2011) the ex ante expected payoffs to each potential participant under the
two disclosure policies are not equivalent.
11The organizer can choose a set of signals, each signal corresponds to a set of numbers of bidders. He can
then design a consistent rule to release signals upon observing the actual number of bidders.
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3.3 Endogenous Entry Decisions
Previously, we assumed that each agent has an exogenous probability of participation. In this
section we consider endogenous participation decisions. Entry is costly, and thus potential
bidders decide whether to incur a cost to enter. We make two case distinctions. In one case,
a potential bidder receives her signal on the value of the prize only after entering the auction
(henceforth, ex ante participation decision). In the other case, a potential bidder receives her
signal before making her entry decision (henceforth, interim participation decision). The main
result can be applied to these cases.
3.3.1 Ex ante Participation Decisions
We start from ex ante participation decisions and discuss two types of participation costs,
fixed and publicly known participation cost and private and independent participation cost.
Before proceeding to solve the problems, we make a technical assumption for this section.
Assumption 3.2. Under disclosure policy D, the interim expected payoff of each bidder is
strictly decreasing in the number of opponents, i.e., pim(x) > pim+1(x).
12
This assumption is not unnatural. A bidder wins only if her signal is higher than all the
other participating bidders’ signals. Hence, an additional opponent brings a bad news to the
winner. We derive a crucial property which leads to our second main result.
Lemma 3.3. Suppose p(x) = q for all x ∈ [0, 1]. Under Assumption 3.2, pi(q) is strictly
decreasing in q.
Proof.
pi(q) =
n−1∑
m=0
Pm(x)
∫ 1
0
pim(x)dFX(x) =
∫ 1
0
n−1∑
m=0
(
n− 1
m
)
qm(1− q)n−1−mpim(x)dFX(x).
By Assumption 3.2, pim(x) is strictly decreasing in m. A binomial distribution with a higher
probability of success first order stochastic dominates a binomial distribution with a lower
probability of success (see Lemma 8.3 of Wolfstetter, 1999). Then, the desired result follows
from the property of first order stochastic dominance.
The strict monotonicity of pi(q) helps us to rule out the case of multiple symmetric equilibria
under each disclosure policy. In the following, we study two types of endogenous entry, and
show that the ex ante probabilities of participation of each potential bidder under the two
disclosure policies are identical.
12For example, this assumption is satisfied if bidders have independent and private values (IPV), because
under IPV pim(x) =
∫ x
0
Fm(y)dFX(y).
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Fixed Participation Cost. First, we consider fixed and publicly known participation cost.
Suppose it costs a potential bidder an amount c to participate. Under disclosure policy K,
K = C,D, an equilibrium participation probability qK satisfies
qK = 1 if pi
K(1) ≥ c
qK ∈ (0, 1) if piK(qK) = c, and
qK = 0 if pi
K(0) ≤ c.
That is, a potential bidder will definitely participate in bidding if the expected benefit from
bidding is higher than the cost even if all the other potential bidders participate; she is
indifferent between participating or not participating if the other players also play a mixed
strategy; she prefers staying outside of the auction if the participation cost is higher than the
expected value of the prize (pi(0) = E[Vi]).
Since piC(q) = piD(q) = pi(q) and pi(q) is strictly decreasing in q by Lemma 3.3, there
must be a unique equilibrium participation probability qK under disclosure policy K, and the
equilibrium probabilities must be of the same value, i.e., qC = qD.
Proposition 3.2. Suppose the participation cost for each agent is c. Each agent participates in
bidding with the same probability in the symmetric equilibria under the two disclosure policies.
Private Participation Costs. Second, we consider private and independent participation
costs. Each potential bidder i’s cost ci ∈ [0, 1] is governed by distribution G, with a probability
density function G′(c) > 0 for all c ∈ [0, 1]. Each potential bidder learns her participation
cost before she participates (and her private signal after joining). In a symmetric equilibrium,
each agent’s participation decision must be a cut-off rule. That is, low cost types participate
and high cost types do not. Under disclosure policy K, K = C,D, an equilibrium cut-off type
cK is indifferent between participating and not, and thus cK satisfies
13
piK(q(cK)) = cK , where q(c) = G(c).
As piK(q) is strictly decreasing in q and q(c) is strictly increasing in c, the solution, cK , of
the above equation must be unique. Because piC(q) = piD(q) = pi(q), the equilibrium cut-off
types under the disclosure policies must be of the same value, i.e., cC = cD. A bidder with
any signal x has a probability q(cC) of participation.
Proposition 3.3. Suppose each potential bidder has an independent and private participation
cost ci. Each potential bidder has the same probability of participation in the symmetric
equilibria under the two disclosure policies.
13Notice that piK(1) < 1 and piK(0) > 0.
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As a consequence of Theorem 4.1 and Propositions 3.2 and 3.3, we have the following
result.
Theorem 3.2. Under ex ante participation decisions,
1. if g is convex, the organizer prefers to conceal the number of participating bidders;
2. if g is concave, the organizer prefers to disclose the number of participating bidders;
3. if g is linear, the organizer is indifferent between concealing and revealing.
3.3.2 Interim Participation Decisions
Next, we discuss interim participation decisions, and we consider fixed and publicly known
participation cost. Suppose it costs a potential bidder c to participate. Each potential bidder
independently decides whether to participate after learning her own valuation of the prize.
In a symmetric equilibrium, each potential bidder’s participation decision must be a cut-off
rule. That is, only those who receive high-value signals will participate. Denote xK as the
equilibrium cut-off type under disclosure policy K, K = C,D. A potential bidder who receives
a signal above xK strictly prefers participating the contest, and a potential bidder who receives
a signal below xK strictly prefers not to participate. We ignore all zero probability events.
Claim 3.1. Under disclosure policy K, K = C,D, in a symmetric equilibrium with monotone
bidding strategies, the cut-off value xK = xˆ, where xˆ solvesFY n−1(xˆ)E[vn−1(xˆ, y)|y ≤ xˆ] = c if c < E[vn−1(1, y)],xˆ = 1 if c ≥ E[vn−1(1, y)].
If c ≥ E[vn−1(1, y)], the participation cost is so high that no one is to participate. If c <
E[vn−1(1, y)], a potential bidder who receives a signal xK is in different between participating
and not. She obtains a payoff of 0 if she does not participate. If she participates, she will bid 0,
because a participating bidder with the lowest type has no incentive to bid more than 0. She
loses for sure if there is another participant. She wins only when there is no other participant,
which happens only when all other potential bidders’ signals are below xˆ. Her expected payoff
is thus the expected value of the prize minus the entry cost, FY n−1(xˆ)E[vn−1(xˆ, y)|y ≤ xˆ]− c.
Equating this term to zero yields the value of xˆ.
The cut-off type for participation, xˆ, is invariant to the cost function g and the disclosure
policy. Hence, regardless of the disclosure policy, each potential bidder with a signal x has a
90
conditional independent probability of participation
p(x) =

1 if x > xˆ
0 if x < xˆ.
Applying Theorem 4.1, we have the third main result of this chapter.
Theorem 3.3. Under interim participation decisions,
1. if g is convex, the organizer prefers to conceal the number of participating bidders;
2. if g is concave, the organizer prefers to disclose the number of participating bidders;
3. if g is linear, the organizer is indifferent between concealing and revealing.
3.4 Asymmetric Entry with IPV
In the previous sections, agents are symmetric ex ante. However, in many cases agents have
different probabilities of participation. For instance, an agent who faces a higher entry cost
has a lower probability of participation. A question is, does the main result hold if agents
have different probabilities of participation? The answer is no.
To show that, we turn back to exogenous and independent probabilities of participation:p1
for bidder 1 and p2 for bidder 2. Without loss of generality, assuming that p1 > p2 > 0,
we conduct an analysis of a case of two agents with independent and private values, i.e.,
Vi = Xi and f(x1, ..., xn) =
∏n
i=1 f(xi), and linear bid cost functions, i.e., g(b) = b. The
distribution functions of the two agents’ valuations are identical. However, the result for
a general distribution function of valuations is not traceable. We thus consider only the
uniform distribution, F (x) = x, under which the equilibrium bidding strategies can be derived
explicitly.
Contests with Full Disclosure. First, suppose the organizer commits to reveal the num-
ber of participants. Because a participating bidder bids 0 if she is the only participant, the
organizer earns revenue only when both agents participate. In the case that both agents par-
ticipate, in the symmetric equilibrium (of this subgame) the bid function of each participating
bidder is
β1(v) =
∫ x
0
sdF (s) =
∫ x
0
sds =
x2
2
.
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The organizer’s ex ante expected revenue can be computed:
ERD = 2p1p2
∫ 1
0
β1(x)dF (x) = 2p1p2
∫ 1
0
x2
2
dx =
p1p2
3
.
Lemma 3.4. Suppose F (x) = x and g(b) = b. If the organizer commits to disclose the number
of participating bidders, the ex ante expected revenue is ERD = p1p23 .
Contests with Full Concealment. Next, suppose the organizer commits to conceal the
number of participants. The equilibrium in our auction with asymmetric entry probabilities
is then solved below.
Lemma 3.5. Suppose F (x) = x and g(b) = b. If the organizer commits to conceal the number
of participating bidders, there is a unique increasing bidding equilibrium, in which
β1(x|p1, p2) = x
p1
p2
+1
1
p1
+ 1p2
and β2(x|p1, p2) = x
p2
p1
+1
1
p1
+ 1p2
.
Proof. See the appendix.
In equilibrium bidder 2, who has a higher probability of entry, bids more aggressively than
bidder 1. This is due to the special assumption we made on the distribution. In general, this
is not true, although it seems to be very intuitive.14
Comparison across Disclosure Policies. Now, we are ready to compare the expected
revenues across the disclosure policies. A direct comparison shows that the organizer prefers
to reveal the number of participating bidders. The result is formally stated below.
Proposition 3.4. Suppose F (x) = x and g(b) = b. Full disclosure generates a higher expected
revenue than full concealment.
Proof. See the appendix.
Hence, our main result can not be extended to the case with asymmetric participation
probabilities. Due to the technical difficulty, we are only able to compare the expected payoffs
under uniform the distribution. However, we suspect under linear cost it is always true that
full disclosure induces a higher expected revenue than full concealment, because full disclosure
symmetrizes the game and the bidders in a symmetric game should compete more vigorously.
14Intuitively, one may guess that bidder 2 tends to bid more aggressively than bidder 1, because bidder
1 has a higher probability of entry. This is not true. Suppose the distribution function takes the form of
F (x) = xk, k > 0. Then, bidder 1 bids less aggressively than bidder 2 if k < 1; more aggressively if k ≥ 1
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
We examine the impact of disclosure on expected revenue in all-pay auctions with a stochastic
number of bidders, and give important insights into the designing problem. We show that
whenever the cost function is convex (concave), concealing the number of bidders yields a
higher (lower) expected revenue to the organizer. However, any bidder is indifferent between
the two policies. The results hold even when participation is endogenous. Although the proof
of our main result is similar to that of Fu et al. (2011), the logic behind it is closer to that of
McAfee and McMillan (1987).
We end this chapter with two remarks. First, the better policy between full disclosure and
full concealment is actually optimal among all disclosure policies, including partial disclosure
policies. Second, the question on general revenue comparison under asymmetric participation
probabilities is still open. To solve the problem, one has to find a proper methodology.
3.A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 3.5. Firstly, It is a standard result that in equilibrium the maximal bids of
the potential bidders are the same. Denote [0, b¯] as each potential agent’s biding range. A
bidder who has a value of 0 will bid 0, and a bidder who has a value of 1 will bid b¯. In an
increasing strategy equilibrium, it must be the case that
max{β1(x|p1, p2), β2(x|p1, p2)} > 0 for all x > 0. (3.3)
Otherwise, an bidder with a valuation close to 0 can increase her expected payoff significantly
by bidding slightly above 0 to secure her winning.
Secondly, let φi be bidder i’s inverse equilibrium bidding function over the domain [0, b¯)
and define φi(b¯) := min{x|βi(x|p1, p2) = b¯}. Suppose bidder i receives a signal x ∈ (0, φi(b¯)).
She bids b to maximize her expected payoff
pi(b, x) = (1− p−i)x+ p−iF (φ−i(b))x− b (3.4)
The first order condition with respect to b yields
p−iF ′(φ−i(b))φ′−i(b)x = 1 (3.5)
In equilibrium, x = φi(b) and thus (3.5) becomes
p−iF ′(φ−i(b))φ′−i(b)φi(b) = 1. (3.6)
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Substituting F (x) = x back to (3.6), we have
p−iφ′−i(b)φi(b) = 1. (3.7)
⇔ p−i ·
φ′−i(b)
φ−i(b)
= pi · φ
′
i(b)
φi(b)
⇔
∫ b¯
y
p−i ·
φ′−i(b)
φ−i(b)
=
∫ b¯
y
pi · φ
′
i(b)
φi(b)
⇔ p−i
[
lnφ−i(b¯)− lnφ−i(y)
]
= pi
[
lnφi(b¯)− lnφi(y)
]
. (3.8)
Thirdly, incentive compatibility also requires φi(b¯) = 1. If this is not true, then bidder i
bids b¯ if her valuation is in between φi(b¯) and 1. Then, if her opponent has a type very close
to 1, the opponent can obtain a substantial increase in payoff by bidding slightly above b¯ to
secure her winning rather than bid below b¯. To see that, suppose φi(b¯) < 1, then
(1− p−i)x+ p−iF (1)x− (b¯+ ) > (1− p−i)x+ p−iF (φ−i(b))x− b (3.9)
when b < b¯, x→ 1−, and → 0+,
where the term on the left hand side is bidder −i’s expected payoff if she bids b¯+ , and the
term on the right hand side is the expected payoff if she bids φ−i(b).
Substituting φi(b¯) = 1 back to equation (3.8), we have
p−i lnφ−i(y) = pi lnφi(y)
⇔ (φ−i(y))p−i = (φi(y))pi
⇔ φi(y) =
(
φ−i(y))
p−i
pi . (3.10)
Together with 3.3, equation (3.10) implies that φ1(0) = φ2(0) = 0. Substituting equation
(3.10) back to equation (3.7), we have
(
φ−i(y))
p−i
pi φ′−i(b) = 1
⇔
∫ y
0
(
φ−i(b)
) p−i
pi φ′−i(b)db = y
⇔ p−i
(
φ−i(y)
) p−i
pi
+1
p−i
pi
+ 1
= y
⇔
(
φ−i(y)
) p−i
pi
+1
1
pi
+ 1p−i
= y. (3.11)
Hence, in equilibrium bidders’ bidding strategies are, for x ∈ [0, 1],
β1(x|p1, p2) = x
p1
p2
+1
1
p1
+ 1p2
and β2(x|p1, p2) = x
p2
p1
+1
1
p1
+ 1p2
.
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Proof of Proposition 3.4. Using the equilibrium bidding functions in Lemma 3.5, we have the
expected revenue under full concealment being
ERC = p1
∫ 1
0
β1(x|p1, p2)dx+ p2
∫ 1
0
β2(x|p1, p2)dx
= p1
∫ 1
0
x
p1
p2
+1
1
p1
+ 1p2
dx+ p2
∫ 1
0
x
p2
p1
+1
1
p1
+ 1p2
dx
=
p1(
1
p1
+ 1p2
)(p1
p2
+ 2
) + p2( 1
p1
+ 1p2
)(p2
p1
+ 2
)
= p1p2 ·
(p1
p2
+ 1
)(p2
p1
+ 2
)
+
(p2
p1
+ 1
)(p1
p2
+ 2
)(p2
p1
+ 1
)(p1
p2
+ 2
)(p1
p2
+ 1
)(p2
p1
+ 2
)
= p1p2 ·
3 + 2 · p1p2 +
p2
p1
+ 3 + 2 · p2p1 +
p1
p2(
2 + p2p1 +
p1
p2
)(
5 + 2 · p1p2 + 2 ·
p2
p1
)
= p1p2 ·
6 + 3 · p1p2 + 3 ·
p2
p1
14 + 9 · p1p2 + 9 ·
p2
p1
+ 2
(p2
p1
)2
+ 2
(p1
p2
)2
< p1p2 ·
6 + 3 · p1p2 + 3 ·
p2
p1
14 + 9 · p1p2 + 9 ·
p2
p1
+ 4
=
p1p2
3
= ERD,
where the strict inequality holds because p1 6= p2.
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Chapter 4
On Disclosure Policies in
Innovation Contests
Introduction
Contests have been practical and prevalent mechanisms for procuring innovations. Prior to
World War II, the U.S. Army Air Corps regularly sponsored prototype tournaments to award
production contracts to the winning manufacturers. The Federal Communication Commis-
sion (FCC) determined the American broadcast standard for high-definition television by a
tournament. IBM sponsors annual tournaments to grant winning contestants to develop their
projects for commercial use. In 2006 the Internet television company Netflix announced a $1
million prize to induce a 10 percent improvement in the accuracy of its movie recommendation
algorithm.
This chapter studies information disclosure in innovation contests. Most existing studies
on information disclosure in innovation contests are input oriented. They focus on how to
optimally disclosing intermediate performances so as to elicit a higher deterministic total
input (effort). However, in many cases, two ways that elicits the same total input may induce
two different outcomes with one outcome strictly dominates the other. In contrast to those
studies, my study is output oriented. It is on how to optimally choose disclosure policies to
induce a more desirable outcome. In my model, agents search for innovations privately over
time — exerting costly effort and observing their own outcomes. At each moment an agent
can decide whether to continue searching and whether to submit her best discovery. The
game ends once both agents have made a submission, and the organizer only values the best
submitted innovation. In such a contest, in order to maximize his own benefit, should the
organizer choose (1) to reveal the information on a submission upon receiving it or (2) to
conceal the information until all agents have made submissions.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the organizer announces publicly and commits
to his disclosure policy. Second, the organizer implements his commitment throughout the
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game, and each agent searches for innovations and makes a one-time irrevisable submission of
the best innovation she has discovered. Finally the agents who submitted a better innovation
wins a prize.
I show that the organizer prefers revealing the information on a submission upon receiving
it. On the one hand, it elicits a higher expected revenue to the organizer. On the other
hand, the expected length the contest lasts is shorter under this policy. However, each agent
is indifferent between these two disclosure policies if the marginal cost of search is low and
prefers information concealing if it is high. Moreover, under information concealment, equally
share the prize to agents who submit an innovation with a type above a certain cut-off is
outcome equivalent to let the agent who submits the best innovation to take the whole prize.
When the organizer chooses to reveal the information on a submission immediately, the
contest turns out to be a war of attrition. When the organizer chooses concealing the infor-
mation until the end, the game effectively turns out to be a special case of Taylor’s (1995)
model.
There is a rich literature on information disclosure in innovation contests.1 Aoyagi (2010),
Ederer (2010), Goltsman and Mukherjee (2011), and Wirtz (2013) consider two-stage games
and study how much information on intermediate performances a contest designer should dis-
close to elicit the optimal total input. Bimpikis et al. (2014) and Halac et al. (forthcoming)
study innovation contest design, which includes both award structures and information dis-
closure policies. Their models are also output oriented. However, contrasting to my setting,
they model an innovation process as a repeated costly sampling process with binary outcomes:
failure and success. Therefore, the organizers in their models care about the probability of
success rather than the value of the winning innovation. Another common trait in their mod-
els but not in my model is believe updating: There is uncertainty about the environment
and agents update their beliefs about the environment over time through their past sampling
outcomes. If an organizer chooses to make intermediate outcomes public, each agent also
updates her belief through her opponents’ past sampling outcomes. They show that, among
all winner-takes-all contests, the public winner-takes-all contest elicits the highest probability
of obtaining an innovation to the organizer. However, the hidden equal sharing rule may be
even better for the organizer. On the one hand, I also find, in my winner-takes-all model,
that full information disclosure induces a strictly higher expected revenue than full informa-
tion concealment. On the other hand, any hidden equal sharing rule, however, is outcome
equivalent to the winner-takes-all contest with full information concealment and thus elicits
a strictly lower expected revenue than the winner-takes-all contest with full information dis-
1The incentives for contestant to voluntarily reveal information is also investigated by Yildirim (2005), Gill
(2008), and Akcigit and Liu (2015).
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closure. Rieck (2010) investigates the organizer’s incentive to reveal each agent’s innovation
progress in the two-period case of Taylor’s (1995) multi-period repeated sampling model. He
shows that revealing intermediate outcomes would lower the organizer’s expected revenue but
increase the agents’ expected payoff, totally contrasting to my results. This is due to the
finiteness and discreteness of his model.
4.1 The Model
In order to obtain an innovation, a risk neutral principal organizes a contest between two risk
neutral agents, Agent 1 and Agent 2. Time is continuous and runs from 0 to infinity. At every
instance t ≥ 0, each agent makes three decisions in the following order:
D1. Whether to continue searching for innovations.
D2. Whether to submit the best innovation discovery to the organizer.
When an agent searches actively, innovations privately arrive to this agent according to a
Poisson process with an arrival rate of λ. λ is publicly known, and I assume that λ > c to
ensure there is at least one participant. The types of innovations are drawn independently
from a distribution F , defined on (0, 1]. F is continuous and has a strictly positive density f
over the domain. The cost of conducting a search is c > 0 per unit of time for each agent.
Whether an agent is actively searching is not observable to her rival and the organizer.
For convenience, I say an agent is in a state a ∈ [0, 1] at time t if the type of the best
innovation she has discovered by time t is a, where a = 0 means that the agent has discovered
no innovation. Both agents start from state 0.
Each agent can make at most one submission.2 In particular, I say an agent chooses to
quit the contest if she submits a “type-0 innovation”. In this case, this previous one-time
submission assumption means that once she quits she can not re-enter the contest. The
contest ends when both agents have made a submission. When the contest ends, the agent
who submitted a better innovation wins a prize normalized to 1. If both agents quit, the prize
is reserved; otherwise, a tie between the two submissions is solved by a random allocation of
the prize with equal probabilities.
An innovation with a type a is worth v(a) to the organizer, and the organizer only needs
one innovation. v(a) is strictly increasing in a. Before the contest starts, the organizer has
to announce publicly and commit to one of the two disclosure policies: fully revealing (R) or
fully concealing (C) the information about the submissions of the agents. Under full revelation,
once the organizer receives a submission he reveals the information on the submission to the
2This assumption is without loss of generality and simplifies the analysis.
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public, and thus the public knows when and who has submitted what type of innovation or
has quit; under full concealment, the organizer reveals the information on the submissions
only when the game ends.
In detail, the model has the following timing:
1. The organizer publicly announces and commits to Policy R or Policy C.
2. Each agent decides on D1−D2 as described above, based on the information about the
opponent’s submission and her own state.
3. Once an agent has made submission, the organizer implements his commitment.
4. Once both agents have made a submission, the game ends and the agent who submitted
a better innovation wins the prize.
4.2 Results
In this part I solve the contest under the two disclosure policies and then compare the expected
revenues to the organizer across the two disclosure policies.
4.2.1 Contests with Full Disclosure
We first consider the case in which the organizer reveals the information a submission upon
receiving it. The solution concept I use here is the subgame perfect equilibrium. I focus on
symmetric (strategy) equilibrium.
Proposition 4.1. Under disclosure policy R, there is a symmetric equilibrium described as
below.3
i. On the equilibrium path:
a. Both agents continue searching if no one has submitted an innovation with a type
above F−1(1− cλ).
b. Once an agent discovers an innovation with a type above F−1(1 − cλ), this agent
stops searching and submits this innovation immediately.
c. An agent submits (or equivalently quits) immediately once the opponent has sub-
mitted an innovation with a type above F−1(1− cλ).
ii. Off the equilibrium path:
– If an agent’s opponent has submitted something with a type a below F−1(1− cλ), this
agent continues searching until finding an innovation with a type above a. Once she
finds such an innovation, she submits it immediately.
3Elements which are associated with zero probability events are ignored throughout the chapter.
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Each agent’s ex ante expected payoff in equilibrium is 0.
Proof. We prove this proposition by backward induction. I first argue for the off the equi-
librium path. Suppose an agent j’s opponent, agent i, submitted something with a type
ai < F
−1(1 − cλ). If agent j is in a state aj above ai, stopping searching and submitting the
innovation aj is a best response. If agent j is in a state below ai, her instantaneous gain from
continuing searching is
λ[1− F (ai)]− c > 0,
where λ[1− F (ai)] is the instantaneous rate of obtaining an innovation with a type above ai,
or say the instantaneous rate of winning. Therefore, agent j would continue searching until
reaching a state above ai.
Next, I argue for the on the equilibrium path. Suppose an agent j’s opponent, agent i,
submitted something with a type ai > F
−1(1 − cλ). For agent j, in a state aj < ai, stop
searching and submit aj is a best response, because the instantaneous gain from continuing
searching is
λ[1− F (ai)]− c < 0.
Then, given [i(c)], each agent who has discovered an innovation with a type above F−1(1−
c
λ) should submit it immediately so as to deter her opponent and win the contest.
Last, it is easy to verify that given [ii] and [i(c)]when no when no submission has been
made, it is optimal to continue searching until one agent reaches a state above F−1(1 − cλ).
Given that agent j plays the prescribed strategy, agent i can win the contest only if she is the
first to submit an innovation with a type above F−1(1− cλ). However, the instantaneous rate
of obtaining such innovation from searching is λ[1 − F (F−1(1 − cλ))], which equals to c. She
is indifferent between continuing search and not. Hence, continuing searching until one agent
reaches a state above F−1(1 − cλ) is a best response. To this point, I have shown that the
prescribed strategy profile is a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Additionally, I can also show that, given [ii] and [i(c)], in a symmetric equilibrium, no
agent would like to submit an innovation with a type below F−1(1 − cλ). Suppose there is a
none-zero probability event that an agent submits an innovation with a type below F−1(1− cλ).
I argue that when no submission has been made and the event has not happened, an agent in
a state below F−1(1− cλ) strictly prefers continuing searching to stopping searching. Suppose
agent i is in a state below F−1(1 − cλ). If she makes a submission, by [ii], she will lose the
contest for sure, obtaining an expected continuation payoff of 0. However, if she continues
searching, she can obtain a strictly positive continuation payoff: At any instance, she has a
rate of c to obtain an innovation with a type above F−1(1 − cλ) to win the contest; there is
also a positive probability that agent j submits an innovation with a type below F−1(1− cλ),
in which case, by [ii], agent i can obtain a strictly positive continuation payoff.
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In equilibrium, an agent’s instantaneous payoff is always 0, and thus her ex ante expected
payoff is also 0.
In fact, under policy R the contest turns to be a war of attrition. Both agents continue
investing until eventually one agent gets into a high state and the other agent gives up. It
then is natural that each agent obtains an ex ante expected payoff of zero.
Remark. 1. There are many other outcome equivalent equilibria.4 I choose a most fast-
ended equilibrium, in which there is no lag between stopping searching and making a
submission, because this is robust to small perturbations on the setting. Adding a discount
rate and a small reward for quiting the contest, this equilibrium would be the unique
equilibrium.
2. The setting with full disclosure is equivalent to award the prize to the agent who is the
first to submit an innovation with a type above F−1(1− cλ).5
4.2.2 Contests with Full Concealment
Next, I analyze the case in which the organizer conceals the information about the first sub-
mission. This is, however, effectively the same as the model of Taylor (1995) in the case that
the deadline approaches infinity. In both models each agent’s searching and submission deci-
sions and searching outcomes are privately known. If the deadline in the Taylor’s model goes
to infinity, the contest effectively ends when both agents stop searching, which is exactly the
case here. Hence, the solution my model should coincide with the solution to the continuous
time version of Taylor’s model (see Chapter 1). Same as these two mentioned papers, I only
consider constant cut-off equilibrium.6,7
Proposition 4.2. Suppose the organizer commits to policy C.
i. If c < λ2 , there is an equilibrium, in which each agent continue searching with F
−1(1− 2cλ )
as the cut-off and submits the innovation once she stops searching.
ii. If c > λ2 , there are two equilibria, in each of which one agent does not search and the
other agent searches with F−1(1− 2cλ ) as the cut-off and submits the innovation once she
stops searching.
Proof. See Theorem 1.1 of Chapter 1 and take the limit of the deadline in the benchmark
model to be infinity.
4For example, another equilibrium would be the above equilibrium strategy profile with a modification on
i(c): An agent quits some time after the opponent has submitted an innovation with a type above F−1(1− c
λ
).
5There are many outcome equivalent designs for the contest. My focus is on information disclosure policies.
6A cut-off is a value of an agent’s state, above which this agent stops searching and at or below which she
continues searching.
7Same as in before, I select the most fast-ended equilibrium (or equilibria).
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Lemma 4.1. Suppose the organizer commits to policy C.
i If c < λ2 , each agent’s ex ante expected payoff is 0.
ii If c > λ2 , in an equilibrium, the agents who searches has an ex ante expected payoff of
1− cλ and the other agent has an ex ante expected payoff of 0.
Proof. See Lemma 1.2 of Chapter 1 for [i]. For [ii], the firm who searches wins the contest
with a probability of 1, and thus her expected duration of search is 1λ . Therefore, her expected
payoff is 1− cλ . The other agent does not search, and thus obtains a payoff of 0.
Remark. Another realistic disclosure policy is partial revealing (P), in which it is publicly
known whether an agent has submitted an innovation or not, but type of any submitted inno-
vation is not. One can easily verify that all equilirbia under policy R and policy C are equilibria
under policy P.
4.2.3 Comparison across Disclosure Policies
Under policy R, there is only one effective submission in equilibrium, because the other agent
quits. The effective submission is of an innovation with a type above F−1(1− cλ). Under policy
C, if c > λ2 there is also only one submission, but the submission could be an innovation with
a type below F−1(1− cλ). Hence, for c > λ2 , policy R elicits a higher expected revenue to the
organizer.
However, if c < λ2 there are two effective submissions in equilibrium. Although both
submitted innovations are of types only above F−1(1− 2cλ ), only the better submission matters
to the organizer. It is thus not straightforward which disclosure policy is better for the
organizer in this case, one submission above a higher cut-off or two submissions above a lower
cut-off. A comparison of the ex ante expected revenues for the organizer across the two
disclosure policies shows that policy R elicits a strictly higher expected revenue than policy C
does.
Theorem 4.1. The contest organizer strictly prefers policy R to policy C.
Proof. The case that c > λ2 is argues as above, I only need to show for the case that c <
λ
2 .
Under policy R, the expected revenue for the organizer is the expected revenue a submission
can generate conditional on the type of the submitted innovation is higher than F−1(1− cλ),∫ 1
F−1(1− c
λ
)
f(a)
1− F (F−1(1− cλ))
· v(a)da.
Under policy C, in the case when there are two submissions, the expected revenue is the
expected value of the better submission conditional on the types of both submitted innovations
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are higher than F−1(1− 2cλ ),∫ 1
F−1(1− 2c
λ
)
2f(a)F (a)
1− [F (F−1(1− 2cλ ))]2
· v(a)da.
To prove that policy R elicits a higher revenue than C does to the organizer, it is sufficient to
show that, the distribution of the winning innovation type under policy R first order stochastic
dominates the one under policy C. Let us defineGD : [F−1(1−2cλ ), 1]→ [0, 1] as the distribution
under policy D ∈ {R,C}. For a ∈ [F−1(1− 2cλ ), F−1(1− cλ)],
GR(a) = 0 ≤ F
2(a)− [F (F−1(1− 2cλ ))]2
1− [F (F−1(1− 2cλ ))]2
= GC(a).
For a ∈ (F−1(1− cλ), 1],
GR(a)
GC(a)
=
F (a)− F (F−1(1− cλ))
1− F (F−1(1− cλ))
/
F 2(a)− [F (F−1(1− 2cλ ))]2
1− [F (F−1(1− 2cλ ))]2
=
F (a)− (1− cλ)
c
λ
/
F 2(a)− (1− 2cλ )2
1− (1− 2cλ )2
=
F (a)− (1− cλ)
c
λ
/
F 2(a)− (1− 2cλ )2
2c
λ (2− 2cλ )
=
4[F (a)− (1− cλ)](1− cλ)
F 2(a)− (1− 2cλ )2
=
F 2(a)− [2(1− cλ)− F (a)]2
F 2(a)− (1− 2cλ )2
=
F 2(a)− [(2− F (a)− 2cλ )]2
F 2(a)− (1− 2cλ )2
≤ 1 (= 1 iff a = 1).
Hence, the desired result derives.
As what is shown in the proof, although there could be two submissions in the equilibrium
under policy C, the probability of obtaining a good submission is lower than that under policy
R, whatever the distribution of innovation types is.
Though the organizer prefers policy R to policy C, the agents’ preferences have two pos-
sibilities. If search cost is below λ2 , agents are indifferent between the two policies. As shown
previously, each agent obtains an ex ante expected payoff of 0 under either disclosure policy
in this case. If search cost is above λ2 , then the agents prefer policy C to policy R, as under
policy C each of them has some probability to be the single player in the contest and thus can
obtain a positive expected payoff, whereas under policy R both of them obtain an expected
payoff of 0. Formally, I state the result as below.
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Corollary 4.1.
i. For c < λ2 , agents are indifferent between policy R and policy C.
ii. For c > λ2 , agents prefers policy C to policy R.
The next question is, which game is more efficient, or say, under which policy does the
contest ends quicker in expectation? The answer is unambiguous.
For search cost being below λ2 , under either policy, an agent obtains the prize with a
probability of 12 and an expected payoff of 0. Hence, each agent’s expected cost on search
is 12 , and the expected during of search is
1
2c under either disclosure policy. However, under
policy R agents stop searching at the same time, whereas under policy C agents stop searching
independently. The game ends when both agents stop searching. Therefore, expectedly, the
contest ends quicker under policy R in this case. For search cost being above λ2 , under policy
R the expected duration is still 12c , whereas under policy C it is
1
λ , a standard result from the
probability theory. Because 12c <
1
λ , the contest ends quicker under policy R in this case as
well. I formally state this result as below.
Corollary 4.2. The expected duration of the contest is shorter under disclosure policy R than
under policy C.
Hence, the organizer prefers policy R not only for that it elicits a higher expected revenue
but also that it is more efficient.
In contrast to my results, Rieck (2010) finds, in a multi-period model of Taylor (1995),
that revealing intermediate outcomes would, however, lower the organizer’s expected revenue
but increases the agents’ expected payoffs. This is because of the finiteness of the deadline
in his model. In a continuous time version of his model, taking the limit of the deadline
to be infinity, the equilibrium under information revealing policy actually coincides with the
equilibrium in my model.8
Halac et al. (forthcoming) builds a continuous time model in which sampling outcomes of
each agent are binary and beliefs about the state of the world are updated over time based
on the past sampling outcomes. They also find in their model that the public winner-takes-all
contest is optimal among all winner-takes-all contests. However, the hidden equal-sharing
contest may induce a higher probability of success than the public winner-takes-all contest.
In my setting, there is no belief updating. There could also be hidden equal-sharing rules:
ER: the prize is shared equally to both agents if both submitted innovations are above certain
8In the multi-period model of Rieck (2010), in the limit of the deadline being infinity, it is not an equilibrium
that both agents continue searching until one obtains an innovation with a type above a certain cut-off.
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cut-off and the prize is given to the agent who submitted a better innovation otherwise.9
However, unlike the finding of Halac et al. (forthcoming), in my setting any hidden equal-
sharing rule is strictly dominated by the winner-takes-all contest with policy R. In fact, I can
make the following claim.
Claim 4.1. Any hidden equal-sharing rule is outcome equivalent to the winner-takes-all contest
with policy C.
Proof. We first analyze the case that c < λ2 . If the cut-off set by the organizer is below or
equal to F−1(1 − 2cλ ), it is not effective, because no agent is going to search with that value
as the cut-off. The game is exactly the same as the winner-takes-all contest with policy C. If
the cut-off set by the organizer is above F−1(1− 2cλ ), the expected share of the prize an agent
can win is still 12 , same as that in the winner-takes-all contest with policy C, and thus both
agents will still search with F−1(1− 2cλ ) as the cut-off in equilibrium.
The analysis for the cases that c > λ2 is similar and thus is omitted.
In short, a hidden equal-sharing rule is just a modification of the winner-takes-all contest
with policy C. It merely changes the realized prize allocation but not the expected share of the
prize each agent will win, and thus it does not alter agents’ incentives for searching. Hence,
the competition strategy of each agent remains the same.
4.3 Concluding Remarks
In this study, I found that in innovation contests revealing information on contestants’ sub-
mitted innovations yields a higher expected revenue to the organizer and is more efficient than
concealing it until the end. However, contestants are indifferent between the two policies if the
search cost is low and prefer information concealment if the search cost is high. The results
can be extended to the cases with more than two agents (see the appendix). There are two
other possible extensions. One is on contests with asymmetric agents and the other is on con-
tests with a deadline.10 Unfortunately, due to lack of closed form equilibrium solutions, one
cannot make direct comparisons of the expected revenues across disclosure policies. Proper
methodologies have to be found. However, I conjecture that the main result holds in these
two extensions. Last, like in many studies on information disclosure, the organizer’s ability of
commitment is also an issue in my model. When announced to reveal information, the orga-
nizer may want to hide the information when he receives a submission so that the remaining
agent(s) may submit an even better innovation.
9One can also look at another rule, in which the prize is shared equally to agents who submitted innovations
above a certain cut-off and the prize is reserved otherwise.
10One can refer to Section 1.6 of Chapter 1 for the case with heterogeneous search costs.
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4.A Appendix
I discuss the extension to include N > 2 agents. In this extension, the main result still holds.
Under disclosure policy R, when there are more than 2 agents, there are uncountably many
symmetric equilibria. Some properties a (most fast-ended) symmetric strategy equilibrium has
to satisfy are describe below.
i. On the equilibrium path:
a. Before some agent submit an innovation with a type above or at F−1(1 − cλ), no
agent stops searching before she discovers an innovation.
b. Once an agent discovers an innovation with a type above F−1(1 − cλ), this agent
stops searching and submits this innovation immediately.
c. An agent stops searching and submits immediately once one of the opponent has
submitted an innovation with a type above F−1(1− cλ).
ii. Off the equilibrium path:
a. If N − 1 agents have submitted but no submission is of an innovation with a type
above F−1(1 − cλ), the last agent continues searching until finding an innovation
with a type above a. Once she finds such an innovation, she submits it immediately.
b. If N − 2 agents have submitted but no submission is of an innovation with a type
above F−1(1− cλ), the remaining 2 agents continue searching until one of them finds
an innovation with a type above a. Once an agent finds such an innovation, she
submits it immediately.
For example, suppose there are three agents. One equilibrium path can be like that: All
agents continue searching until some agent reaches a state above or at F−1(1− cλ) and makes
a submission, and then both other agents quit.
Some other symmetric equilibria paths can be like follows. At the beginning, each agent
continues searching with a˜ ∈ [0, F−1(1 − cλ)) as the cut-off. The first agent who discovers
an innovation with a type above this value submits it immediately. If the first submitted
innovation is with a type above F−1(1− cλ), all other agents quit and the contest ends. If the
first submitted innovation is with a type below F−1(1− cλ), the remaining two agents continue
searching until one agent reaches a state above or at F−1(1− cλ).
In brief, on an equilibrium path there must be at least two agents playing the war of
attrition. The distribution of the winning innovation type is the distribution of an innovation
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type conditional on it being above F−1(1 − cλ), i.e., GR(·), same as when there are only two
agents.
Under disclosure policy C, equilibrium strategies are also similar to the case when there
are two agents.
i. If c ∈ (0, λN ), there is a unique equilibrium, in which all agents continue searching with
F−1(1− Ncλ ) as the cut-off.
ii. If c ∈ ( λm , λm−1), m = 2, 3, ..., N , there are
(
N
N−m+1
)
equilibria, in each of which m − 1
agents search with 0 as the cut-off and the other agents do not search.
Hence, if c ∈ (0, λN ), the distribution of the winning innovation type is the distribution
of the first order statistic for a sample of N from the distribution of an innovation type
conditional on it being above F−1(1 − Ncλ ); if c ∈ ( λm , λm−1), m = 2, 3, ..., N , the distribution
of the winning innovation type is the distribution of the first order statistic for a sample of
m− 1 from the distribution F .
I can show that the main result still holds when there are N agents.
Claim 4.2. Given N > 2 agents, the contest organizer strictly prefers policy R to policy C.
Proof. It is sufficient to prove for the case that c ∈ (0, λN ). As what I do in the proof of
Theorem 4.1, I prove it by showing that the distribution of the winning innovation type under
policy R first order stochastic dominates that under policy C.
Let us define the the distribution of the winning innovation type under policy C by G˜C :
[F−1(1− Ncλ ), 1]→ [0, 1]. For a ∈ [F−1(1− Ncλ ), F−1(1− cλ)],
GR(a) = 0 ≤ F
N (a)− [F (F−1(1− 2cλ ))]N
1− [F (F−1(1− 2cλ ))]N
= G˜C(a).
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For a ∈ (F−1(1− cλ), 1],
GR(a)− G˜C(a) = F (a)− F (F
−1(1− cλ))
1− F (F−1(1− cλ))
− F
N (a)− [F (F−1(1− 2cλ ))]N
1− [F (F−1(1− 2cλ ))]N
=
[F (a)− (1− cλ)][1− (1− 2cλ )N ]− cλ [FN (a)− (1− 2cλ )N ]
c
λ [1− (1− 2cλ )N ]
=
[F (a)− (1− cλ)− F (a)(1− 2cλ )N + (1− 2cλ )N+1]− cλFN (a)− [ cλ(1− 2cλ )N ]
c
λ [1− (1− 2cλ )N ]
=
c
λ [1− FN (a)]− [1− (1− 2cλ )N ][1− F (a)]]
c
λ [1− (1− 2cλ )N ]
=
[1− F (a)]
[
c
λ
∑N−1
k=0 F
k(a)− Ncλ
∑N−1
k=0 (1− Ncλ )k
]
c
λ [1− (1− 2cλ )N ]
=
[1− F (a)]
[(∑N−1
k=0 F
k(a)−N
)
−∑N−1k=1 (1− Ncλ )k]
1− (1− 2cλ )N
≤ 0 (= 0 iff a = 1).
Hence, the desired result derives.
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